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INTRODUCTION
Russia, together with other countries of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS), has begun the transition to a market economy. This 
implies that the national economy must become incomparably more open than before 
in the sphere of international economic relations. It presents policy-makers with 
the crucial task of choosing an appropriate opening-up strategy. Judging from the 
controversy over the tactics chosen by the Yeltsin/Gaidar government for internal 
economic reforms, this can be expected to be a difficult problem involving, as 
before, many conflicting interests.
This thesis deals mainly with one aspect of opening up the Russian 
economy, namely, with policy toward foreign investment. Russian politicians need 
no persuading that foreign capital can play a very positive role in the 
renovation of the national economy. However, there is still a lot of confusion 
and uncertainty as regards both the practical ways of attracting foreign 
investment into the country and the capital entry management regulations. An 
observer may notice two prevalent conflicting attitudes on the part of 
politicians and their academic consultants. One group expresses apprehensions 
that, unless very elaborate policy measures are worked out, the massive 
unregulated inflow of foreign capital may result, in the prevailing erratic 
conditions, in loss of control over the most important and competitive national 
industries. The other group in contrast warns against dilatoriness in taking 
decisions and insists on a drastic laissez-faire approach towards economic
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reform. Both groups refer to the experience of other countries, international 
practice and modem economic and political theory. There is little evidence of 
any narrowing of the gap between the two opposed positions. Meanwhile, the 
situation in Russia and the CIS in general has been characterized, on the whole, 
by the absence or inadequacy of conceptual, legislative, institutional and 
material premises for foreign investment.
This study attempts to contribute to the discussion of conceptual 
grounds for a basic framework for a national policy toward foreign investment in 
an ex-Soviet type economy with a special emphasis on Russia. The study focuses on 
four critical aspects of the problem: how to identify those specificities of 
Russian economic development that require to be taken into account as the opening 
up strategy is worked out; what conceptual base is appropriate for Russian 
strategy toward foreign investment; what is the present investment climate in the 
country and how it may be improved; and what priorities should govern Russian 
policy in respect to foreign direct investment.
The aims of each chapter are explained further below. But first it is 
necessary to mention one of the main problems faced by a contemporary study of 
the transition period. It concerns the choice and quality of information sources. 
This thesis essentially discusses very recent developments: the establishment of 
a capital entry management system in a country in which such a system was 
practically non-existent only three or four years ago and in which, at present, 
it exists only in a rudimentary and varying form. The distance between events and 
their analysis in the present study often was so short that the author had no 
choice but to rely on daily newspapers and weekly and monthly journals. Thus, 
many sources for this thesis were foreign since the Russian academic press,
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especially periodicals, found itself, in 1992, in a severe publishing crisis 
following a dramatic increase in the price of paper and postal services. To take 
one example, at the moment of writing this introduction, in September 1992, only 
four issues (instead of nine) of the leading Russian economic journal Voprosy 
ekonomiki have found their way to subscribers thus presenting articles (and 
views) prepared for publication towards the end of 1991. Still another problem is 
the statistics. The point is that there seem to be no reliable official data 
concerning many aspects of Russian foreign economic relations including one of 
the most fundamental - the amount of foreign investment in the country. Soviet 
statistics were always infamous for being presented in a form almost impossible 
to understand. Russian statistics to date have maintained this defect. It is 
particularly difficult to make correct comparisons over time also because of the 
changes in the geography of the country. For this reason there was no possibility 
of quantifying long-term trends in foreign investment in modern Russia.
This study does not aim to produce yet another programme of economic 
reforms in post-communist Russia. It is written under the premise that market 
reform is the only plausible way toward the revival of the country. The whole 
burden of my argument, however, is that economic policy-making in Russia should 
be liberated as much as possible from any ideological dictat, no matter what is 
its theoretical base. It should be determined neither by the present 
oversimplified market orthodoxy, nor the old orthodoxy of economic planning. To 
tackle this matter, I start, in chapter one, by demonstrating that the conflict 
between "big bang" and gradualist approaches to economic reforms in Russia was 
principally of a political nature. The application of monetarist doctrine was not 
conditioned by the actual state of the national economy but rather by other, non­
economic, considerations. Meanwhile, the economic situation demanded a much more
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balanced approach. This was stipulated by the fact that seventy years of the 
Soviet regime had turned Russia’s economy into a very specific entity sharply 
diverging from the pattern developed in the non-communist world. Hence, the 
question of speed and measure has become central to the success of reforms. By 
stressing the importance of "pace and measure" I want to highlight the 
specificity of the transition in question: this is a transformation not to an 
adjacent but rather to an opposite state. In order to avoid the most negative 
consequences of the opening-up, it is necessary to address the Soviet economic 
mechanism as the starting point of the transition to the mechanism of 
international markets and then to evaluate the distance between them.
The problem of Russia and other ex-Soviet republics is not only a 
complete lack of experience with private ownership or market-based prices. No 
less important is the fact that, in the years of socialist planning, the economy 
was subordinated to a completely different logic of development. It has 
resulted, inter alia, in the creation of a number of built-in checks or barriers 
(Ol’sevich, 1991) insulating the economy as a whole as well as its separate 
sectors and enterprises from the rest of the world. I investigate three of these 
barriers, i.e., technological, structural and efficiency incompatibilities of 
domestic industries with the international market. This serves me to corroborate 
a hypothesis that in the long run economic degradation cannot be excluded as a 
possible outcome of hasty integration of former Soviet-type economies into the 
international market. Being the product of the Soviet economic system, the 
aforesaid barriers may fall only as the system’s legacy is disposed of. However, 
some forms of destruction may be productive, others not. There is already 
evidence to show that the task of preparing the economy to become a part of the 
modem international economic system cannot be entrusted to the market mechanism
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alone. The question therefore arises whether, in Russia, owing to its planning- 
days heritage and historical background, there is not a strong case for 
interventionism. Such interventionism in this thesis is described, following 
Richard Wade (1991), as the "new interventionism". Its important distinction is 
that it needs to be open to the feedback from the market so that state economic 
policy is subordinated to economic rationality rather than to political 
ambitions.
Regarding foreign investment, state policy is always and necessarily 
an important component of the environment for business which is yet to be 
synthesized. Searching for the guiding lines along which the synthesis will 
proceed, I attempt to propose, in chapter two, a conceptual framework for a 
national policy toward foreign investment. I start from two premises. One 
concerns what Drucker (1986) describes as the crisis of the modern "macroeconomic 
axiom”. The mainstream of economic theory traditionally considers the national 
economy, especially that of the large developed countries, to be autonomous and 
the unit of both economic analysis and economic policy while treating the 
international economy largely as a restraint and a limitation. This approach 
accounts only poorly, if at all, for the reciprocity of national economies. On 
the other hand, the "new" international political economy (Keohane and Nye, 1987; 
Nye, 1990; Strange, 1988a, 1988b; Vernon and Spar, 1988; Waltz, 1979) has been 
successful in demonstrating that the interdependence of nations is playing the 
role of the most influential single factor behind the changing profile of 
international relations, both political and economic.
This study shows that, for the purpose of economic policy-making, the 
conceptual notion of interdependence may be successfully interpreted in terms of
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national competitiveness theory. It is introduced in the thesis as an attempt to 
supply policy-makers in ex-Soviet republics with a conceptual method to evaluate 
short-term and medium-term economic policy against the background of the major 
tendencies of international economic development. The competitiveness in question 
is a much wider notion than just industrial competitiveness measured by the share 
of national firms in international trade. For the purpose of this research the 
term "national competitiveness” is defined as the ability to protect or pursue 
national social and economic interests in the situation of profound international 
interdependence. Clearly, the challenge presented by this task exceeds the scope 
of separate firms and industries. Recent developments in Russia, which caused 
mass impoverishment of the population, made me, in particular, raise the question 
of the human component of national competitiveness. I also explore whether the 
traditional measures of competitiveness like export quotas should be abandoned in 
favour of such indicators as per capita national income, the level of employment 
and quality-of-life indices.
This study puts into question the causal chain, more economic openness
- more competition - higher efficiency - increased competitiveness. But this 
chain does not allow for the fact that the opening up of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, taking into consideration its consequences for the modem 
international economic regime, creates a serious problem for the stability of the 
latter. Hence, it would be reasonable to expect that the main pillars and 
beneficiaries of this regime, the US, the EEC and Japan, would take measures to 
ensure that the integration of the ex-Soviet economy will proceed on terms worked 
out by the triad and favourable to it. To countervail this pressure an 
alternative scenario is proposed aimed at increasing national bargaining power by 
concentrating effort on identifying, preserving and reinforcing existing
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competitive advantages, and creating new ones already in the early stages of 
reforms.
Chapter three deals with Russia’s previous experience as a capital 
importing country. It is quite common that the pattern of newly industrialized 
countries is evaluated in the academic literature as particularly relevant to 
post-communist economic transition. However, Russia’s own economic history can 
prove to be no less instructive. At the turn of the century in terms of economic 
development Imperial Russia did something very similar to what South Korea or 
Taiwan did in the 1970s and 1980s. To an extent this was a result of very skilful 
foreign capital entry regulations practised by the tsarist government. It 
succeeded first in awakening the interest of foreign investors and later in 
extracting benefits from a massive inflow of foreign investment. Consequently, 
within only twenty years, Imperial Russia made great strides towards becoming a 
major industrialized country. It is particularly suggestive to look for an answer 
to one of the paradoxes of the first Russian industrialization, namely, the 
willingness of foreign capitalists to invest despite a not so favourable 
investment climate.
Chapter four examines the characteristics of the investment climate in 
Russia. Since "investment climate" is a very diversified notion, I concentrate on 
two of its most important aspects, political risk and policy risk. As regards the 
former, I intend to investigate in more detail government risk and the 
consequences, for the prospects of foreign investment, of post-communist 
nationalism and regionalism in the former USSR. An attempt will be made, based on 
the theory of rational government, to disclose the origins of what are claimed to 
be purely technocratic governments, a distinguishing feature of the majority of
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post-communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe. Nationalism and regionalism 
will be analyzed along the lines of "national frustration" theory (Knudsen, 1974) 
in order to establish whether the post-communist nationality issues present 
investors with an opportunity or a threat.
Policy risk in turn stems from uncertainties related to the dynamics of 
capital entry regulations. Hence the importance of revealing a tendency 
underlying the genesis of Russia’s capital entry management system (CEMS). This 
part of the thesis contains the analysis of relevant legislation and relates the 
attitude of the higher levels of policy to that of the lower levels which were 
very important under the Soviet system and still retain much of their power.
Chapter five continues the examination of the capital entry management 
system started in the previous chapter, but the emphasis is switched to a more 
widely defined CEMS. This is necessary to demonstrate that environment and 
incentives for investment, forming an integral part of the host-country economy, 
are to be created in a different way from those aimed at attracting enclave-type 
investment. The former incentives are largely identical with those that encourage 
domestic economic growth and rapid expansion of the private sector. Seen this 
way, any CEMS must include some elements of industrial and regional policy. As it 
is quite obvious that Russia will never get all the money it needs to renovate 
its economy through foreign investment, it is legitimate to raise the question of 
how to concentrate foreign resources into priority spheres.
The problems facing the Russian economy are characterized in this study 
as largely structural. Therefore an attempt will be made to identify some of the 
most urgent structural problems to be solved in the coming years and to analyse
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the role of foreign capital in resolving them. Therefore I focus on the 
development of natural resources, technological and environmental challenges, 
and the conversion of the defence industries.
Lastly, in chapter six, because this has been a subject of a major 
debate in Russia, I undertake a more detailed study of one of the prospective 
forms of foreign investment regulations, the creation of free economic zones in 
the territory of the ex-USSR. The chapter contains criticism of the official 
policy (more precisely, of its absence) in respect to the zones. It also 
addresses itself to the phenomenon of free export promoting zones with a view to 
assessing the relevance of this type of economic zone, quite wide-spread in 
developing countries, to the needs of Russian economic restructuring.
Some concluding remarks summarize the main findings and limitations of 
this research.

1 THE CHALLENGES OF POST-COMMUNIST TRANSITION
1.1. The Basic Approaches Conflict
The ex-Soviet economy at the beginning of the 1990s entered into the 
deepest crisis in its post-war history. Some interpreted its disastrous 
performance as an inevitable price of change. Others, however, claimed that there 
was no evidence of structural change; that the economy simply risked 
degeneration, and that it had lost its way on the path of transition.
After six years of frustrated attempts at increasing economic 
efficiency without sacrificing the basic principles of a command-administrative 
system, reforms have taken a drastic turn towards radicalism. The destination of 
the transition has been defined more clearly. From the famous "500 days" program 
to Yavlinski’s draft of a treaty on common economic space, to the economic 
program of the Cabinet of President Yeltsin, the projects of economic reform more 
and more explicitly advocated the change from an economy owned and managed by the 
state to a market driven economy imitating the most daring models of neo­
classical economics. In general terms, it was going to be a system in which 
private property had priority over all other forms of ownership, market forces 
were given an upper hand in defining the shape of the economy, and the national 
economy was wide open towards international market.
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In academic and political circles, indeed in all the strata of the 
society, there has been major debate and uncertainty with respect to the scheme 
and many of its details, especially as regards the economic role of the state and 
its welfare polity. But that could not deter the process of reforms anymore.
With the points of departure and arrival identified as non-market and 
market systems, the problem of transition lies in the task of determining their 
reciprocal positions and finding the optimal passage. For this end it is 
necessary to know how much of a difference there is between the two economic 
systems; how easily can this difference be overcome, and in what a time.
This set of questions is the crux of a great controversy. Basically, 
there are two approaches. One claims that the case of the Soviet Union is unique 
and demands specific tailor-made measures. The other stresses the validity of the 
experience accumulated by the variation of countries which have undergone 
economic restructuring; the general validity of modern neo-classical economic 
theory, and also of the standard package of "structural adjustment" 
recommendations developed by international financial organizations.
Initially the dividing line between the two approaches practically 
coincided with the border-line of the country. A clear example was the 
fundamental multivolume report A Study on Soviet Economy (1991) prepared by the 
IMF, the World Bank, the OECD, and the EBRD, and the reaction it provoked in 
academic circles in Moscow. Giving praise to the objectiveness and the 
thoroughness of the authors of the report, experts of two leading economic 
institutes of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR were unanimous in noting its
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"cognitive, analytical rather than practical value" . All objections summarized, 
the practical value of the report was dismissed on the grounds that it did not 
account for the principal differences between the content of monetary, budgetary, 
credit and other relations in the Soviet economy and a capitalist economy. Hence, 
the recommendations of the report, quite predictably biased towards exactly 
monetary, budgetary and credit instruments, were found inadequate for a situation 
in which the market was both underdeveloped and overmonopolized, the production 
of consumer goods was marginal in comparison to the output of heavy industries, 
the weight of a military-industrial complex-was enormous, agriculture was in a 
deep structural crisis and the population was poor. The "program of the four" was 
criticized as too radical and painful, as putting to much emphasis on purely 
market measures whilst the specifics of the Soviet system and the necessity to 
preserve the integrity of the economy required gradualness and the preservation 
of the elements of the centrally planned system at least in the initial stages of 
transition.
Within only one year the situation had changed dramatically. First, 
numerous independent economic centers (former Soviet republics which became 
sovereign states) have emerged with their own nationally colored approaches to 
reforms. Second, in the biggest and most powerful of republics, Russia, some of 
the most questionable proposals of a radical agenda have materialized into the 
governmental policy of free-market "shock" therapy.
This latter development, important as it is, does not signify that one 
concept has surpassed the other by the strength of its argument. The events in
1. For the discussion on the condensed version of the Study, the so-called "report of the 
four", see Voprosy economlkl, 1991, No.4, pp.37-47; No.5, pp.3-27.
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Russia have confirmed what was noticeable initially in the ex-socialist countries 
of Central Europe: in practical terms the choice between the two approaches is 
determined in the long run by the balance of political forces. The new political 
leadership which attained power in the course of struggle against established 
political structures opted for drastic economic changes in the view that they 
must even further undermine the positions of old state-party apparatus in the 
society.
One should not disregard either the importance of the fact that 
financial aid from the OECD countries to ex-Soviet economies is made conditional 
on the choice of the strategy of transition. The interaction of this 
circumstances made Russia, in terms of a regime theory, a policy-taker strongly 
influenced by external forces.
As Yeltsin s administration chose to apply shock therapy to the economy 
of the country, in the Russian literature the two approaches to reform described 
above started to be more and more often characterized as evolutionary and 
radical. The shift of emphasis, however, seemed to be determined by political 
considerations more than anything else. In analytic terms it is misleading 
because contributes to illusions which might have truly damaging consequences for 
the strategy of national economic development.
(1) The term marketization often used in connection with economic reforms in the 
ex-socialist countries obscures the essence of the process. The passage to be 
effectuated by post-communist economies is not a leap from a non-market to a 
market condition but rather a shift from an inefficient, distorted and suppressed 
market to an efficient one. In other words, the problem is to "get prices right", 
not just to liberate them from state dictate which was the hard core of all shock
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therapies ever prescribed. As the experience of several centuries of capitalism 
shows, there are so many other factors besides government intervention that 
distort prices, that getting prices right has inevitably become an endless 
process deeply interrelated with other circumstances. The impression that this 
type of qualitative transition could be made in one great bound is an illusion, 
hence even the most radical approach cannot avoid a good portion of evolutionism.
(2) The propaganda of shock therapy implies the presence of a free market "in 
general" and a market economy "in general". In practice these are unreal 
conditions. There may be a "wild" market of the period of the initial 
accumulation of capital. This was surpassed in western industrialized countries 
long ago but is still possible for Russia. There may be a "civilized" market. The 
market economy may be an attribute of a depended and exploited country, and it 
may be a basis for an economy with a high competitive potential. Hence the goal 
should be to create an efficient modem market economy, not just any market 
economy. Shock therapy may or may not be instrumental in constructing the basics 
of modem market structures. It certainly does not exhaust the spectrum of 
economic strategies which represent the social function of the modem state.
(3) The opposition of radical to evolutionary change builds an illusion that old 
structures may simply be disposed of by dismantling them. This amends to nihilism 
with respect to everything that bears the stamp of a pre-free-market period. In 
turn this impoverishes and narrows the choice of strategies, allows short-term 
gains to overshadow longer-term priorities.
The discussion on the two approaches to economic transition initially 
focused on confronting "tailor-made" to "standard" reform packages. This came to 
be reformulated in terms of radicalism-versus-evolutionism (or even 
conservatism). The issues concerning the speed of reforms and the hardships of
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change have overshadowed the principal question of the origins of the "standard" 
package, and why international financial organizations are so much obsessed with 
promoting it.
The answer hinges on what Robert W. Cox (1991, p.335) has specified as 
a powerful globalizing economic trend towards the achievement of a market utopia 
on the world scale. This trend is based on the internationalization of production 
by transnational corporations. The internationalizing process results when 
capital considers the productive resources of the world as a whole and locates 
elements of complex-globalized production systems at points of greatest cost 
advantage. Hence, transnational production, on which the prosperity of western 
capitalism is based, requires an environment in which (a) capital, technology, 
and inputs in the production process, as well as finished goods, could cross 
boarders relatively freely; (b) business conditions (the price system, property 
rights, taxes, market organization, employment norms, etc) are standardized 
worldwide in order to relieve the management of transnational complexes and to 
facilitate the collection of information on costs and revenues necessary to 
combine these complexes in an optimal manner. The formula of the free market is a 
very convenient ideology for pushing forward such a standardization. Agencies 
such as the IMF and the OECD act as transmission belts for the world economy. In 
relations with the countries of the "second world" and "third world", their 
priority is to contribute to the creation of this unified environment; national 
welfare and social policies are consigned to the background. As for the World 
Bank, it focused its efforts towards the regions of "absolute poverty" in order 
to, turning to Cox once again, prevent poverty somewhere from becoming disruptive 
of growth elsewhere.
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There is yet another important feature to distinguish the two 
approaches. Shock therapy derives from the philosophy that puts trust in the 
separation of state and economy, while the rival agenda reasserts the recognition 
of the indispensible guiding role of the state in the development of the nation’s 
productive forces. Shock therapy is an export adaptation of the much publicized 
hyper-liberal model of Anglo-American capitalism of late . In social aspect, it 
generally relies on confrontational tactics. The post-War economic reconstruction 
of Europe and Japan - the much quoted example of a successful large scale 
transition - was achieved, however, along the lines of Keynesian model through 
conscious industrial policy and consensus-based tactics.
This dissertation is devoted to the problem of opening the economies of 
Russia and other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to 
foreign capital. In this realm the competition of the two approaches is 
especially fierce. Given the disastrous economic situation, inadequate capital 
base and slow privatisation, for many providing freedom for foreign direct 
investment seem a ready-made answer to the economic difficulties of the country. 
Professor Hans Hirsch from the Institut für Wirtschaftwissenschaften TH Aachen, 
for instance, claims that Russian industry cannot be reorganized successfully 
unless it is managed and owned by foreign capital (Izvestia, April 13, 1992,
2. It Is not without Irony that In the United States where the Bush Administration, with 
Its free-market orientation, for years publicly opposed a collaboration between the 
Government and the private sector, the developments In the Commonwealth of Independent 
States urged a noticeable change in policy. Seeking to give the United States a leading 
role in shaping the Commonwealth transition to capitalism, the Bush AdmlnistraUon has 
patently supported Federal guarantees for prlvate-sector investments. Moreover, by doing 
this it fueled a debate over the need for a more comprehensive naUonal industrial policy, 
one that would explore other areas that could benefit from Government help and presumably 
rank them by importance.
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p. 7). One should not be prejudiced against foreign control of enterprises, Hirsch 
continues, as long as they function efficiently.
In our cosmopolitan age this point of view is no more extravagant than 
any other. Harvard economist Robert B. Reich practically shares this approach to 
the question of control. In several articles and a new book, The Work of Nations, 
he drives home the argument that the prosperity of America depends less on the 
strength of American companies than on the strength of the economic activities 
located within the US borders. But the question of control over the economy 
cannot be dismissed merely by assumption. Even ignoring national defence, there 
are still many good reasons to believe that control matters. National markets, 
despite the process of globalization, remain highly regulated. As professor Laura 
D’Andrea Tyson (1991) notes in her critique of Reich, it is premature to rely on 
market forces to bring high-wage jobs to American shores. This is no less true of 
any other country.
Nowadays, concerns related to the issue of foreign control concentrate 
in particular on two points. First, it is usually stressed that the efficiency of 
a foreign owned firm in market (money) terms is not the same as its efficiency in 
the terms of public welfare. The economic success of such firms is measured 
according to the global interests of power centers controlling them which may or 
may not coincide with the economic interests of the host country. The second 
point has to do with the task of shaping the structure of the national economy. 
The most important question is, if foreign companies are in charge, will their 
investment polity assist national industries to gain place among major players 
dominating the technological race, or, on the contrary, will these industries be 
reduced to the role of simple recipients of technology developed elsewhere.
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Apprehensions on this account are not all groundless. According to John Dunning, 
a scholar who has done extensive research on multinationals, outside their 
domestic environments, global companies mainly produce goods and services, not 
innovation.
1.2. Defining the Capital Entry Management System
It is probably impossible to find a publication on foreign investment 
which would put in question the significance of the business environment, or the 
investment climate, as a premise for foreign investment. The literature is by far 
less unanimous as to the role of the state. It is quite often ignored that the 
investment climate always assumes the economic presence, in one form or another, 
of the state and, hence, the existence of what may be called a capital entry 
management system. Major progress in employing foreign capital in the interests 
of economic reforms in Russia may be achieved if sporadic regulatory efforts of 
the government give place to a comprehensive program of action which will not 
confine itself to emergency measures to eliminate current bottlenecks but, 
instead, will concentrate on a framework for foreign participation on a long-term 
basis by means of improving the country’s investment climate, and establishing an 
efficient capital entry management system.
In general terms the category investment climate is well described in 
the literature. Nonetheless, it is scarcely elaborated with respect to the ex- 
Soviet Union despite the fact that the importance of this issue goes far beyond 
the boundaries of purely theoretical interest. It has practical significance for 
working out regulations and policies concerning foreign capital in as much as it
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helps to determine priorities within which international investors act and, on 
this basis, to optimize national strategy towards them.
The "investment climate" is a multiple category encompassing everything 
that foreign investors takes into consideration when evaluating to what extent 
conditions in a particular country favor capital investment, including the 
economy and culture, ideology and politics. In the course of analysis they seek 
to use this heterogeneous input for calculating a generalized index-of investment 
risk. When the investment climate is bad, capital exporters estimate their risk 
as high and the cost of attracting investment for the capital importing economy 
increases. Hence, for the recipient countiy, the investment climate is not an 
abstraction, it is something that has value, and the country may gain or lose 
wealth according to how the state of the investment climate determines the 
efficacy of foreign investment.
Modelling the investment climate should become an important stage in 
developing a well-founded strategy of international economic relations. First of 
all, it provides a systematic knowledge of the factors influencing foreign 
investors’ decision-making. Second, it gives a new reference point to evaluate 
the economic situation in the country. Finally, it helps clarify the motives 
which drive foreign partners. At any given moment, the investment climate is an 
objective parameter as long as it is related to an actual socio-economic
situation in the country. Yet, at the same time, it is subjective because it is
always an interpretation of this situation by foreign investors in terms of 
efficiency of their investment. In any case, state regulations are important for
shaping this notion, whether they are consciously aimed at forming a particular
business environment or were contemplated without taking into account possible
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outcomes for foreign ventures. Even the inertia of the authorities is already a 
factor forming the investment climate. From this point of view one may claim that 
any country open for foreign capital possesses a certain capital entry management 
system (CCEMS) referring to legislation and institutions, implementing state 
policy with respect to investment from abroad, or their absence. The entry 
management system may be defined as that system consisted of public and semi- 
public agencies, laws, regulations, and programs established by host country 
authorities to both regulate and facilitate the entry and subsequent operations 
of investment and business ventures of foreign firms (Ting, 1988, p.67).
The CEMS and the investment climate interact. The CEMS makes a 
component of the investment climate and simultaneously, to a certain extant, it 
is an external factor able to rearrange this climate. As logical categories, the 
CEMS and the investment climate cannot coincide absolutely not only because the 
latter is broader than the former but also owing to the fact that the CEMS 
represents the recipient side concept of how to channel foreign capital in 
accordance with national priorities, while the "investment climate" evaluates the 
economic situation in terms of maximizing premises for the increase of the 
profitableness of investment.
In fact, the entry management system may be justly regarded as an 
important form of communication. It passes signals to and receive signals from 
the world investment market and, on this basis, is a tool of adjusting investment 
conditions both to national interests and to certain established international 
standards. This communicational aspect of the CEMS may be particularly trying for 
ex-socialist economies which lack this sort of experience. The theory of 
interpersonal com m unication opens a gateway for success: it is in seeing the
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expressed idea and attitude from the other person’s point of view, achieving his 
or hers frame of references about the subject being discussed. The lesson to be 
drawn from this recommendation in terms of international investment relations is 
evident : modelling of the investment climate is indispensible when working out 
the outlines for the entry management system. The second postulate of the 
communicational theory is no less relevant: the communicational message must be 
expressed in a clear form, or in other words, regulations should be transparent 
and self-explanatory.
The CEMS may form itself without a previous plan being a result of 
nonco-ordinated actions which have affected in some way or other the 
international economic relations of the countiy in question. This is how it has 
been built in those countries in which the process of integration in the 
international markets was stretched across time and how it is being built in some 
others which are in the initial stages of integration into the world markets and 
are still uncertain about it, with Russia being one of them.
Countries which staked their fortune on export-led growth followed a 
different scenario according to which, from the start, the CEMS is contemplated 
as a complex-of interrelated measures including the formation of a necessary 
institutional structure up to a specialized state body responsible for foreign 
investment. Of the OECD countries, none, excluding Greece, reported incentive 
measures specifically intended for foreign enterprises. But, as the experts of 
the OECD conclude, the international promotional activities of most member 
countries indicate that foreign investors are targets of certain programs which 
aim at substituting foreign ventures for domestic firms when they are in no 
position to carry out the desired investment themselves (OECD, 1983, p. 17).
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In the economic literature the elements of the CEMS used to be 
classified as positive and negative. The first group usually includes tax 
incentives, tariff concessions, locational incentives, export processing zones, 
non-expropriational guaranties, favored repatriation, one-stop approval, etc. 
Ownership restrictions, repatriation restrictions, local content requirements, 
price controls, export ratio requirements, bureaucratic red-tape, lack of patent 
and trade-mark protection together with some other restrictions form the second 
group. This grouping, however, appears to be somewhat biased: it explicitly 
relies on the increase in the revenue of foreign investors as a criterion for 
evaluating the entry management system. If this logic is to be followed, the 
optimal CEMS should be the one that vigorously plays into the hand of foreign 
investors. In reality, no government wishing to retain public support can agree 
to identify national interests with the interests of international investors no 
matter how strongly it is committed to the principles of economic openness.
"Negative" or restrictive elements are an organic component of an CEMS 
rather than a sign of its imperfection. It is not by chance that many writers 
investigating the implications of the business environment on foreign investment 
hold the same opinion as the authors of Developing with Foreign Investment who 
claim (1987, p. 10)
ITJhe policies that have had the greatest impact both in attracting FDI 
and ensuring high social returns to the host country are not special 
Incentives, but countries’ principal economic policies. Financial, fiscal 
and trade policies are by Car the most important.
The evidence of less developed countries shows that, where governments seek to 
boost import of capital, entry management systems tend to have typical teething 
diseases. The balance of interests in relations between investors and the host 
country is quite often distorted as authorities overshoot the mark in rendering
incentives and privileges for foreign owned ventures in hope to send a strong 
signal to the international business world that foreign capital and technology 
are welcome. In some cases this eagerness to attract foreign ventures breaks with 
economic rationality and proves to bring more disadvantages than otherwise.
Even if we put aside the fact that, by doing this, the host country 
deprives itself of legitimate income, it is not difficult to see that this 
approach is shortsighted also in the terms of establishing a favorable investment 
climate. If the purpose of the entry management system is to promote long-term 
and expanding relations between exporters and importers of capital, as it should 
be, than stability and mutual respect gain especial importance as features of the 
investment climate. Obvious disparity puts them at peril. This fact becomes ever 
more acknowledged. Commenting on treaties of investment (or treaties of 
establishment) often signed by governments of capital importing countries under 
the pressure of transnational corporations, Raymond Vernon (1985, p.91) makes the 
following remark
[Hllstory suggests that thefse) treaties are too Imbalanced to provide the 
basis for a durable regime; the rights and obllgaUons so obviously loaded 
against the host country as to be a target for any dissenting political 
force in the country.
At this point it is appropriate to stress once again that experts are quite 
unanimous in the opinion that sound economic interest and coherent economic 
policy could be more important to foreign investors than some privileges. Foreign 
direct investment continues to flow also to countries with rather a rigid regime 
for foreign-owned firms when regulations are stable and clear.
The above does not mean, of course, that incentives or privileges to 
foreign capital should be avoided. This is neither possible, nor desirable. Even
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if international corporations, in some cases, do not gain much by these measures, 
the very fact that the host country is willing to offer them is considered by 
potential investors as an important declaration of intentions promising a 
generally benevolent treatment of foreign capital. Nevertheless, a certain 
conflict of interests between the host country and transnational business is 
hardly avoidable. At the same time, feverish competition among borrowing 
countries in the world capital market plays a harmonization role: it remains a 
sellers market thus putting limits on the freedom of recipient countries to 
shape business relations with foreign investors. There is an evident tendency 
towards unification and standardization of regulating investment regimes.
Getting back to the two approaches to economic reforms, in the ex- 
Soviet republics reform-making radicalism and evolutionism are not necessarily 
antipodes. Of course, if radicalism is understood as disposition to hasty actions 
and evolutionism as a synonym for inertia, then the two cannot but be in 
contradiction. However, if radicalism instead is seen as the declaration of the 
resolution to achieve the result, i.e. the desired effect, not just any change in 
the state of affairs in comparison to the pre-reform period, in the shortest time 
possible though not at any cost, while evolutionism is regarded as something that 
stresses the values of continuity and discretion as factors reinforcing reforms, 
than the two approaches could successfully complement one another. This latter 
concept of the mutual complementariness of radicalism and evolutionism in 
contemplating economic reforms when applied to the realm of foreign investment in 
Russian economy, suggests, in my opinion, that designing the CEMS for Russia 
should have as its starting points the analysis of
- the particularities of the economic situation in the country;
- the modem theory of foreign investment;
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- Russia’s own experience in respect to foreign capital.
1.3. The Challenges of Speedy Integration
1.3.1. Systems Incompatibility
The emerging regime for foreign capital in Russia and other ex-Soviet 
republics cannot be investigated properly unless it is duly placed in the context 
of the general transition to an open economy which the CIS member-states are 
willing to undertake. It is indisputable indeed that, in order to succeed in 
restructuring, the economy of the Commonwealth must be much more open. The 
experts of the IMF, the World Bank, the EBRD, and the OECD, for example, in their 
already mentioned report on the Soviet economy practically put this point in the 
center of their concept of reform maintaining that
|i|t is ... essential to move as rapidly as possible to a transparent and 
decentralized trade and exchange rate system, in order to hasten the 
integraUon of the USSR into the world economy (The Economy of the USSR. 
1990, p. 17).
Otherwise, the report claims, the monopolism of producers, one of the most 
characteristic features of the Soviet economy, cannot be eliminated and, until 
prices are free to move in response to shifts in supply and demand, both domestic 
and external, markets cannot begin to develop.
The general logic of this reasoning raises no objections. Nonetheless 
one should not fail to note that the questions of speed and regulation are 
central to this problem. In fact, there is no guarantee that the consequences of 
a hasty integration of an economy producing twenty five million different 
products will limit themselves just to a destructive impact on monopolies. In 
order to estimate other possible outcomes as well, it is necessary once again to
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confront the Soviet economic mechanism as a starting-point of the transition to 
the mechanism of international markets and evaluate the distance between them.
The discrepancy between the two mechanisms was stipulated from outright
by a distinction in the forms of ownership. However, in the course of the
development of the socialist economic mechanism this discrepancy was consciously
drawn to extremes owing to two factors which had more to do with politics and
ideology than with the organic qualities of the economic system itself. The first
was that hyper centralism in political system - the foundation of Stalin’s regime
- could not be firm enough unless coupled with equally rigid centralism in
economy. The slogan "economic policy is the main policy of the Party" was used as
an ideological gimmick for designing and creating an economic mechanism non-
responsive to any input other than the directives of the central authorities. The
primitive and erroneous perception of socialism as a society which has to be in
every respect diametrically opposite to capitalism was the second factor. Instead
of being a successor to capitalism, as envisaged by Marx, Soviet socialism tried
to become its alternative. This perception spread and enforced itself in the late
20s early 30s as the expectation of the imminent world revolution had given way
to the comprehension that Soviet Russia was destined to remain, for some
considerable time at least, the only socialist state. This situation intensified
concerns on how to solidify the socialist identity of the Soviet society. Under
these conditions any possible similarity between socialist and capitalist
economic organization was rejected, on the words at least, as a concession to a
hostile capitalist environment. According to Richard Sakwa (1990, p.372)
Soviet-type systems were built on fairly simple premisses. A dominant 
Communist Party would guide political and Intellectual life. A strong 
state would eliminate private ownership of means of production and 
rationally plan and achieve society's development by concentrating all
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resources In its hands. Human resources would be mobilized on a grand
collective scale to achieve directed goals, and individual and collective
needs would be subordinated to the larger purpose.
Unlike many other important events in economic history, the moment of 
the shift of the Soviet economic mechanism from a model still compatible with 
what was conventional in the rest of the world to what later became a central 
planning model is well documented and may be defined with great precision. In 
July 1927, a decree was published considerably changing the basic law of 1923
concerning the status of enterprises. In the 1923 law it was stressed that
enterprises must "act on the principal of commercial calculation with the aim of 
deriving profit", whereas the new status of 1927 stated that enterprises "are 
administered by the State institution defined in the status and act on the basis 
of commercial principles in accordance with planned tasks which have been 
approved by the said State institution" [author’s emphasized] (translated in 
Baykov, 1950, p. 113).
The logic of constructing socialism in "one separate country" demanded 
a degree of political and economic isolation and shaped Soviet strategy towards 
international markets. The system of foreign economic contacts evolved in the 
USSR had a two-fold orientation: to protect the national economic system from 
whatever external signals interfering with the voluntarism of the command economy 
on the one hand and to compensate for the deficiencies of domestic production 
through imports on the other hand. The system evolved proved to be reliable and 
the Soviet Union, in the course of time, had got the economy with pretty strong 
autarkic momentum which remained to be significant also since the creation of the 
CMEA in as much as this integrational organization followed, yet on a larger
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scale, a traditional "two systems - two worlds" approach to international 
economy.
Today, this highly specific economy is proposed to be promptly 
integrated into the world economy. The aim cannot be in question. Yet policy­
makers must be fully aware of the obstacles awaiting the country on this path, as 
well as of the additional costs the opening-up is likely to impose on the economy 
and decide on the pace of a reform and measures necessary to minimize its burden.
1.3.2. An "Open Economy" Concept
Since reform is often described in the terms of a transition from 
"closed" to "open" economy, it is important to be clear on the meaning of these 
concepts. Although the two words - open economy - are very common in modern 
economic discourse, there is still no unanimity as to what they really mean.
General convention is that they should be applied to an economy with 
considerable foreign exposure. Most often an international trade criterion is 
used as a corner-stone. In this case an export volume/GNP ratio, a so-called 
export quota, is utilized to measure the rate of openness of the national 
economy. It seems, however, that this indicator, used rigorously, could be valid
3
only for qualified purposes . With the export quota of less than ten per cent,
3. The shortcomings of this measurement are widely acknowledged In the economic 
literature. P.Buomberger (1979) proposed to use two indexes Instead, one based on the 
export quota, the other on a capital quota calculated as a ratio of capital inflow (or 
outflow) to GNP. V. Sokolov and Iy. Schlschkov (1990) introduced a coefficient incorporating 
basic items of a balance-of-payments 0={1/2(A+B+C)*100}/GNP; where A - the volume of 
foreign trade; B - the value of services exported and Imported; C - the aggregate of long­
term capital flow in and out off a country during one year. The UN-calculated index 
reflects both foreign trade and services turnover.
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in 1989, the USA would have a very modest performance as an "open economy", 
especially in comparison with countries such as Belgium and Switzerland, or, for 
example, Ireland in which this ratio, in 1989, was 70 per cent (European Economy, 
November 1989, p.252). But with the United States expelled from the ranks of open 
economies, one would unjustifiably narrow the range of plausible explanations for 
vigorous trade wars in which the US has been almost constantly engaged during the 
last two decades, as well as for the fact that the USA has been the driving force 
behind the GATT ever since its foundation.
It is reasonable, therefore, to apply to the term "openness" to 
describe the situation when there are clear signs, together with or despite the 
export share, that economic stability and well-being of a country substantially 
depend on its international performance, and the economy itself is extensively 
exposed to international competition.
If the United States had ever been a "closed" economy, she definitely 
ceased to be so as long ago as she emerged, after World War I, with $10 billion 
in foreign loans worldwide. At present, the US, Great Britain to a larger extent 
and France, Germany to a lesser extent each have developed a "second economy" 
made up of the activities of their transnational corporations abroad. A study Is 
the US a spendthrift nation? by R.Lipsey and I.Kravis, two National Bureau of 
Economic Research experts, suggests that while the fraction of world markets held 
by US corporations exporting from the territory of the United States has steadily 
dropped during the last quarter of a century, such losses have been offset by the 
gains of American corporations exporting from other nations. The existence of 
"second economies" is just one argument favoring the claim that big
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industrialized countries are more open than country-by-country foreign trade 
figures might suggest.
In 1985, when the turnover of the Soviet foreign trade was the highest, 
it had never exceeded four per cent of the world trade though the volume of its 
GNP was about ten per cent of the world total. Since 1986, the figures of 
international trade of ex-Soviet economies had been progressively deteriorating 
to fall, by 1992, to 1979 level. Nonetheless, the opening-up of post Soviet 
economies, at least for the time being, is not so much about their export quotas 
as about disclosing their markets and their enterprises to the hazards of an 
alien economic environment.
The problem of Russia and other republics of the CIS is not only in 
their particularly distorted relative prices, a complete lack of experience of 
private ownership, little exposure to market system and unresolved constitutional 
questions. No less, if not more, important is that, in the years of socialist 
planning, the economy was subordinated to a completely different logic of 
development which had led to the creation of a number of in-built checks or 
barriers (Ol’sevich, 1991) insulating the economy as a whole as well as its 
separate sectors and enterprises from the rest of the world in a more profound 
manner than conventional tariff barriers and exchange regulation can provide. 
Some of the most important barriers are as follows.
32 Chapter 1. The Challenges of 'Post-communist Transition
1.4. Barriers to Integration
1.4.1. Technological Incompatibility
Domestic machinery and technologies are commonly generation(s) behind 
their state-of-the-art counterparts in the West. Usually, industrial and 
technological equipment produced in the country is heavier and less precise, 
consumes more energy than the models of foreign firms and - this is most crucial
- employs far fewer electronic devices, which raises the main obstacle to 
increasing its efficacy. In particular, minicomputerization has created a 
sizeable and growing technological gap favorable to the West. It also brought 
about the shift from the economies of scale of the Fordist-type production to the 
economies of flexibility of post-Fordism. Since, by design, the majority of the 
equipment produced in the CIS belongs to a pre-electronic era, it cannot be 
lifted to modern standards simply through refinement: a new state of 
technological quality must be reached first. Hence, engineering industry can 
hardly find export markets unless in some developing countries, but, quite 
obviously, this is equally true of other national industries as they depend on 
the input from the engineering industry. Even before having slid into its present 
depressive condition triggered by a general economic slump, mechanical 
engineering never contributed, sales to CMEA countries included, more than 15-16 
per cent (in monetary terms) to national export which was twice as little as the 
share of this industry in the total industrial output of the country, three times 
less than machine-building component in the exports of the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the US and two times less than an average index for the world 
(Voprosy ekonomiki, 1991, No 2, p. 105).
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Therefore, the future of this important industrial sector depends on 
how strong its positions in the internal market will be. On the one hand numerous 
prognoses predicting that domestic producers will be ousted by foreign 
competitors as soon as the access to the market of the CIS becomes unconditional 
seem to fail to recognize in full the degree of the qualitative integrity of the 
productive forces of the country. Engineering industry is not the only sector of 
the economy which is below world standards. Its performance corresponds to the 
average quality of labor, supplies, services and infrastructure in the country. 
The following extract from an interview with a ferro-alloy plant director is 
quite indicative. His enterprise is a very successful exporter and generates 
substantial earnings in foreign currency. Nonetheless, he opts for domestically 
produced plant:
(Ijt is designed to fit our workers; it is provided with spare parts and 
is easier in maintenance and. last but not least, it is from three to five
times cheaper than Western analogues even if calculations are made on the
basis of official exchange rate (EKO, No 1. 1992, p.33).
Backwardness as a common feature makes national industries more compatible with 
one another than with firms abroad thus leaving domestic producers at least a 
theoretical chance to retain a niche in the domestic market.
On the other hand, over the longer term, this chance is limited. It is 
based on a disadvantage, rather than on an advantage. It might help enterprises
sharing it stay afloat as long as they constituted mutually related entities. In
reality, this integrity is breaking together with the collapse of the Union 
state. In fact, the economy of the USSR - this is often overlooked - had become 
factually "open" as soon as it had disintegrated into the economies of sovereign 
republics. Each now is extensively exposed to influences by the other. In 1991, 
inter-republic trade involved about 20 per cent of their combined GNP; in the
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European Economic Community the figure was 14 per cent. The share of purchase of 
goods from other republics and abroad, in consumption, ranged from 16 per cent in 
Russia to 31 in Armenia. The share of sale of goods to other republics and 
abroad, in production, varied from eleven per cent in Russia and Kazakhstan to 27 
per cent in Azerbaijan (Ekonomika i zhizn\ February 11, 1992, No 6, p. 13). The 
ending of many traditional ties has put the industrial complex-of the CIS at the 
brink of paralysis. In the Russian economic literature this development is 
generally condemned as regressive and counterproductive, leading to catastrophic
4
consequences . At the same time, one can hardly come across an attempt to 
estimate what has happened from the point of view of modelling the situation of 
hasty integration in the world market. For enterprises, owning to the barrier of 
technological incompatibility, disintegrating effects will be even stronger. How 
many of them will have to be closed down in the absence of relevant regulations 
necessary to smooth the transition? No such calculations have ever been done, 
furthermore, they are hardly feasible5. Nevertheless, some conclusions may be 
deduced from the experience of restructuring in Central Europe.
4. Complex Industries with extensive vertical and horizontal Integration suffer most. 
Steel industry is an appropriate example. Before it represented a conglomerate of 
extractive and processing industrial subdivisions, unified In terms of the final 
production. The commanding posiUon In in this complex belongs to the production of ferrous 
metals. One of the most Important disUnguishing characteristics of Soviet ferrous metal 
production was its self-sufficiency in raw materials and a considerable usage of scrap as a 
replacement of pig iron. This latter fact makes collecting and rechanelllng scrap to 
metallurgical plants vitally important for the Industry. Separatism of ex Soviet republics 
undermined the traditional links of metal turnover and caused, in 1991, a decline In 
production equal to 22 per cent of the achieved level Uzvestta, April 22. 1992).
5. According to official statistics, in 1990, forty per cent of state enterprises were 
either money-losing or made minimal profit (Planovoe chozlatstvo. No 3, 1991, p.31). It 
would be wrong to deduce, however, that all these enterprises are first candidates for a 
close-down If markets are liberalized as many of them were consciously made profitless by 
plan assignments and others were vlcUms of a distorted price system.
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A recent MIT survey on the policy of German’s Treuhandanstalt, the 
agency in charge of privatisation of ex-socialist property, has found that up to 
70 per cent of the firms still on the Treuhand’s books (more than six thousand 
units) are not commercially viable because of low levels of productivity {The 
Economist, March 21st 1992, p.77). The agency can afford not shutting them down, 
though investment by domestic and foreign firms has so far fallen well short of 
expectations, only so long as it is heavily subsidized from the budget. In the 
meantime, the costs of the integration of East German industry, modem and 
efficient by CMEA standards, into the economy of the Federal Republic of Germany 
have proved unexpectedly high. In the territory of the former GDR, industrial 
production has fallen by one half of the 1985 level, the number of unemployed and 
short-time workers has reached 2,5 million (a third of the East Germany’s labour 
force). The IMF estimates that to reach the West German levels of productivity by 
2001 would require no less than one trillion dollar of investment in eastern 
Germany within ten years (The Economist, April 6th 1991, p.63). In 1992 alone, 
net transfers from Bonn to the east are expected to total about 112,5 billion US 
dollar (International Herald Tribune, April 8, 1992). These data put in question 
the reliability of the often quoted estimate of 20-25 billion dollar in foreign 
aid sufficient, according to Russian economists staying on the platform of the 
government , to give an impulse to restructuring of the ex-Soviet economy. Some 
experts claim that the cost of integration of East Germany’s economy is 
particularly high because of the irresistible pressure for wage convergence 
within a unified country. In other countries, in which workers cannot easily 
migrate from east to west, there would be no case of a drastic gap between 
productivity and wages, as in the east of Germany. Even allowing for this 
argument, the main lesson of the German experience which can be useful for the
6. See. for example. La República. 26 marzo 1992.
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republics of the CIS seem to be quite clear: either massive foreign financial 
support coupled with prudent and sophisticated governmental strategy, or the 
abyss of a national catastrophe.
1.4.2. Structural Incompatibility
The Soviet Union’s economy was a rare example of an industrial economy 
without revealed comparative advantages. The profile of its sectoral structure 
and the relative weight of different industries in the GNP was defined by the 
aspiration for self-sufficiency and the maintenances of military-strategic 
parity. Participation in the international division of labourplayed a supportive 
role and, in fact, was never based on anything like comparative advantages, as a 
dramatic gap between internal and world price systems made impossible any 
meaningful comparison. Foreign trade was a state monopoly completely controlled 
by the central authority. Export policy was subordinated to the needs of
7
industries using imports, hence, selling in world markets was mainly a means to 
pay the bill for imports.
The notorious dependence of Soviet export on the sales of oil, timber 
and some other non-manufactured goods (60 per cent of all exports) is more 
evidence of the specifics of the Soviet economic mechanism than of particular 
competitive strength in extracting, mining or other similar industries. In 
reality, Soviet policy-makers traditionally favored the export of machinery and 
equipment in comparison to other goods, also out of considerations of 
international prestige associated with the high level of machinery exports.
7. Though not solely of course: trade, especially In weapons and military hardware, as an 
instrument of political Influence was also important.
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However, the pursuit of this policy was continually frustrated: 
domestic manufacturers, being effectively isolated from competitive pressure as 
much as from the fruits of commercial success, refused to make the additional 
effort necessary to help their products penetrate foreign markets. Furthermore, 
they came to view foreign orders as undesirable. As early as 1959, by introducing 
special supplements to prices, the government launched what later became a long 
succession of export-stimulating measures. They never really worked. A former 
Deputy Minister ox' Foreign Trade of the USSR testifies:
We expected a flood of voluntary proposals after the Introduction of 
various additional incenUves in the late 60s but they resulted only in a few 
cases. The main cause of the problem Is the system of supply of industrial 
output in the country. The goods produced according to the plan are also sold 
according to the plan. As a rule, demand exceeds supply and any machine is 
accepted as long as it meets the minimal requirements of the 
buyer. ..(N.Smeliakov, trans. in The Impact of International Economic 
Disturbances on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, New York: Pergamon 
Press, 1980, p. 195).
In this context, a stress on the export of mineral resources was the easiest way 
out the government had at hand. Oil and gas were exported despite the fact that 
domestic demand for these products was not satisfied and the real cost of 
production was unreasonably high.
The economy of the CIS has inherited the structural defects of the 
Soviet economy. In the last twenty years, in the West the composition of 
industries has undergone profound changes. Labor, material and energy intensive 
industries have given way to technology and capital intensive production; the 
role of services has dramatically increased and their range expanded; front-line 
technology, modem infrastructure and managerial skill became major competitive 
advantages; knowledge has acquired the status of a leading export commodity.
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By contrast, in the CIS prime processing dominates industry; the 
relative weight of heavy industries is overwhelming and the per capita 
consumption of steel kept raising contrary to a world tendency; enterprises are 
orientated on the mass output of simple articles; services, both for firms and 
individuals, are scarce and of poor quality, many modern banking, insurance or 
financial products are simply unknown; infrastructure is obsolete; the degree of 
commercial utilization of the results of scientific research has been extremely 
low.
The logic of autarkic development has brought the industrial complex-of 
the CIS to the point where it can rely on no established niches in the world 
market and, in the terms of a structure, is lagging far behind other 
industrialized countries. This latter fact is especially alarming in view of a 
clear trend in the international economy towards building up an exclusive 
technological community of a few industrialized countries monopolizing research, 
development and innovation. The competitive gap between these and other countries 
is increasing. A new system of international division of labor, which will shape 
the distribution of wealth between countries in the foreseeable future, is under 
way. The CIS member-states may find themselves being backwashed by this process 
to the periphery of international economy. The disquieting signs are everywhere. 
For example, boasting a quarter of the world’s graduates, the Soviet Union, in 
the 1980s, managed to export patents and licenses averaging only 150-200 million 
dollars a year against 700 million dollars in Japan and eight billion dollars in 
the United States (Pravda, August 10, 1989). Furthermore, no leading industry of
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the country has a competitive advantage from pioneering technology to ease a
g
start out into the world market .
In this situation the speedy integration of the CIS into international 
markets will inevitably entail drastic restructuring of the economy. If firms are 
left to fend for themselves, it will mean the death of entire industries. At the 
same time, the accelerated pace of restructuring alone can provide no guarantee 
that the economy which will emerge will be something more than an off-shore 
assembly platform for transnational corporations, or an indigenous exporter of 
mineral resources, basic machinery and educated labor.
The "new" international economics, whilst not denying the importance of 
underlying differences among countries in shaping the positions of a national 
economy with respect to other economies, adds that much of international trade 
also reflects national advantages that are created by historical circumstances, 
and that then persist and grow because of other advantages to a large scale 
either in development or production. Paul Krugman (1990, p. 110) cites journalist 
James Fallows: "Countries that try to promote higher-value, higher-tech 
industries will eventually have more of them than countries that don’t", and then 
concludes:
Because comparative advantage is often created, not given, a temporary 
subsidy can lead to a permanent industry.
8. Military industries have considerable technological potenUal. In certain areas 
(metallurgy, composites, aeronautics) they hold leading positions in the world and surpass 
American and Japanese producers. However, the technologies they use are so much specialized 
on military products that they cannot be utilized for other purposes without enormous new 
investment. 150 billion US dollars according to official figures Uzvestia. March 31. 
1992).
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This plea is addressed to the American government but there are no reasons to 
believe that this line of reasoning is not valid for the case of the CIS with its 
huge problem of structural imbalance. The standard claim of big-bangers is that 
the idea that ex-socialist economies can be whipped into shape while still under 
government control is a dangerous illusion does not account for at least two 
issues: first, in one form or another, state interventionism is an indispensible 
attribute of all existing economic systems including American capitalism; second, 
in the case of Russia and other ex-socialist countries the main problem, for the 
moment, is not so much how to increase economic efficiency as how to save them 
from deindustrialization and economic and political collapse.
1.4.3. Efficiency Incompatibility
Efficiency depends on a combination of factors many of which stay 
beyond what may be described in terms of production organization proper. By 
responding to market failures through internalizing certain market functions, 
modern corporations - especially those doing business in international markets - 
has evolved sophisticated organizations in whose ultimate success is secured by 
developing and implementing a range of product, technological, marketing, 
employment, advertisement and others strategies. A popular theory on 
transnational corporations specifically stresses the importance of so-called 
intangible assets as a stimulus for internationalization (Dunning, 1985). They 
include not only in-house bred technology and patent rights, but likewise 
managerial skills, the organizational experience, the knowledge of the market, 
local contacts, the reputation of the brand, good record with the banks, etc.
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In this respect the CIS enterprises are very seriously handicapped by 
their socialist past. There are factories and plants using modem technology able 
to produce competitive goods. But this might not be sufficient enough for them to 
remain viable in an open market environment. For decades the efficiency of 
enterprises was evaluated according to how successful they were in fulfilling 
plan figures, they never had a free hand to pursue their own industrial, 
technological or commercial policy. The system did not harbour effective 
incentives promoting innovations, technical progress or quality. Many enterprises 
have been "value subtractors" - that is, at world prices the value of the 
resources they consume is worth more than they produce. There are no figures 
concerning the ex-Soviet Union, however, a recent study covering manufacturing 
industries in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary maintains that 20-25 per cent of 
enterprises could be value subtractors (The Economist, September 21st, 1991, 
Survey, p. 13).
Excessive centralization in decision-making and priority for
administrative over economic criteria stipulated a particular type of business
9 . . .
environment which made for a wasteful economy and left its basic units -
enterprises - only poorly equipped for autonomous survival in the face of more
competent competitors. The observation of N.Klimov and D.Kuzin, two experts from
the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, is much to the
point:
11 If in capitalist countries industrial, technological and foreign 
economic policies are closely interrelated, if any big firm there evaluates 
its performance and builds its strategy accounting for the global factors of
9! The following data is helpful in conveying the idea of the scale of this waist: the 
cost of the equipment bought and paid for by state firms which had not been installed and 
remained in deposit by the end of 1989 amounted to an astronomic sum of 18 billion rubles. 
One third of this equipment was ordered from abroad (Pravda. December 22, 1989).
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competition, in our country there is neither such coordination of policies, 
nor even a basic notion of a long-term firm strategy or of those dozens of 
factors which determine competitiveness (Voprosy ekonomtki, 1990. No.8.p.7).
If the situation remains unchanged, direct clashes between the firms of the CIS 
and foreign companies in the world market, as well as in the market of the CIS, 
are likely to resemble a skirmish between militia units and the regular army. To 
turn once again to the fate of big industry in the ex-socialist countries of 
Europe: firms with modem plant and boasting a certain standing in export 
markets, such as Tungsram (lighting equipment) in Hungary and Skoda (automobiles) 
in Czechoslovakia, already have become property of transnational corporations. 
The others face at best a dim and uncertain future, and at worst oblivion.
1.5. On the Way to "New" Interventionism
The above review of only a few of the difficulties awaiting Russia’s 
economy in the course of integration into the world economic system, though 
necessarily brief, sufficiently serves our goal of drawing attention once again 
to what is at stake in current reforms. Unlike text-book abstractions, in actual 
life no variable may be disposed of because it does not fit the model. A long­
term economic degradation of the country cannot be just assumed away. Shock 
therapy hard-liners never lose a chance to stress that the country has found 
itself in an economic stalemate not because reforms are harsh and hasty but 
because they came late, adding that "hidden" degradation was characteristic of 
the Soviet economy long before the reforms started.
However, references to the past could be as misleading as consoling. In 
real terms the difference between "hidden" and "revealed" degradation may be 
enormous. The main point is the problem of the crack down in living standards,
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and the inevitable unemployment and social tensions provoked by them. Under the 
administrative-command system, overemployment was the cause of inefficiency in 
production, and by far the most important sign of economic degradation. But, at 
the same time it was also a tool of social policy similar to public works under 
President Roosevelt’s "new deal". It was used by the regime to cushion the social 
consequences of economic stagnation. Marketization is eliminating this cushion 
and the opening of the economy will be the ferment which may speed up the process 
to the state of explosion. From the nuclear physics, we are well aware of the 
difference in results of controlled and uncontrolled chain reaction.
Being the product of the Soviet economic system, the described barriers 
cannot be overcome until the system’s legacy is disposed of. Internal reforms, in 
particular the privatisation of property and the establishment of a new type of 
relations between the business and the state, play a leading role here. Despite 
all the present uncertainty concerning the pace and the efficiency of these 
reforms, they should define the speed and the scale of the opening up of the ex- 
Soviet economy (unless its integration in the world market is seen as an end in 
itself, which would be a mistake).
The problem of reforming the ex-Soviet economy is very much a chicken- 
and-egg dilemma. So many factors interact and so many interests interlace that no 
beginning seems to have indisputable advantages over any other. The reforms by 
definition are destructive. However, some forms of destruction may be productive, 
others not. What matters is the scale, pace and sequence of reform. This is 
wholly valid with respect to the sphere of international economic relations. The 
warnings that a shift to an open economy should be gradual, well prepared and 
based on a sophisticated strategy may be heard not only inside Russia. Addressing
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reformers in post socialist countries, Professor Alice Amsden writes 
(International Herald Tribune, April 10, 1990):
Without institutional guidelines and vision, freer markets will only 
squelch the ability (of industries] to compete, and at greater social 
cost....Many developing countries that lack the machinery to screen 
foreign investments find the benefits less than costs.
In her conclusions, Professor Amsden refers to the record of those countries 
which commonly serve as a text-book example of a successful transition from 
internal to external oriented development: the newly industrialized countries.
Contrary to early publications and the position of the major 
development agencies tending to present their case as a vindication of a free- 
market approach to economic development, recent investigations are careful to 
stress that their success was designed and secured through extensive state 
intervention. Two of them, by Richard Wade (1990) and Stephen Smith (1991), stand 
out thanks to the scope and the depth of the analysis. Their major finding is 
that successful export-led growth has generally been based on activist trade and 
industrial policy. However, this recent flow of literature (see also States and 
Markets: Neo-Liberalism, and the Development Policy Debate, 1992) draws a 
distinction between what Wade calls "traditional" and "new" interventionism: the 
former tried to eliminate the market, the latter seeks to collaborate with it, to 
guide, not replace, the market. The important characteristic of the "new" 
interventionism is that it needs to be open to the feedback from the market so 
that state economic policy is to be subordinated to economic rationality rather 
than to political ambitions.
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1.6. Searching for a New Paradigm
Clearly the problem with the "new" interventionism, as with any 
authoritative action, is that regulators may abuse discretion or use their powers 
incompetently. In the case of Russia and other CIS member-states, the abundance 
of goodwill cannot make up for the absence or inadequacy of theoretical and 
material, legislative and institutional premises for foreign investment. Such an 
environment has yet to be synthesized. This naturally only brings in the question 
of what will be the guiding lines along which the synthesis will proceed. There 
might be different scenarios varying mainly by the relative balance between 
governmental action and the interplay of market forces.
The synthesis may only work if there is a strategic concept 
constituting a basic framework for a national policy towards foreign investment. 
There is no real need that such a concept would necessarily take the form of an 
official declaration or a program, although this variant cannot be entirely 
excluded. It may well be a kind of prevailing general attitude for foreign 
capital participation expressed through state legislation and practice, 
entrepreneurial behavior and public opinion. As any product of the interaction of 
social forces this attitude is likely to bear the signs of compromise and will be 
subject to permanent correction. Though there is little doubt that it will be 
based mainly on the everyday experience and material interests of the main 
participant groups, it is nonetheless of great importance that will serve as a 
methodological key for interpreting the facts of life.
The change of attitude towards economic openness in general and towards 
foreign direct investment in particular is a remarkable sign of the new political
46 Chapter 1. The Challenges of ‘Post-communist Transition
and economic thinking in Russia. Foreign investors are now seen, for the most 
part, as partners in developing the economy of the country. However, this general 
perception has not yet taken the form of a coherent comprehensive longer-term 
strategy at the state level. Up to now the efforts of the state to regulate 
foreign investment and adjoining activities bore many signs of haste and 
emergency. They were mainly concentrated on two objectives: one was to grope for 
organizational forms facilitating the inclusion of foreign direct investment in 
the framework of the Soviet economy with its many specific features (in practice 
so far only the joint venture has been widespread). The other wets to adopt some 
essential legislation intended either to bring juridical norms, affecting foreign 
investors, in line with prevailing international standards. For example, since 
being introduced in 1987, norms regulating joint ventures have undergone three 
more sequent rounds of profound revisions and amendments, explicitly progressing 
towards further liberalization. Otherwise, provisional measures have been 
introduced to close gaps in existing legislation.
Both approaches are of importance, granted the total lack of previous 
administrative experience in the area, as well as the absence, until late, of any 
regulations or institutions dealing with this range of issues. But this type of 
work, as well as forthcoming regulations, may eventually miss their point if 
there is a lack of a pivotal idea (or criterion) behind them, generalizing 
foreign investment related aspirations on the national scale and, in this 
capacity, functioning as a sort of a yard-stick for measuring the effects of 
state policy and the performance of foreign capital itself. This implies the 
following question: "What potential advantages this country may expect to get 
from foreign investment and how can it manage to extract them in reality?".
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It seems only logical at this point to advise policy-makers to refer to 
existing concepts of foreign investment - intellectual products offered by 
international economics and international political economy, and allegedly 
combining theoretical insight with the generalization of actual experience. In 
reality, of course, this advice cannot easily be followed owing to competition 
between different theories and, in too many cases, the spectacular inadequacy of 
theoretical analysis in relation to the practical needs of policy makers. Despite 
the sincere effort of many scholars to be independent and objective in their 
research, political and economic theories are known to reflect ideological 
beliefs and cultural and historical background of their authors. In the case of 
international relations studies, belonging of the scholar to one of the two 
existing "worlds" - developed and developing - usually also shows.
Nonetheless, all the social and economic conceptions that have stayed 
the test of time cannot but carry a grain of rationality in them. Padre Ernesto 
Balducci, authoritative modem Italian philosopher, once remarked (Testimonianze, 
No.2, febbraio 1992):
In order to creatc a really planetary' civilization, without any hegemony, 
we have to resolve conflicts not by force but through revealing the 
partial truth which every particular case conceals.
This observation holds its force also when applied to the realm of theories. What 
make possible the coexistence (though not necessarily peaceful) of contradictory 
explanations of the world around us is in part the complexity of the world 
itself. Physicists discovered long ago that the observer’s perception of reality 
depended on his position in respect to the investigating item, i.e on the chosen 
system of co-ordinates. For this reason both classical and quantum mechanics are 
right within their own term of reference. Rival economic theories follow the same 
pattern by applying, quite often, different systems of co-ordinates, presumption
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and assumptions in relation to the facts they allegedly explore. In this context 
the choice between a right and wrong theory should be considered in the terms of 
choosing a proper system of co-ordinates, i.e. the relevance of its premises and 
the degree to which it relates to reality itself.
For Russian scholars this choice will not be easy. There are clear
signs of a general search for a new paradigm to be characterized, among other
things, by a rearranged balance between traditional Marxism and modern western 
theories. It is a natural and important process. However, it is not unfounded to 
believe that, at least on the initial stage, it will be strongly affected by 
other than purely scientific considerations. Facing the fate of a dismissed 
official teaching, Marxism is clearly on the defensive in the country. Western 
theories, on the contrary, have all the appeal of forbidden fruit, the charm of 
novelty and can very often count on the support of important academic schools and 
international organizations. If in the West, for decades, Marxism has been 
synonymous with radical thinking, in modern Russia, instead, scientific 
radicalism in economics and social sciences expresses itself in advocating the 
extremes of free market theorizing. Radical "fashion" may deprive the newly 
emerging paradigm of many approaches which might prove to be especially relevant 
for the Russian case.
Below I shall try to put forward argumentation in favor of the claim
that defining proper terms of reference for opening-up strategy in the
transitional economy means directly addressing issues of national 
competitiveness.
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The issue, like the attention paid to it by scholars and politicians, 
has grown dramatically in recent decades owing to the globalization of production 
and markets, and to the new lines of interaction of nations this latter brought 
into existence. Nonetheless, whatever extensive globalizing proceeded up to now, 
one sixth of the dry land of our planet, harbouring one fifth of the production 
capacity of the world, has been and still is mainly isolated from this process. 
The integration of the ex-Soviet republics in the international market system 
will inevitably affect the interests of traditional and new world economic power 
centers and add to international rivalry.
One hundred and fifty years ago, Friedrich List wrote that, in the real 
system of international competition, the nation may rely only on itself; it may 
not even expect other states not to interfere, as the increasing might of one 
power threatens the interests, and insults the feelings, of all nations aspiring 
at independence, wealth and high political significance. A lot has changed in the 
world since the time this observation was put on paper but it appears to be 
premature to regard it as dated. In the economic sphere nations continue to vie 
for wealth. The state of national competitiveness is important since jobs with 
high value adding and wealth generating capacities are rare and by no means can 
be distributed evenly across nations. The structure of production is such that 
these "premium" jobs make only a fraction of all jobs needed to provide for the 
modern society. Rich countries are anxious for transfer the low tiers of a job 
pyramid to a foreign production basis. Foreign direct investment is a tool of 
this policy as much, although, as it is an important channel of dispersing modern 
technology worldwide; most of all it is an indispensable component of the 
international economic system.
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The premises, functions and consequences of the export of capital are 
numerous which is probably the reason for the absence of anything like a general 
theory of foreign investment; instead there are many explanations on foreign 
investment from different positions and points of view. The following section 
will search for a methodological key to the many investment theories valid for 
countries in the state of transition.
2 THE NATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS PARADIGM
Theories are reflections of the reality in the minds of the people 
analyzing this reality. Fashion in a theory may be just a fashion, or it might be 
a manifestation of the general recognition of a new reality. Recently there has 
been a notable surge of interest in national competitiveness. At first it looked 
predominantly like an American phenomenon, a demonstration on the part of 
American politician, businessmen and academics of preoccupations with the 
declining role of American industry in the world. However, the scale of the 
discussion has been increasing, also in geographical terms. Having started across 
the Atlantic (M.Porter, R.Reich, P.Drucker, P.Krugman), it later benefited from 
the contribution of Europeans (J.Dunning, A.Francis, H.-P. Frölich, Ch.Carr). 
Quite soon the notion of competitiveness became something more than an issue of 
the business theory alone but developed into an important analytical key to the 
explanation of the modem process of internationalization.
2.1. The Formation of a Bi-polar Model
Historically, the first theoretical reflections on this process may be 
traced back to the beginning of the 19th century. Internationalization initially 
asserted itself through a vigorous increase in international trade, following the 
rise in production and consumption in a number of European states based on 
capitalist entrepreneurship and the fruits of the First Industrial Revolution. It 
was only logical, in this early stage, that the attention of theorists, when
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directed to the realm of the international economy, was drawn almost exclusively 
to foreign trade and its consequences.
Two major approaches emerged. These pioneering insights were so 
powerful that, in fact, they have defined the scope of the discussion ever since 
and, hence, cannot be left out in this analysis. Very much contrasting on the 
surface, they marked the two poles in explaining international trade and 
international economic relations in general.
The relationship of the two in the historical perspective is very 
suggestive. The first, free-trade theory, seemed to have all the necessary 
credentials to be presented as a powerful example of a victorious teaching, 
revealing to the benefit of the thankful world the hidden mechanics of 
international economics. The record of the other, a protectionist doctrine, might 
invite many to regret once again the pitiful human weakness of persisting in 
one’s delusions. Indeed, as much as the free-trade theory looks to be logical, 
rational, democratic and progressive by claiming that any trading country would 
gain from international trade provided nothing impedes market forces to disclose 
its comparative advantage, protectionism seem to be nationalistic, discriminative 
and politically biased when defending the right of the nation state to correct 
the "invisible hand" of the market. In the realm of theory, the free-trade 
concept could boast the contribution of such giants of economic thought as Adam 
Smith and David Ricardo, politically it was backed by the authority of one of the 
oldest democracies of the world - the British. By contrast, in many minds 
protectionism strongly associates with dictatorial regimes and war preparations. 
Protectionism is related to mercantilism which is based on the premise that, in
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international economic relations, the gains of one of the sides signal losses for 
the other is particularly irrelevant nowadays.
In decades of uneasy coexistence of the two doctrines, free-traders 
more than once announced a crashing theoretical defeat of protectionism. As early 
as 1923 J.M.Keynes (Keynes, vol.XIX,p.l47) was writing that free trade was based 
on fundamental truths
which, stated with their due qualifications, no one can dispute who is 
capable of understanding the meaning of the words.
However, the remarkable viability of protectionist heresy perplexed many minds in 
free-traders’ camp. American liberal economist G. George was among the first to
raise the question which still has not lost its significance:
If the protectionist theory Is so incompatible with the nature of 
things and contradicts Itself, how does It manage then, after so many 
years of discussion, to enjoy so powerful support? (quoted In A.Iydanov. 
p. 10).
This question cannot be answer as long as one is willing to discuss the 
international economy exclusively in the terms of pure economic rationality. 
Under certain conditions, national states cannot abstain from intervening into 
the economy. The free-trade conception implicitly suggests the willingness or 
ability of the states to pay the social and political costs of the adaptation 
period necessary to reveal their "comparative advantage . It is not by chance 
that this theory was developed in the 19th century Britain, the country which had 
no doubts as to where her comparative advantages lay. The economic strength of 
Britain added to the persuasiveness of free trade postulates. As a resultant a 
particular case was developed into a general (or generalized) theory. However, in 
more than one respect it was an idealistic concept built on the belief in the
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feasibility of the optimal international division of labour, and in the 
possibility to put the world’s resources and abilities to the best uses of all 
nations without discrimination.
This idealism was excusable in the time when international economic 
relations had not yet revealed their complexity. Even today the belief that 
market impulses may be efficiently corrected only by the market itself has 
influential advocates. But, it seems, this idea has never worked in practice. 
Attempts to correct the play of market forces are both numerous and never ending. 
This is especially true of national reaction to external changes. This may be 
attributed, inter alia, to the following three reasons.
First, the international market is far from being a structure in which 
market power is diffused to such a degree that all participants have the chance 
to be equally affected by its developments. On the contrary, the market of today 
is associated, in the first place, with the activities of transnational banks and 
corporations. Despite their sometimes accentuated supranational image, these are 
seen in countries other than their home-countries as serving foreign interests 
rather than the conductors of the impulses of a national-neutral international 
market. From this perspective, if to speak in simplified terms, for a country to 
be exposed to the world market is veiy much the same as to be exposed to the 
transnational corporations and, eventually, to the policies of external power- 
centers. Susan Strange (1988) in States and Markets reveals the importance of 
what she calls "structural power" ("the power to shape and determine the 
structures of the global political economy within other states..." [Strange, 
1988, p.24]) in international relations, i.e., a power based upon control over 
key world "structures" (production, credit, knowledge, and also transport
Chapter 2. The 9{ationalCompctitvcntss (Paradigm 55
systems, trade, energy, welfare) by big corporations headquartered and owned in a 
few industrialized countries, rather than on a capacity to exert political or 
military pressure by one state over another.
Second, there still remains the central problem of the cost of the 
market self-balancing in terms of material losses, the wastage of time and the 
growth of social tension. It stays in close relation to the fact that, third, 
national government cannot submit to speculative economic rationality only. 
Politics, ideology, defence, ecology are just a few of the priorities which would 
not to be neglected. This is where the state steps in. It tries to equilibrate 
these priorities by reacting to the interplay of a variety of factors, with the 
balance of power between main social groups having a decisive vote. Although, as 
an abstraction, it is possible to imagine a certain optimum, in reality this 
equilibrium is most likely to be reached at some other point as there is no 
scarcity in historical precedents. Nationalism, for example, might overwhelm 
ideological believes, or political ambitions might subordinate economic common 
sense. In this respect Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers 
(1988) is extremely helpful in supplying a historical record of cases when the 
economy fell a victim to military expansion and political ambitions. The record 
reveals a striking regularity in the fate of Great Powers: at a certain moment 
their economy cracks down following the misplacement of accents on the matrix 
of state priorities.
2.2. Integrating the Political Dimension
Hence, any theoretical concept describing international economic 
relations, if aiming at any worthy applied results, should not omit a political
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factor. The perception of the ruling elite of what is good for the country 
translates into a set of laws, acts and regulations. By issuing them and by 
securing them to be observed by all the persons and agencies under its 
jurisdiction, the state implements its sovereignty.
The concept of sovereignty has long been the focal point of an animated
discussion1. There have been persistent attempts to discredit sovereignty as a 
legal myth, as too amorphous a concept lacking precise meaning. Indeed, nowadays 
sovereignty may hardly be interpreted as "absolute power". And yet, the 
viability of the term, concerns about the erosion of national sovereignty which 
may be readily traced in the extensive literature on international relations 
demonstrate that the concept, whatever loose it may seem, has its hard core. The 
right and the ability of taking a final decision on all the issues concerning a 
certain territory and the people living there are the raison d’etre and the mode 
of existence of any state. A state cannot give up this privilege without ceasing 
to be the state. This explains to an extent why in the literature on 
international economic relations which, in fact, is a mosaic of nationality 
determined views on the problem, one comes across words such as "dependence", 
"vulnerability" and "threat" much more often than "cooperation" and "assistance".
The state cannot allow itself to be indifferent to the character and 
the intensity of impulses transmitted through the channels of international 
economic interconnectedness. The question is whether it is in a position to cut 
off these channels, or at least dilute the exposure to external influences.
1. See for details the anthology In Defence of Sovereignty edited by W.Stanklewiez 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1969).
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The answer depends on two parameters: the degree of economic openness 
and the relative power of a state to handle the matter.
At this point once again we confront the problem of what should be 
conceived as openness. If it is to be associated with foreign trade - trade could 
be put under control. If it has to do with the physical presence of foreign 
companies - they may be prohibited or nationalized. For instance, Arthur Lewis, 
internationally renowned economist, tended to discredit dependency theory on the 
grounds that in LDCs independent governments were engaged in restructuring the 
place of foreigners in the country (Lewis, 1969, quoted from Pioneers of 
Development, 1984, p. 129):
The most important control |of multinationals in the LDCs] is the 
use of work permits to force the firms to hire and train local recruits at 
managerial and professional levels.
This seems to be a very feasible measure. A wave of "Nigeriasation" almost 
completely swept away foreigners from the offices of banks and firms in Nigeria 
in the 70s. But, to the surprise of the government, the policy of foreign-origin 
firms in the country was not seriously affected. This small example - from a big 
country - is just one of many showing that there are no simple responses to 
openness challenges.
It is advantageous to address this set of problems as a structural 
phenomenon. Such an approach suggests that an economy maybe profoundly involved 
in internationalization without being overexposed to the world market in any 
particular field. The fact that no country - great or small - can resist the 
forces that impose these structures supports the thesis that, taking into 
consideration the present level of the development of productive forces, no one 
country is big enough no longer either as a market or as a production base.
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For many, a protectionist doctrine is synonymous to tariffs and its 
critique is often confined to evaluating if tariffs and other impediments to 
international trade are good or bad for the development of national industry and
2
the economy in general . But, if to overcome quite a narrow approach to this 
doctrine as to a specialized trade theory and put the controversy between 
protectionism and free trade in a wider context of the opposition of laissez-fair 
and what is now commonly known as Keynesian school in economic thinking, its 
significance increases.
By allocating expressively a particular role to the state,
protectionist theory adds, in a sense, a new, political, dimension to the one*
dimentional picture of the world dominated by economic rationality alone. In
methodological terms this constitutes its cognitive value. It also explains why
its appeal increases every time that the world economy enters the troubled waters
of recession. Furthermore, as world trade was supplemented by the flows of
foreign direct investment and "hot money" as well as technology, labour,
information, the protectionist idea understood, in a wide sense, as a bias on
preserving the national economic (and not only economic) identity has enforced.
Keynes was probably among the first to recognize that the international economy
had been entering a new state when foreign economic relations no longer were the
extension of the national economy but, instead, this latter was developing into a
subordinate part of a new supranational whole. This made him write, in 1933, only
ten years after his essay on free trade cited above:
|T)he policy of an Increased national self-sufficiency Is to be 
considered not as an ideal in itself but as directed to the creation of an
2. In fact, besides the welfare approach to protectionism as described above, there is a 
positive theory of protection which Is not concerned with assessing the desirability of 
IntervenUons affecting trade or resource allocation (see W.Corden, 1979[ 19711).
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environment in which other Ideals can be safely and conveniently pursued 
(Keynes. vol.XXl. p.240).
2.3. A First Step to Synthesis
The argumentation presented by Keynes in his article "National Self- 
Sufficiency anticipated many of the theses of modem open economy theories. At 
first glance this similarity may be puzzling: the latter seem to be more related 
to free trade thinking since they do not really dispute the merits of intensive 
transnational exchange of goods, capital, labour, etc. and accept them as an 
objective necessity.
Yet it is not difficult to notice that these theories are genetically 
linked to protectionism, although reflecting the realities of a different time. 
There is a strong tradition, especially in econometric literature, to regard the 
problem of openness from the point of view of neutralizing unfavourable outer
3
influence , that is exactly the approach followed by Keynes in "National Self- 
Sufficiency". This proves in a remarkable way that protectionist doctrine as a 
current of thought had never actually led to a deadlock. Rather it gave a shape 
to natural concerns of a world divided by national boarders. At the same time, 
the open economy theories have principal distinctions in comparison with their 
forerunner: the task of how to stay free of the external impact has given way to
3. In one of the recent macroeconomic textbooks the author writes about his subject in the 
following words: "Each country is capable of generating its own economic problems but most 
are also effective in creating problems for others. |A] change of government is followed by 
a short period of attempting to implement policies which focus on domestic problems but 
which are thwarted by the reaction of the rest of the world." (R.Morley. The Macroeconomics 
of Opened Economies. Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1988. p.IX).
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that of how to cushion this impact whilst employing in full the advantages of the 
international division of labour4.
The open economy theories reflect a specific stage in the development 
of the international political economy and economics when the eminence of the 
process of internationalization had been acknowledged by theorists but its true 
scale and force had not been yet realized. Unlike the inter-war period, in 
postwar years the great majority of scholars have held the opinion that 
participation in international economic relations is not a matter of free choice 
but, in fact, has no alternative. Indeed, the 20th century has brought about the 
unprecedented expansion of world trade and transnational capital flow which 
represent two major channels connecting numerous economies in a contradictory 
bunch. In recent decades they have been coupled with the cross-frontier streams 
of technology, labour, expertise and know-how. Together with the worldwide 
exchange of information and culture which provides the groundwork for a powerful 
demonstration effect apt to generate additional currents of goods, services and
capital across national borders5, these new channels have pushed the process of 
internationalization of national economies to the degree where it has become one 
of the most important factors of national development and world politics.
4. Modern protectionists, who sometimes are called "new protectionists", have long 
abandoned militant Intonation when expressing their views and at most can allow themselves 
to warn the public against some extremities of open regimes (see P.Krugman "Protectionism: 
Try It, You 11 Like It" In The International Ekxtnomy, June/July 1990, p.35-39).
5. US movies, music. TV programming, and home video together now account for an annual 
trade surplus of some S8 billion. Sales of US television programming to Europe alone gross 
at about $600 million a year. Only aerospace outranks pop culture as an export ("America's 
Hottest Export: Pop Culture" In Fortune. December.31, 1990, p.28).
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At the same time, it is widely recognised that the process of 
internationalization has increased the number of challenges facing national 
policy makers as well as entrepreneurs, added to the unpredictability of market 
developments. All in all, it seems, it has made the actors of international 
economic relations pay greater costs incurred by multiplied uncertainties. 
Therefore it is not surprising, that the literature on the open economy and the 
economic interdependence first concentrated on revealing the destabilizing 
effects of the internationalization on the national business environment, and 
especially on the ability of government agencies to carry out the regulative 
strategy they conceived to be necessary for national interests or, more 
precisely, their ability to acquire the results they had in mind when launching
it6.
These concerns - and the open economy theories reflecting them - came 
to the fore against the background of three major developments which were to 
change the landscape of the world economy in the 60s and the 70s.
The first was the break down of the Bretton-Woods monetary system. It 
was probably in the course of this painful process that the economic openness of 
leading industrial countries expressively manifested itself as a potential 
disaster with serious consequences. Member-states found themselves confronted 
with numerous challenges caused by the distortions in the balances-of-payments of 
the United States, the EEC countries and Japan, by undermined confidence in
6. Some of the noticeable books on the matter are: R.Cooper. The Economics of 
Interdependence.(London: McGrow-HUl. 1968): P.Buomberger. Theorie und Strategie der 
Geldpolitik ln einer kleinen, offenen Volkswirtschaft (Zürich, 1979); R.Dombusch. Open 
Economy Macroeconomics (New York: Basic Books. 1980): R.Keohane, J.Nye. Power and 
Interdependence. World Politics ln Transttion-iBoston: Little. Brown & Co.. 1977)
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national money as the means of international settlements, and by large-scale 
speculations in currencies. Especially devastating were the raids of the bulks of 
"hot money" across Europe. Imported inflation was also one of external 
disturbances associated with the collapse of the Breton-Woods system and, later, 
with the oil crisis. Under these conditions a stream of literature emerged 
questioning the effectiveness and even the viability of a national monetary and 
credit policy in new circumstances. What made this a burning issue was the role 
attributed to such a policy by the then dominating Keynesian concept of a welfare 
state. It was feared that external economic impulses, transmitted through 
monetary channels, could undermine the ability of national authorities to pursue 
the goals of economic growth and full employment.
The second development to make scholars treat economic openness in the
terms of dependence and vulnerability was transnational corporations’ rise to
eminence. Although not at all a new phenomenon, TNCs had happened to be somewhat
at the periphery of the mainstream of academic research effort until, early in
the 70s, students and politicians recognised the TNCs as the potent and
influential actors of international economic (and political) scene. In the 70s,
of all the books dealing with this subject, the most renowned carried a title
which explicitly specified the dominating mood: Sovereignty At Bay. One can find
on its pages the following warning:
IMultlnaUonal enterprises! sprawl across national boundaries, linking the 
assets and activities of different national JurlsdlcUons with an Intimacy 
that seems to threaten the concept of the nation as an integral unit 
(Vernon. 1971. p.5).
By confronting the turnover figures of the bigger of transnationals with the GNP 
statistics of the smaller of industrialized countries (twenty corporations 
individually have annual sales greater than the gross national product of any one
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of 80 states [Dialogue, 4/90, No.90, p.4]), some authors inspired alarm in the 
minds of their readers. A lot of publicity was given to such instances as ITT 
conspiracy against Chile, oligopolistic trade practice of "Seven Sisters" (the 
international oil cartel), sophisticated transfer pricing methods exploited by 
leading pharmaceutical transnationals, etc.
As regards the oil crisis, it played the import role of a catalyst by 
aggravating contradictions already present in the world economy.
2.4. The Crisis of the "Macroeconomic Axiom"
The important developments in the international economic sphere and the 
consequences that followed have driven the increasing number of students to the 
conclusion that economic dynamics have decisively shifted from the national 
economy to the world economy. Stephen Hymer (1979, p.76), whose monopolistic 
advantage FDI theory (1960, published in 1976) is praised by many as the most
weighty contribution in this field7, writes about "an interlocking system of
cross-penetration" that changes the world:
When a corporation Invests abroad, it not only sends capital and 
management out. but also establishes a system for drawing foreign capital 
and and labour Into an Integrated world network. When many firms from many 
countries do this together on an expanded scale, as has been true over the 
last decade and will be increasingly true in the next, they are forming a 
new world system. They are unifying world capital and world labour into an 
interlocking system of cross-penetration that completely changes the system
7. In Klndleberger's opinion. Hymer had used "many of the words and virtually all the 
ideas that have now emerged as the ’new theories" (Klndleberger, 1984, p.181). See also 
McClain (1983).
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of national economies that has characterized world capitalism for the past 
three hundred years.
The interlock hypothesis is a challenge to conventional theory. As 
P.Drucker (1986, p.791) puts it:
Prevailing economic theory - whether Keynesian, monetarist or 
supply-side - considered the national economy, especially that of the large 
developed countries, to be autonomous and the unit of both economic 
analysis and economic policy. The international economy may be a restraint 
and a limitation, but it is not central, let alone determining. This 
"macroeconomic axiom" of the modem economist has become increasingly 
shaky.
Drucker’s critique of the "macroeconomic axiom" stresses that it 
poorly, if at all, accounts for the reciprocity of national economies. Open 
economy theory seems to be a tool to combine a traditional macroeconomic approach 
with the realities of the interconnected world. However, in the final analysis, 
the open economy theories speculate on how to cope with strong foreign influence 
on the national economy in order to achieve a desired macroeconomic equilibrium 
on a national scale, i.e., practically, on how to reduce a dynamic multicountiy 
approach to a more static and, hence, particular case.
Specialized theories dwelling on important phenomena of the 
international economy, such as foreign portfolio investment theory, foreign 
direct investment theory, foreign trade theory and so on, are often instrumental 
in explaining why this or that phenomenon occurs but they tend to treat their 
subject as a separate event bearing in itself the mystery of its origin. 
International portfolio investment are usually explained on the basis of interest 
rates; direct investment, at one time, were put in relation to managerial
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resources (Penrose, 1959), monopolistic advantages of a firm (Hymer, 1960[1976]), 
a product life-cycle (Vernon, 1972), intangible assets (Caves, 1982) and net 
ownership advantages (Dunning, 1979). The example of FDI theories is particularly 
significant since they address the most important development in the world 
economy over the last two decades. Although very inventive in revealing the inner 
springs of transnational direct investment flaws, these theories are often only 
very discreet in what regards the consequences of FDI for national economies, 
national states with all their obligations and international relations.
It is hardly against the truth to claim that, in the post-war period, 
the first serious attempt to scrutinize the intensification and diversification 
of international economic ties not only at a firm level but also in the context 
of the interaction of the national and the international economies, long before 
the internationalization process took its present scope, were made by development 
g
economists . Raul Prebisch (1949; 1978) and other noted writers such as Hans 
Singer, Gunnar Myrdal, Albert Hirschman, Francois Perroux elabourated on a 
center-periphery concept. They abundantly demonstrated that foreign investment 
and exposure to the international market might bring about some progress to a 
restricted group of economic activities (mainly export oriented), while actually 
conserving obsolescence in other spheres. Prebisch also showed that reliance on 
foreign capital is not enough for transferring the innovative capitalism of 
industrial core to the stagnant developing periphery. Later Prebisch and his 
colleagues were heavily criticized for opposing the pattern of outward-oriented
8. Dudley Seers paid the tribute when he stood out to recommend to import the insights of 
development theories into the concepts addressing the problems of developed countries in as 
much as these problems are raised by "powerful external forces, especially the policies of 
transnational c o r p o r a t i o n s ,  and [by) the strains of absorbing modem technology" 
(Development and Change, Vol.lO, 1979. p.714).
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development, with the newly industrialized countries being invoked to support the 
rightfulness of this pattern. Still, the dependency theory cannot be so easily 
dismissed. Leaving aside its other implications, it is relevant to point out here 
that, by stressing the importance of structural changes and industrialization in 
the developing countries, it, in fact, linked the economic progress in these 
countries with their ability to increase their competitiveness in the world 
market by eliminating their specialization on producing and exporting raw 
materials. As for the newly industrialized countries, their experience is no less 
valid as an argument in favour of Prebisch’s position as against it in as much as 
their success had been prepared (at least this is true of South Korea, Singapore, 
Taiwan, and Malaysia) by import substituting industrialization while their 
economies in general has been subject to large-scale interventions on the part of 
the Government. What may really make a difference in the case of these latters is 
the fact that the performance in international markets was eventually chosen as 
a yard-stick for measuring the efficiency of this policy.
In the industrialized world the need for a broader - nation to nation 
rather than firm to firm - approach to economic internationalization was first 
realized by non-economists. Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber opened his Le défi 
américain (1967) with a claim which fully exposes the militant and provocative
spirit of his book (p. 19):
La troisième puissance industrielle mondiale, après les Etats-Unis 
et l'U.R.S.S. pourrait bien être dans quinze ans. non pas L'Europe mais 
l'Industrie américaine en Europe.
Servan-Schreiber happened to be wrong in many of his predictions. His book is 
important nonetheless because it had drawn wide attention to two major issues 
which became focal points of prolonged discussions. One was the issue of power 
exerted through FDI and, in wider terms, of new dimensions of power in the
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interrelated world. The other - how foreign are foreign companies and what could 
serve as a criteria for defining the nationality of transnational corporations 
and whether the nationality really matters.
Since the time of Le défi américain our perception of these problems 
has become much more sophisticated. Political economists have traced modern
sources of power where they were not looked for before9. As for the firms’ 
nationality debate, the main finding probably has been the conclusion that the 
prosperity of country-owned firms and the prosperity of the country itself is not 
necessarily one and the same thing (see, for instance, Reich, 1988; 1990).
As we have seen, the interaction (i) of national economies with one 
another and (ii) of national economies with the world market (which, due to the 
formation of supranational structures of TNCs, is no more an arithmetical sum of 
national economies) has been winning constantly growing attention from different 
separate sciences. The diversity of interpretations reflects the immensity and 
versatility of the internationalization process itself. For practical purposes of 
policy-making it is crucial, however, to single out a key notion (supported by a 
relevant theoretical insight) to serve as a strategic pivot for policy-making.
9. For example. Susan Strange (1988, p. 133) stresses the importance of knowledge and the 
language as the means of communication:"The American language has become the Itnguajranca 
of the global economy and of transnational social and professional groups.... American 
universiUes come to dominate learning and the major professions not only because they have 
numbers and resources of libraries and finance, but also because their work is conducted in 
English By comparison with this predominance in the knowledge structure, any loss of 
American capability in industrial manufacturing is trivial and unimportant."
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2.5. Translating Interdependence in Economic Terms: National
Competitiveness
Summarizing recent most important facts and concepts pertaining to the 
international sphere, it is legitimate to suggest that such a notion should be 
interdependence. Increasing numbers of political scientists analyzing the sources 
of power in international affairs are willing to attribute to the interdependence 
the role of the most influential single factor behind the changing profile of 
international relations, both political and economic (Keohane and Nye, 1977,
1987; Nye, 1990; Strange, 1988a, 1988b; Vernon and Spar, 1988; Waltz, 1979)10. 
Traditional economics, as follows from Drucker’s remark, is slow to recognize 
this development. For the aim of economic policy-making, however, the general 
notion of interdependence is too wide to be sufficient and there is still a need 
for an appropriate equivalent specifying this term for economic relations to be 
found. A national competitiveness concept suites best for this purpose.
2.5.1. Why National Competitiveness?
The competitiveness theory first emerged as a firm competitiveness 
theory and for a long time it was monopolized by management specialists. There 
has been little debate as for the capacity of the firm to generate real income 
above a certain return ("a competitive floor") to be chosen for estimating
10. Both Waltz and Strange write about structural power while Nye uses the term co-opttve 
power to describe a situation when political pressure is exerted indirectly through the 
control over the "structures*, material and Intellectual, which represent the main channels 
of interaction of national states and economies.
Chapter 2. 'The OiationaiCompetitveness (Paradigm 69
relative competitiveness. When firms became global, the same approach was 
expanded to define international competitiveness:
Competitiveness Is the capacity of a firm under free and fair market 
conditions to produce goods and services that meet the test of 
international markets while, at the same time, maintaining or expanding 
its real income (Ph.de Woot, 1990, p.8).
As incomes rise through the sale of products and services, the market share of 
the firm or, to be more precise, the change of the market share over time, with 
some approximation, may be regarded as an indication of its competitive 
position. Such analysis proved especially relevant for international comparisons 
in which the direct confrontation of revenues is difficult owing to differences 
in accounting practice, in fiscal legislation, in the currency composition of 
sales and so on. Hence, when the nation’s competitiveness is taken as equal to 
the ability of firms flying its flag to improve their international sales, then 
national competitiveness can be defined as the power of the nation "to capture 
and expand a share of the world market" (Cox, 1987, p.303) or to achieve a trade 
balance surplus or a balance-of-payments surplus.
This approach, which could be identified as traditional, has been 
widely criticized recently. One group of critics, whilst not questioning the 
underlying assumption of the essential similarity of national and firm 
competitiveness, insists however that the market share as a measure of national 
performance is legitimate only with some due qualifications accounting for such
developments as the shift of traditional industries to developing countries11,
11. How really misleading market share figures could be Is demonstrated by a Mexican case: 
half of the value of Mexico's manufactured exports is made up by the supply of so-called 
«maquiladoras» (border plants belonging to foreign corporations engaged in assembling
(Footnote continues on next page)
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the growing importance of so-called intangible assets (technology, know-how, 
managerial skill, etc.) as well as the exchange of services and information.
The other group challenges the traditional approach on more serious 
grounds claiming that it is impossible to identify nations with corporations. 
This claim contradicts a longstanding and quite widely-spread belief (cultivated, 
inter alia, by those interpretations of a popular managerial revolution theoiy 
that tend to link the performance of big firms to the will of the "captains" of 
big business to act in the "best-balanced interests" of "stakeholders" 
(shareholders, customers, employees, suppliers, and plant community cities) or to 
maximize the "wealth-producing capacity" of their enterprise (see Harvard 
Business Review, March-April 1991, pp.106-114) that what is good for big 
companies is good for the nation.
The globalisation of firms itself had probably given the hardest blow 
to this assumption as transnational companies proved to be quick in relocating to 
remote countries with less demanding social standards or in other ways showed 
that national loyalty was not their guiding motivation. As Robert Reich puts it, 
commenting on the predisposition of US firms to expand employment, investment 
and R and D abroad,
American competitiveness Is not the profitability or market share of 
American-owned corporations. In fact, because the American-owned
(Footnote continued from previous page)
products for the US market) while the average use of Mexican Input in maquiladoras' 
production is a mere 1,5 per cent of final value (Harris, 1990, p. 121-122). In other words, 
the actual competitiveness of Mexico Is something different from what is suggested by 
export share calculations alone If they do not allow for a special role played by American 
and other foreign corporations in the export sector of Mexican economy.
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corporation is coming to have no special relationship with Americans, it 
makes no sense to Americans to entrust our national competitiveness to it. 
The interests of American-owned corporations may or may not coincide with 
those of American people (Reich, 1990a, p.59).
One is likely to find this assertion somewhat premature as regards the
characteristic of relationship between American-owned firms and Americans;
nonetheless, it is extraordinary instrumental in marking an important modern
trend of great consequences.
If the claim "nations compete" being accepted, two major questions - 
(i) what kind of a relationship is this competition? and (ii) what makes the core 
of national competitiveness? - become most challenging and significant.
2.5J2. Competition as a Relationship
Earlier we tried to specify the narrowness of some popular approaches 
to international economic interdependence: the idealism and the negligence of the 
national-political component of free trade ideology; the "zero-sum" philosophy 
implicit to mercantilist’s and neomercantilist’s postulates; the partiality of 
specialized theories and the static character of macroeconomic inroads. Still the 
mankind is indebted, though probably to a varies degree, to all of them for 
stimulative insights. What could offer a national competitiveness approach? It 
does not pretend to be a new original explanation of the international economy. 
Nevertheless, it has the potential to update our perception of the world and be 
helpful as an intellectual tool for strategists.
Competition divides as much as unites. It is always an interaction. If 
to use an analogy from physics, namely, from a field theory, competition is an
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environment built of and filled with mutually attracting and pushing away 
elements (or agents). Hence national competitiveness is generally about 
interaction and interdependence and more specifically about the trajectory of an 
economy across an economic environment, and factors defining this trajectory. For 
the national stat it is about measuring and optimizing the trajectory of its 
economy against other economies, keeping in mind that such an optimization is 
possible in so far as any national economy makes an active part of the world 
economy; otherwise the trajectory will be shaped by independent factors alone.
This approach implies the abandoning of national-centric idea of the 
world (i.e., the shift from "we and the world" philosophy to "we in the world" 
philosophy); the necessity of conceiving and following certain general rules of 
the game; the rejection of a "zero-sum" approach to international economic 
relations.
Drawing on exact sciences for another analogy, economies are not like 
planets which galactic routes are defined once and for ever. They are more like 
man-made space objects equipped to change their orbits, but the amount of fuel is 
limited so that the moment when the engine can be started as well as the time- 
length of its action should be calculated very thoroughly.
When put in the terms of competitiveness, the interrelation between the 
international performance of a country and its economic growth, unlike in the 
open economy theory, focuses on the constructive side of interconnectedness. The 
existence of this "positive" side follows from the premise that no economic 
progress is possible unless sufficient competitive space is available to
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stipulate productive destruction, the term introduced by Joseph Schumpeter to 
describe a competition propelled evolution.
The prominence of competitive space is readily deducible from the 
Schumpetrian theory of innovation driven growth in which he stresses that 
competition is not all about prices. His theory has received much attention of 
late owing to the tribute it pays to technical progress and innovation - the two 
big issues that can not be overestimated nowadays. Schumpeter confronted a 
dynamic model of innovation driven evolution to a classical model of static 
reserve allocation. Schumpeter’s emphasis on innovation arises from his theory of 
monopolist capitalism:
As soon as we go into detail and inquire into individual items in 
which progress was most conspicuous, the trail leads us not to the doors of 
those firms that work under conditions of comparatively free competition 
but precisely to the doors of the large concerns...(Schumpeter. 1943, p.82 
in the 1976 edition).
This observation made him look for explanations for the successes of capitalism 
other than the ability of market forces to secure the efficient utilization of 
resources. He tends to stress the role of the non-price competition; eventually
he came to the conclusion that
the fundamental impulse that acts and keeps the capitalist engine in 
motion comes from the new consumer goods, the new methods of production or 
transportation, the new markets, the new forms of industrial organisation 
that capitalist enterprise creates (Schumpeter, 1943, p.83 in the 1976 
edition).
What matters for our purpose is the fact that major new tendencies in 
technology, methods of production, storing, transporting, management, etc. which 
eventually concur the whole world and determine the economic development and,
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indirectly, social development for a considerable period of time, first declare 
themselves on the national scale and only gradually filter into other countries. 
Mass production methods, for instance, were initially introduced in the United 
States; in the 1930s they were adopted in the Soviet Union and, since World War
II, mass production spread worldwide to revolutionize not only the production 
itself, but the consumption pattern and the living standards of billions of 
people.
The competitive space postulate suggests that countries with the open 
economy objectively are better placed for catching world trends as they are more 
sensitive to external signals. Their exposure to the world market would also 
demand more prompt reaction to external "irritants". The importance of this 
factor is stressed by Porter (1990): nations succeed, he maintains, where local 
circumstances provide an impetus for firms to pursue new strategies for competing 
in an industry early and aggressively.
NaUons fall where firms do not receive the right signals, are not 
subjects to the right pressures, and do not have the right capabilities 
(Porter. 1990. p.68).
Therefore, in principle, economic openness theoretically provides an advantage, 
especially if the process of internationalization has such a scope as it has 
gained lately. It is a great problem to utilize this advantage: the task of 
fishing out "positive" (or right) impulses (those carrying information on 
progressive mainstream changes) alone poses tremendous problems. Nevertheless, 
closed economies, or closed industries within generally open economies, are 
considerably less responsive and take the risk of being forced to pay a high 
price for being late in following the tendency of the world economy.
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One of the most illustrious examples is the history of the decline of 
the American automotive industry. The oligopoly of the "big three" made it very 
inert to the world trend in automotive design and production. According to 
J.DeLorean (Flink, 1988, p.293), for many years one of the top "General Motors" 
executives,
there hadn't been an Important product innovaUon In the industry since 
the automatic transmission and power steering in 1949... In place of 
product innovation, the I American 1 automobile industry went on a two 
decade marketing binge which generally offered up the same old product 
under the guise of something new and useful.
In the 60s, for the first time in its history, Detroit was forced to consider
competition on the part of Japanese and European manufacturers; the moment of
truth came with the first shock of the oil crisis. The years 1980s the "big
three" met amidst a desperate struggle for staying afloat. When finally the
industry had overcome its decay by the middle of the decade, it emerged
profoundly renovated; not only the products were superior, but the business
strategy itself had changed: research and development were promoted to a key
position, a lot of emphasis was put on internationalization (including
cooperation with competitors - Japanese and Europeans). Examined in retrospect,
the core of the crisis of the American automotive industry appears to be not so
much the conflict of choosing between small and bigger cars as the struggle
between two tendencies, old and new. The latter anticipated a modern state-of-
the-art" product: sophisticated, functional, energy and material efficient,
technologically intensive. The former represented a dating mass production
approach in which the economy of scale was the first major priority as much as
the second and the third, and styling was substituting for technological
progress. Had the industry been less introverted, it could have participated in
developing the new trend rather than catching up with it in a later stage.
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The above story expressively favours the argument that under certain 
circumstances the size of a national market alone is not a sufficient condition 
to secure innovation. Schumpeter defined the modem non-price competition as "not 
that kind of competition that counts" but as an ever-present threat. Obviously, 
in quite a few cases this "threat" is not big enough to result in a pronounced 
effect when national companies are left to themselves. Therefore, it is little 
wonder that recently free trade has received a lot of lip-service as a means of 
encouraging innovation and strengthening national competitiveness. And yet, as 
the failure of the Uruguay Round has demonstrated once again, action falls far 
behind rhetoric. This is not surprising either. Too vital economic, political and 
social interests are at stake, too high the price of a mistake may be.
The statement that a better competitive position of a nation could be 
secured only in the course of competitive struggle itself or, in other words, 
that no form of isolationism is consistent with striving for economic progress 
might look, on the first glance at least, quit obvious. In reality, it is far 
from being so. On the one hand, there is a long tradition in economic thinking to 
give priority to internal economic problems, on the other hand, there is a deep- 
rooted mentality characteristic of different social layers (including quite 
often, as numerous examples demonstrate, a ruling elite) to favour defensive 
approach to the alleged and real influences of foreign markets.
One of the most notorious cases is, of course, the Soviet Union in 
which a new and "superior" economy was intended to be built in a situation of 
almost total insulation from those economies which allegedly it was to overwhelm 
and, thus, with which it was actually competing. However, symptoms of this 
mentality also can be easily found in advanced capitalist countries. "Buy
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American campaigns in the United States is just a small but eloquent example. 
How much this mentality is still spread in the country is indicated by the fact 
that the Business Week magazine (December 17, 1990, p.34.) in a special report on 
why the United States is failing in the international competitive race found it 
necessary to address its American readers with a reminder which, despite its 
pathetic intonation, amply conveys the essence of competitive thinking: "Success 
will come by embracing the world economy - not trying to escape it".
The outlook on the international economy from the point of view of 
competitiveness denies trench psychology but it recognizes the legitimacy of 
concerns over national interests. A national competitiveness approach assumes 
that people sharing territory, language, culture and traditions on top of 
economic activities cannot but have certain common interests distinguishing them 
from the rest of the world. At the same time, it equally suggests that these 
interests can be better pursued in coordination with other nations through the 
adaptation to tendencies forming across international economic space.
Action presumes counteraction. Among other things, competition is 
always a struggle for one’s own interests. The success of this struggle depends 
on two instances: how amply and correctly these interests are defined and how 
well the instruments for implementing them into life are chosen. Even, in 
Porter’s terminology, "positive" impulses have to be adapted to country s 
specifics. With international competition having developed into a major force 
prompting the progress of productive forces, impulses transmitted through the 
world market become too important for the national economy as a whole for 
separate firms to be left alone to cope with them. For instance, American two
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most successful export industries - aerospace and electronics - have been 
continuously slashing jobs even though orders from abroad keep increasing.
This performance follows a more general trend, pronounced even stronger 
in Japan, according to which the success of an industry does not translate any 
more in additional manufacturing employment but rather leads to further 
substitution of capital for labour. In the United States, in R and D intensive 
industries as well as in traditional sectors such as automobile production, 
international competition has urged decline in blue-collar employment. Firms with 
most international exposure are in the forefront of "deindustrialization" of 
America: they use foreign production bases for labour-intensive production, they 
hastily introduce blue-collar jobs cutting technologies for what is still left in 
their home-country.
The challenge presented by this trend exceeds the scope of separate 
firms and industries. It is a national challenge as, according to experts, the 
occupational profile of the United States together with other industrialized 
countries is going to undergo radical changes, within the next twenty five years. 
Given the importance of the change, its social, cultural and political 
consequences, it is hardly possible that it will not provoke a governmental 
reaction. With the growth of interdependence the responsibility of the government 
increases. Under the Labour Party, Britain was trying to resist the trend 
described above. Because of governmental policy, the number of blue-collar 
workers per unit of manufacturing production had been going down far more slowly 
than in other developed countries. As a result, the comparative industrial power 
of the country declined while the unemployment rate had soared up to the highest 
level among developed countries.
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2.5.3. Competitiveness and National Interests
By summarizing what has been said previously, the term national 
competitiveness for the purpose of this research may be defined as the ability to 
protect or pursue national economic interests in the situation of profound
12
international interdependence This formula meets the request, present 
implicitly or explicitly in many publications on the subject, for a broader
definition of national competitiveness breaking away from the conventional mind 
set
which imprisons industrial strategy to narrowly based concept of
manufacturing productivity and export market share (A. Rugman. 1987, pp. 95- 
96).
This definition offers certain advantages in comparison to those proceeding from 
the premise that the competitiveness of a country essentially is the 
competitiveness of its business by expressively stressing several important 
points:
a) National competitiveness is not a value in itself, nor is exclusively about 
firms. In the last analysis, it is about people. What the reference to national 
interests is particularly designed to point at are the welfare effects of
national development. The talk about the competitiveness of a nation is
meaningless if it is not related to the welfare of the nation. By accentuating 
the wellbeing of the people this definition depreciates the traditional measures 
of competitiveness such as export quotas and pushes to the foreground per capita 
national income, the level of employment and quality-of-life indexes.
12. A somewhat similar definition may be found in the Report of the President’s Commission 
on Industrial CompeUUveness:"The deflniUon of competitiveness for a nation must ... be 
tied to its ability to generate the resources required to meet the nations needs" (The 
Report of the President's Commission.... Vol.Il: Global Competition. The New Reality. 1985. 
p.6).
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b) This definition underlines the relativeness of national competitiveness not 
only in the sense that, for a country, it can be measured only vis-a-vis another 
country, but also that it should be related to the stage of development of the 
country in question and its "priorities list" corresponding to this stage. For 
instance, industrialized and developing countries compete in as much as they are 
actor in the world market. However, the former compete on the basis of leading- 
edge technologies whilst the latter can reciprocate only relying on cheaper 
labour. The situation is far from being equal: technological innovation, unlike 
the exploitation of cheap labour, is an inexhaustible source of competitive 
advantages.
c) By stressing the aspect of pursuing national economic interests, the
definition above raises the point that international competition of nations is
not a perpetual game of catch-up with more advanced countries through imitating 
these countries. Competitive issues should be addressed more directly, without 
relying to much on policy panaceas derived from generalized theories.
Most successful in competitive struggle have been those new-comers,
such as the South-Asian "Young Tigers", which managed to leap-frog several stages
of development having taken advantage of a particular combination of economic,
political and social circumstances. Such approach demands realism in assessments
and openness to non-conformist decisions. An example of this approach is provided
by Japanese industrial policy. Christopher Carr (1990, p.26) cites Mr Y.Ojima,
Vice-Minister for International Trade and Industry, as stating that it was
decided to establish in Japan industries which required intensive 
employment of capital and technology, industries that in consideration of
comparative costs of producUon should be the most inappropriate for
Japan, industries such as steel.oil refinery, petrochemicals, aircraft, 
industrial machinery of all sorts, and electronics including electronic
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computers. From a short-run static view point, encouragement of such 
Industries would seem to conflict with economic rationalism. But from a 
long range view-point, these are precisely the industries where ... demand 
is high, technological progress is rapid, and labour productivity rises 
fast.
d) The stress on interdependence warns against taking traditional theoretical 
models too far and puts weight on creating a long-range vision of where the 
international economy is going. As "new" economics maintains, an obsession with 
short-term disequilibrium problems such as inflation and budget deficit, whatever 
important these problems are, is not enough to prevent decline of national 
competitiveness. Even more important may be detecting longer-term tendencies 
characterizing the general direction of the growth of the international economy 
and encouraging them on the national soil.
The stress on interdependence, furthermore, is helpful for placing into 
the limelight the important insight of the open economy theory, namely, that 
extensive exposure to international markets is advantageous to strong economies 
while creating additional problems when the economy is out of balance. Hence, the 
organization of an internal economic structure could be more important in terms 
of results produced than the speedy opening of the economy in as much as openness 
gives results in as much as the structure is properly adjusted.
The proposed definition fails to point any single critical element 
which, such as the philosopher’s stone in ancient alchemy, would be a key to 
transforming any national economy into a supercompetitive one. In economics, as 
in chemistry, this key element hardly exists, but there are many, according to 
economists, putting claim to play a particular role in forming national 
competitiveness. Adam Smith and later classical and neo-classical economists put
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in the center of the growth of "the wealth of nations" the accumulation of 
capital, Marx gave priority to labour productivity, and Keynes, while accepting 
in the large part the classical equilibrium model, singled out the importance of 
the demand side. More recently, Porter and Frolich emphasize the prominence of 
efficiency and productivity of major firms and businesses; Reich argues in favour 
of the quality of the labour force; Rugman considers that nations should 
concentrate on utilizing in full comparative advantages their business possesses, 
and Krugman (as well as Reich and Dunning) points out that in a modern economy 
created competitive advantages are much more important than those endowed by 
nature. However, Christopher Carr probably came closest to the essence of the 
confusion about the mystery of competitiveness when remarking that the principles 
behind achieving competitiveness are straightforward, but easily neglected. They 
do not diverge from those well known as determining economic growth though seen 
in a much broader context of the international economy and expanded 
interconnectedness between nations.
2.6. Competitiveness and Scenarios of Reform
2.6.2. Cyclops Regains the Sight
Judging from press reports from Moscow and the capitals of other CIS 
member-countries, one might conclude that the only type of competition these 
countries could be involved in is that for a place on the charity list of 
international aid agencies. But, under closer examination, this conclusion is 
certain to appear premature. An attentive reader would be able to pick up in the 
current of alarming reports some valuable tips that would not let him forget 
that, in fact, what is called the CIS now used to be one of the most 
industrialized powers of the world only very short time ago.
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The negligent approach to the economic potential of the CIS, quite 
tangible in the modem western literature on the issue, stems, in part, from the 
observation of the actual state of the ex-Soviet economy and the generalization 
of the results of detailed examination by western experts of industries in 
Central European countries. On the other hand, to not a small degree, it follows 
a certain tradition in sovietology depicted the Soviet Union as a kind of 
economical Cyclops. Zbigniew Brzezinski’s verdict (Encounter, December 1983, 
p. 12) presents this line of thinking in its most refined form:
The Soviet Union is a world power of a new type in that its might is one- 
dimensional... the Soviet Union is a global power only in military 
dimension.
This evaluation is not groundless but, at the same time, it is not completely 
correct. It is biased by the Cold War logic according to which the industrial 
capacity of a nation belonging to the opposite block was estimated in terms of 
how much it could contribute to the military build-up. This was almost the only 
context in which the Soviet economy was regarded as competing with western 
industries. The market competition, due to the reasons outlined earlier, was 
practically nonexistent, which left many analysts the right to an unshaken belief 
in the superiority of western industries. Post-communist revelations about the 
comparative technological level of socialist production and its many deficiencies 
only seemed to have reinforced this view. But the situation is more complex. The 
command system could make the economy as a whole inefficient, but this does not 
mean that in any particular case the products manufactured within the frame of 
this economy are hopelessly inferior to reasonable standards.
The International Herald Tribune (January 8, 1991) reported that the 
United States is completing a deal to buy an advanced type of a nuclear reactor 
built by Russia in order to leapfrog a development stage, to start from
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operational hardware and make a variation; some of the alloys used in the 
structure are virtually unknown in the West. Time magazine informed its readers 
of the test of a Soviet battle aircraft undertaken by German military experts 
whereby it was found superior to all models currently in service in the 
Bundeswehr. Izvestia (May 8, 1992) wrote that the price on the French fighter 
Mirage in the world market had halved after the announcement of the Russian 
government that arms producers would be allowed to effect the direct sale of 
their products. These examples may be found too insignificant to turn the tide. 
The truth is, however, that owing to the gigantic scope of the Russian economy 
"particular cases" may accumulate on such a scale that they may destabilise whole 
branches of the world economy. The example of the aluminium industry is very much 
to the point. In 1991, the flow of the metal to the West increased dramatically 
and equaled one million tons. Coming on top of recession in main markets, it 
caused the price of aluminium to fall to its lowest level in real terms and the 
western industry to shut down about ten per cent of its capacity (Izvestia, March 
21, 1991; Financial Times, April 2nd, 1992, p.26).
Earlier I wrote about the problems posed for the economy of the CIS by 
its forthcoming integration in international markets. The above examples 
demonstrate that the CIS is also a challenge to the established structures of 
these markets. This implies that, from the first steps towards an open economy 
on, the CIS member-states should contemplate their strategy in terms of national 
competitiveness taking into account that for the West they are not just lost 
sheep returning to the herd but potential competitors and a threat to the 
existing international economic regime.
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The West does not hesitate to take preventive measures against exports 
from the CIS. A trade war between Russia and other member-countries of the CIS on 
the one side and the US on the other side is a reality. The United States 
actively withstands the intention of Russia to increase its quote in the 
international market of enriched uranium from seven to 25 per cent. The conflict 
has progressed according to a standard scenario. The Association of American 
Producers of Uranium accused the producers from the CIS in the price dumping and 
excessive production as import had soared to 110 million dollars in 1991 from 
just two million dollars in 1986. The Association has proposed a punitive import 
tariff that would more than double the price. The exporters denied these charges. 
Nonetheless, the Association received support from the US administration. The 
Commerce Department introduced a 116 per cent tariff on the uranium from the CIS 
effective from the autumn of 1992 proceeding from the assumption that the 
republics’ costs were comparable to those in Britain, Canada and Namibia (The New 
York Times, May 29, 1992). The obvious duality of the official policy did not 
embarrass the administration which, criticizing Western Europe for excluding 
goods from Eastern Europe, itself have taken measures causing damage to export 
trade of some of the most impoverished uf the ex-Soviet republics.
Another precedent is even more suggestive as it shows the pattern of 
Western response to the entry of Russian in the high-tech sector of the 
international market. Washington exerted great pressure on Russia and India in 
order to force them to cancel a deal involving the shipment of three Russian-made 
rocket engines to India. According to the official version, the United States was 
concerned by the military-strategic implications of this sale since the engines 
might, have been installed in mid-range ballistic missiles. Indians and Russians 
put forward a different version of events. The official intervention of
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Washington followed when the Indian Organization of Space Research had turned 
down the offer of an American corporation which asked a three and a half times 
higher price than that set by Russia’s Glavkosmos for its products. Experts 
claimed, however, that the true reason for the American demarche should be looked 
for beyond a particular deal. The objective was to force away the Russian space 
industry from its largest foreign market, the only one in this region not yet 
controlled by American producers. As the lever the US used the threat of taking 
away their support for the G7 plan to provide the CIS with 24 billion dollars in 
financial loans. This threat was not realized, but Washington has put a two year 
embargo on Glavkosmos. This is a hard blow at one of the few competitive 
industries in Russia. Furthermore, this is a blow at plans of converting Russia’s 
military-industrial complex and, allowing for the share of this complex in total 
national output, at the restructuring of Russian industry on the whole.
To take what lies on the surface, the message of the competitiveness 
theory to post-communist reformers is that integration in the world market and 
foreign investments will increase competition, which in turn will increase 
efficiency, which in turn will increase competitiveness. However, at a closer 
examination the chain of causation does not appear to be so simple.
Theoretically at least, different scenarios of integration are 
possible. The one advocated (and imposed) by international financial agencies and 
the Group of Seven puts the whole burden of the transition on the shoulders of 
ex-socialist countries. They are urged to accept the western model as the 
absolute truth without being given time to rethink their own heritage. More than 
that, while there is room for discussion as concerns the longer-term outcomes of 
shock therapy, in the short term they are devastating for the national productive
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forces especially in the case of the CIS in which they exist in the form of huge 
enterprises and manufacturing complexes. This impedes privatisation, slows down 
reorganization according to market principles and, therefore, frustrates one of 
the main arguments in favour of abrupt actions, namely, that reforms must proceed 
simultaneously in all directions. The big-bang logic has pushed national industry 
to the line where hundreds of enterprises are to be either closed down or sold 
out to foreign investors. Nor necessarily inefficient ones since there was no 
possibility to measure their efficiency according to world standards. The 
analyzing scenario, hence, allows transnational corporations to internalize 
potential competitors in an early stage and, most likely, at a low cost. 
International markets will expand but this will have no or little effect on 
national producers if, because of the lack of resources, experience and 
competitive advantage, they fail to penetrate the oligopolistic structures of 
these markets.
2.6.2. The Alternative Scenario
The alternative scenario would be to increase the national bargaining 
power by concentrating effort on disclosing, preserving and reinforcing existing 
competitive advantages, and creating new ones already in the early stages of 
reforms in order to countervail asymmetrical interdependence leading to one*side 
dependence. It does not put in question the ultimate goals of reforms, but 
provides for amending obsession with relatively short-term equilibrium problems 
with a vision of the international competitive situation. The competitive 
advantages should be looked for in national industry, the skill of the labour 
force, plus the size of the national market. Respectively, in relation to foreign 
investment this approach envisages pursuing of a policy aimed at avoiding the
eventual transference of most competitive enterprises, brunches and industries 
into a foreign-controlled enclave-type sector of the economy, shortening the 
period when national competitiveness will be anchored to such a hopeless, in 
longer perspective, factor as cheap labour, and counteracting to centrifugal 
tendency of the new division of labour bringing at the concentration of high-tech 
industries in core countries.
As general points of reference, this scenario should provide for the
*
preservation of national industry and especially for the protection of living 
standards because the deterioration of the latters will have as its very next 
consequence a decline in the capacity of the nation not only to increase the 
educational level of its workers, equally blue-collar and white-collar, but even 
to reproduce the highly trained and highly motivated labour force at a previous 
scale. This goal may be achieved in the course of a fundamental restructuring of 
the economy according to the new forms of ownership and the demands advanced by 
the international environment. Foreign capital must be given an important role in 
this process but in such a manner that the judgement of international investors, 
though an important factor within the frame of any open economy, could not 
prevail in deciding the fate of the national economy.
Realistically speaking, the countries of the CIS, facing severe 
economic, national, ecological and, in some republics, political crises, have a 
weak standing at bilateral and international levels, and the second scenario may 
appear utopian. Is it really so? A closer look at the potential of Russia, the 
core republic of the former Soviet Union, gives grounds for optimism.
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The territory of Russia is 1.5 times bigger than that of the United 
States, England, Germany, France, Italy and Japan taken together. The population 
of Russia is equal to the combined population of England, France and Italy. It is 
ethnically homogenous (82 per cent are Russians) and very well educated - 70 per 
cent have degrees at the level of higher and further education. Russia possesses 
almost all natural resources necessary for modem industrial development plus it 
is particularly rich in forests (5 hectares of forest per head against 0.8 
hectares in the U.S.).
The industrial potential of Russia can be characterized by the 
following figures. Its share in the world production of oil is 19 per cent, of 
gas - 32 per cent, of coal - nine per cent, of steel and mineral fertilizers - 
about 12 per cent, of cement - eight per cent. By the cumulative amount of the 
GNP, in 1990, it occupied the fifth position in the world-league table after the 
United States, China, Japan and united Germany. The per capita GNP figure (5,867 
dollars) puts it in the middle of the scale together with Greece, South Korea, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Venezuela. Russia has an extensive and diversified 
machine-building industry, though oriented mainly to military purposes and with 
serious innovation and quality problems.
The country has a potentially enormous internal market and a 
considerable export capacity. It is one the world most important suppliers of 
gas, non-ferrous metals, timber, some other resources and arms. Technologies and 
know-how may become one more important export item as about one million engineers 
and scientists are involved in research and development activities.
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The aforesaid implies that Russia remains a world-class power with 
outstanding prospects for development. Now everything depends on strategies 
chosen and decisions taken. Starting from 1985, the economy has suffered a 
sequence a heavy blows each causing multibillion damages. The Chernobyl 
catastrophe, a sharp decline in oil prices, the earthquake in Armenia swept away
13hundreds of billion of dollars . No less disastrous in financial terms were the 
consequences of the "antialcohol campaign" and more recent chaotic liberalization 
experiments, let alone the disintegration of the former USSR. "I do not think 
that any of western economies would have sustain even a fraction of this 
calamities more than a year", writes a renowned Russian economist Yurii Ol’sevich 
(1992, p.29). As it was in the years of the Second World War, the Russian economy 
has demonstrated once again an incredible capacity to resist shocks. This leads 
to the question of how to combine the introduction of the new principles of 
ownership and management with the strengths of the demolishing system.
This is, of course, a very challenging question. Finding ways towards 
the implementation of what I have called the "alternative scenario" would mean to 
give at least a partial answer to it. This implies if not a revision than a 
revaluation of the aims of the "big bang” approach in the national context. It 
also implies that the government should show more commitment for shaping an 
active strategy towards foreign investment.
13. See Soviet Economy. 1990, Vol.6, No. 1. pp.21-22.
3 RUSSIA’S PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE AS A CAPITAL IMPORTING COUNTRY
3.1. When the "Bear" behaved like a "Young Tiger"
A profound restructuring of industry and agriculture has been one of 
the main objectives of recent social and economic reforms in the Russian 
Federation. The introduction of new forms of ownership is expected to trigger off 
serious technological and organizational shifts affecting the size of 
enterprises, the pattern of the division of labour, the occupational profile of 
the population, the comparative importance of different industries and sectors of 
the economy and so on. It is not the first time in its modem history that the 
Russian economy has gone through a period of drastic change. Both capitalist 
industrialization in pre-war Imperial Russia and socialist accelerated 
industrialization of the 1930s provide a precedent for the 1990s. Both intended, 
in one major effort, to transform Russian industry to an updated technological 
basis. Much the same ambition lies behind the current reforms.
The two Russian industrializations share many features. They were 
state-led, had the development of heavy large-scale industry as their prime 
objective and were carried out mainly at the expense of the country’s rural 
population. If, in the 1930s, the international economic situation and the 
investment climate in the country had been different, they could have had still 
another similarity - the extensive usage of foreign capital, technique and 
entrepreneurial skill. However, all in all Russia possesses rich and diverse
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experience as a capital importer worth being reviewed. It can reveal some 
country specific characteristics which might be important to consider also in the 
framework of the current debate.
The first external loan was placed by a Russian tsarina in Amsterdam in 
1769 while the first foreign-owned company in Russia received the Imperial 
authorization in 1855 (Dongarov, p.8,p.l5). The scope of capital inflow and its 
impact on the national economy, as well as the types of capital entry policy 
pursued by the government, varied over time. It is logical to split the history 
of foreign investment in Russia in two major periods divided by the October 
Revolution. Neither of these periods is completely homogeneous regarding the 
economic and political situation, business conditions or regulations applied. 
But, for the purpose of this research, such classification is relevant as 
factors, determining the investment climate formation and governmental capital 
entry strategy, remained quite stable during each of the singled-out periods.
It has been quite common in recent years that lessons drawn from the 
experience of newly industrialized countries were evaluated by academics as most 
relevant to post-communist economic transition. However, as was shown before, 
this experience can be interpreted in more than one way. Some authors praise it 
as a triumph of economic liberalism, others treat it as a pattern of 
sophisticated étatisme. The achievements of Asian "young tigers", the four most 
successful of newly industrialized countries, may be unique for the last few 
decades but they are certainly not without precedence in a broader historical 
prospect. Imperial Russia at the turn of the century in terms of economic 
development did something very similar to what South Korea or Taiwan did in the 
70s and 80s. Within only twenty years it effected a great leap forward to become
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VOMa major industrialized country. Allowing for all the difference between the 
conditions then and now, Imperial Russia’s case appears to be valuable as a 
historical test for modem economic and political doctrines. Furthermore, as yet 
another story of a successful transition, it may help to disclose some 
regularities pertaining to this phenomenon and help to overcome conflicting 
explanations of other cases.
The last two and a half decades of tsarist Russia provide an example, 
maybe one and only by its scale, when a huge influx of foreign capital had 
fertilized previously underutilized or idle national labour and naturel resources 
to produce a tremendous outbreak of economic activity which, within the life-span 
of only one generation, had transformed stagnant rural Russia into a dynamic 
industrial power. The rise of the Russian economy was outstanding by any 
standard. In the last ten years of the 19th century, Russian industry showed a 
remarkable yearly increase in production equal to eight per cent. At the 
beginning of the 20th century, after the stagnation of 1900-1906, another booming 
decade followed with an average increment of over six per cent per year (Falkus, 
p.45). Between 1890 and 1913, the production of textile grew 3,2 times, of iron 
and steel - 5,99 times, of oil - 2,48 times (Haumann, p.27). To a certain extent 
the record rate of growth can be explained by the general backwardness of the 
country’s economy at the moment when, in Rostow’s terminology, its industrial 
"take-ofT started. Nonetheless, in absolute figures the results achieved were 
equally impressive. Russia joined the league of world superpowers in all the 
major industries (for comparative data see Wood, p.222-223). It even outranked 
France as a steel-producer, was second only to the USA in oil-production and by 
the overall length of railroads was third in Europe. At the same time, the 
Russian Empire remained to be a country of a double standard: it was roughly on
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par with other European industrialized countries if measured by gross production 
figures and lagged behind drastically whenever per person figures were compared. 
According to these latter figures Russia, in fact, rested among the poorest 
nations of Europe1.
Later this duality was inherited by the Soviet economy. It remained its 
intrinsic weakness during the entire period of its existence. It was the cost 
paid by the economy for the political ambitions of its leaders, first Russian and 
later Soviet, who were determined to preserve and even reinforce the status of a 
great power that Russia first acquired in the 18th century. In pursuing this 
goal, the leadership of the country was tempted to subordinate the living 
standard of the people to other priorities such as capital accumulation, the 
development of heavy industries and the escalation of a military potential. 
Historically the disparity between political aims and economic means emerged to 
be probably the main challenge to Russian and Soviet policy-makers.
1. According to the calculations of Paul Balroch. in 1910, in Europe Russian GNP was 
second only to German while on a per capita scale it was superior only to that of Serbia 
and Bulgaria (Balroch, pp. 154-155). According to the estimates made by Russian economist
S. Prokopovich, the national Income of Russia Empire (excluding Finland) calculated for 
Industrial sector only was equivalent to 37 per cent of that of the United States which 
means that allowing for bigger population Russia had a per capita Income of only 20,4 per 
cent of American level (Kudrov, p.89).
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3.2. Imperial Russia: Foreign Capital In The Country Of Economic 
Nationalism
3.2.1. Preparing the Grounds
The policy towards foreign capital adopted in tsarist Russia on the eve
of this century was designed initially as primarily a sort of response to the
aforesaid challenge. The defeat in the Crimean War, in 1856, by its consequences
was a watershed in the history of pre-revolutionary Russia: it made clear to the
tsarist government that without radical social and economic changes the country
would be inevitably pushed aside to the periphery of world politics and exploited
economically (see Kennedy, pp. 170-177). The existence of serfdom impeded the
development of a modern industrial economy which was lacking in Russia its most
basic precondition - free labour market. In this respect the abolition of
serfdom, in 1861, was a major breakthrough towards capitalist production.
However, even after the reform which was incomplete in many ways, social and
economic conditions in the country did not favour rapid industrialization. The
archaic peasantry commune - obshina - was preserved by the regime to play the
role of the cornerstone of social stability in the countiy. This conservative
approach had numerous negative consequences in economic prospect: the
proletarianization of peasants was delayed; the internal market remained
underdeveloped and stagnant as far as, within obshina, the peasant tended to
2
satisfy all his consumption needs through his own production ; money capital was 
scarce and expensive, the capital market in the modem sense of the word was
2. Almost forty years after the liberation of surfs, on the turn of the 20th century, a 
typical peasant household in Central Russia spent on consumption goods bought in the market 
as little as 12 rubles per year (see Dongarov, p. 11)-
almost nonexistent. Despite these obstacles, capitalism in Russia was developing, 
though at a pace vastly inadequate to other European countries.
This inadequacy was once again demonstrated in the course of an arms 
race in Europe which accelerated dramatically by the end of the 19th century. The 
Imperial government had found itself unable to rearm its military forces as often 
and as quick as its major rivals. This discovery urged the government to seek for 
expanding the industrial basis for military production. Domestic industry was not 
capable to meet this requirement. By the 1870s, within two generations time, 
Russia had lost its position as Europe’s largest producer and exporter of iron 
and turned into a country increasingly dependent upon imports of western 
manufacturers. Russian industrialization needed a catalyst. It appeared in the 
form of a symbiosis of efficient governmental interventionism and the invasion of 
foreign capital.
3.2.2. The Role of the State
Even before the liberation of serfs the state in Russia was very deeply 
involved in the national economy. First of all, because of heavy taxes from the 
population, the state was an unavoidable arbiter as to how resources were to be 
employed; it also held the most significant portion of disposable resources. 
Second, the state itself was a major landowner, proprietor of mines, dwells, 
factories, plants and railroads. Last but not least, being extremely 
paternalistic and authoritarian, it widely interfered in the activities of 
private firms, in particular bigger ones: one way or another, they were all 
directly dependent either on state supply or on state orders.
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Nevertheless, for the most part of the 19th centuiy, there was neither 
consistent economic policy nor an accepted view even on central economic issues - 
whether factories were good or bad, what tariff policy should be, or how 
agriculture ought to be improved (see McKenzie Pinter, 1967). Public revenues 
presented the main focus of government concern. It showed in Russian tariffs: 
during the whole period they were rather high fetching a substantial contribution 
to the state budget yet not high enough to give a solid protection to national 
industries excluding, probably, only four branches - the production of wool and 
cotton yarn, cotton thread and pig-iron. In the 1860s and 1870s, Russian import 
of industrial products was huge and included not only sophisticated items but 
also very basic commodities such as nails and hessian.
After the liberation of the serfs in 1861, government economic policy 
underwent important qualitative evolution. It started to reflect certain 
theoretical content, became more logical and coherent. However, the concept 
itself had changed profoundly within only few years. In the two decades that 
followed 1861, it was based on the ideas of free trade and laissez-faire. Private 
initiative and unregulated markets came to be seen as the best prerequisites for 
the accelerated development of the Russian economy. As it happened, Russian 
capitalism was too weak to take advantage of this governmental philosophy and to 
respond to it with higher rates of growth.
Starting from 1882, governmental economic policy took a new direction 
which it never abandoned thereafter. In its most elabourate and complete version 
this new strategy was embodied in what became known as Witte s system - an 
economic program named after its inspirator, an outstanding tsarist statesmen. It 
never existed as a detailed and comprehensive plan. Sergei Witte was very much a
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pragmatist, and in his activities of Finance Minister (1892*1903) relied heavily 
on improvisation. Nevertheless, his action were never chaotic. They were based on 
a clear general economic outlook having as its hard core the principles of 
economic nationalism and étatisme which most prominent propagandist at the time 
was Friedrich List. In the long run, it was these principles that constituted a 
framework for Witte’s reforming effort.
3J2.3. Witte’s System
The interplay of three elements characterized Witte’s system.
The first element was a belief that railroad construction was to play a 
crucial role in precipitating the large-scale industrialization of Russia. 
According to Witte’s plan, railroad orders were to serve as a detonator for the 
explosion-like expansion of heavy industries, while railroads themselves should 
provide previously missing means to unite different economic regions of the 
country in a common market big enough to provide an outlet for capitalist mass 
production. Light industries and agriculture were expected to benefit as well, 
but in a later stage, thanks to such secondary outcomes of the railway boom as 
the increasing personnel demand of millions of workers and employees engaged in 
the railroad construction.
The second element was an emphasis on state intervention as a driving 
force, at least until a certain moment, behind industrialization. Government 
spendings and initiative were to back private capital in those spheres were it 
was active and to substitute for it where it was missing. State orders for heavy 
industry products, mainly railroad equipment, were chosen as the principle lever
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of state intervention. How powerful that lever was may be concluded from the fact 
that, by the beginning of the first world war, state demand for iron and steel 
products made up 23 per cent of the overall demand for these products (Haumann, 
s.36).
The third element reflected the assumption that national capital 
resources were insufficient to provide for the requirements of accelerated 
industrialization. Hence, tapping foreign sources of investment capital and 
encouraging foreign assistance in technique and equipment were to occupy the 
central place among the concerns of governmental economic regulations.
In many respects the implementation of the "Witte’s system" proved to 
be a success. As was mentioned earlier, at the turn of the century Russia went 
through a period of unprecedented growth. The contribution of foreign investors 
and entrepreneurs to this process can hardly be overvalued. Cumulative foreign 
capital in Russia increased from 0,5 billion rubles in 1861 to 2,7 billion rubles 
in 1881, to 4,7 billion rubles in 1900 and to 7,6 billion rubles in 1914 (Jones 
and Gerenstein, p.XIV). Of this total, in 1913, 74,3 per cent was in state bonds 
and state guaranteed railway loans, and 25,7 per cent - in joint stock companies. 
Imported direct and portfolio investment was heavily concentrated in just a 
handful of key industries were foreign capital share was indeed overwhelming or 
immense. Thus, in mining enterprises foreign capital represented 91 per cent of 
all joint stock and bond capital, in chemical industry - 50 per cent, in metal 
processing - 42 per cent, in timber and wood processing - 37 per cent, in textile 
industry - 28 per cent (Liaschenko, p.378).
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3*2.4. Technology Transfer
Impressive as they are, these figures do not reveal in full the
significance of the foreign contribution. The inflow of capital was accompanied
by the transfer of technology which literally revolutionized Russian industry.
Russia had received many technologies and products which were either unknown in
the country or superior in the quality to those traditionally employed. Olga
Crisp, a noted student of Russian economic history, points out that the "newness"
of much of country’s industry was a real advantage: many of foreign financed
plants were, from the technical point of view, superior to those of the country
from which the capital originated. In some industries the gap in labour
productivity at all-Russian and foreign-financed enterprises was absolutely
3notorious: thus in the Ural one minor extracted 6100 puds of iron ore per year 
against 16 400 poods per minor in Crivoi Rog (Crisp, p. 166, p.250). At the same 
time it is »noteworthy that foreign capital was very selective in introducing 
modern technologies. The main beneficiary was metallurgy while in industries were 
easy access to natural resources or market monopoly compensated for low labour 
productivity archaic technologies were still widely employed (Gatrell, pp. 159- 
160).
3.2.5. The Making of an Investment Climate
What made Russian bonds and stocks so popular with foreign investors? 
This phenomenon cannot be attributed to any single reason alone. It had emerged 
as a sequel of the interplay of factors originated in Russia as well as in
3. Traditional Russian measure of weight equal to about 16 kilograms.
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capital exporting countries themselves. Nevertheless, as will be shown below, 
governmental regulations provided a pivot for this success.
Not all the change was owing to Witte. Some of pre-requisites favoring 
foreign investment in Russia existed before 'Witte’s system". Others were 
independent of it.
First of all, historically Russia enjoyed an excellent reputation with 
international creditors. In France, for instance, Russian loans had been placed 
since 1830 and there had never been a single case of default. Although the 
general line of pre-Witte Russian policy with respect to foreign borrowing was to 
restrain it to a possible minimum size, the government had had almost a 
pathological concern for its credit standing abroad. Foreign debt was not only 
meticulously served and honored, but Russian financial ministry was known to 
organize interventions in foreign credit markets in support of Russian bonds. 
Internal monetary policy was also aimed, to a certain extent, at reinforcing the 
appeal of state loans to foreign creditors. The latter consideration was one of 
the motives behind anti-inflationary measures of the 1820s and later in the 19th 
century.
Of no less importance was the political situation in Europe in the 
second half of the 19th century. Russia happened to have as its most important 
political allies two major creditor-countries - France and Great Britain. Close 
political cooperation between the three states encouraged private investors in 
France and Britain. On top of that European superpowers competed for economic and 
political influence over Russia and considered credit relations instrumental for 
this end. For political reason Germany closed down its money market for Russian
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loans in 1887, whilst Paris and London for the same reason, on the contrary, 
favored Russian borrowing.
The geographical position of Russian Empire also had played its role. 
Russia seemed to be a natural choice for cautious rentiers who were many in 
Western Europe in general and in France in particular. They were not prone to 
risk their capital in exotic ventures in exchange for the promise of fabulous 
return but preferred Russia because it was nearby and its economy and politics 
could have been monitored with a certain degree of accuracy. At the same time, 
investing in Russia inspired interest in more adventure-minded capitalists as 
well, as having business in Russia was instrumental for intruding Turkey, Persia 
and Manchuria which, at the moment, were tied to Russian Empire economically.
Last but not least, Russia benefited from the fact that, by the end of 
the 19th century, the industrialized countries of Western Europe had entered a 
particular stage of their development which, after having been first examined, in 
1902, by J.A.Hobson in his Imperialism, became widely acknowledged as 
imperialistic. Among other features it was characterized by the hyper­
accumulation of investment capital in economically most advanced countries and by 
a strong trend towards substituting capital export for the export of commodities 
or for investing in the enhancement of the productive capacity of national 
industiy. The outflow of capital becomes constant and huge, boosting the search 
for new promising outlets for investment (see for detail Kenwood and Lougheed, 
1977, pp.38-56).
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3.2.6. Capital Entry Management Strategy
This was the background against which the Russian government developed 
its capital entry strategy. It essentially rested on four pillars.
The first was a ruble stabilization policy which climaxed in the 
achievement of a state of convertibility of Russian currency into gold at a fixed 
price in August 1897. That was an explicitly outward oriented campaign designed 
to provide foreign investors with yet another argument in favor of Russia as an 
investment outlet. This move was to confirm once again the soundness of Russia’s 
finance and country’s general creditworthiness. Simultaneously Witte introduced 
another novelty serving the same aim: some items of governmental expenditures 
were transferred to a so-called "extraordinary" account so that net losses from 
the operations of state railways and some other expenses were not allowed to 
affect the picture of budgetary health. This simple window-dressing operation 
proved to be exceptionally efficient: since after this step (and until Witte’s
4
resignation) the state budget never showed any deficit .
The introduction of a gold standard was warmly received by investors 
and quickly translated into better terms for Russian loans (see Crisp, chapter 
8). But the cost of this operation was high, in the opinion of some historians, 
even unjustifiably high (see, for example, Kahan, pp. 103-105). It was not 
confined to the price of abandoning the previously existed silver standard and 
accumulating gold reserves in the sum of 1 095 million rubles by 1897. Millions 
of Russian grain exporters had paid for it by the loss of the export premium
4. The "extraordinary" account deficit during the same period amounted to over 2.5 billion 
rubles (Liaschenko. p. 195).
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existed in the form of disparity between the external and internal rates of 
ruble. Moreover, striving to give Russia’s currency the most solid image, the 
authorities arranged regulations that required a very high ratio between gold 
reserves and bank notes in circulation, thus incurring extra costs and exerting 
a constant deflationary impact on the economy.
A change in tariff regulations was another new feature in Russian 
economic polity during the period of industrialization. The relatively liberal 
statute of 1868 gave way, in 1891, to a new one prescribing practically 
prohibitive duties on the majority of imports. Russia stepped into the era of 
import-substituting growth. The new tariffs impact on foreign producers were 
twofold: on the one hand, establishing production operations in Russia had turned 
into the most appropriate way to tap the Russian market; on the other hand, the
5
new tariffs boosted domestic prices and increased return on the productive 
capital.
The implication of the new tariff was much wider than just to isolate 
Russian market» from foreign-made products. It supplied the government with new 
instruments (though quite crude) to regulate the process of industrialization. 
The tariff system was selective - it was biased in favour of high value-to-weight 
equipment and discouraged importingsimple and labour intensive equipment (Dohan, 
p.217). Maybe even more important, by granting tariff allowances and exemptions, 
the government managed to offer an incentive which hardly any foreign firm could 
have ignored, while the threat of abolishing a particular duty altogether was the
5. In 1913, Russian wholesale industrial prices were on average 39 per cent above the 
world level (Davis, p. 15).
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instrument the government could always resort to to exert downward pressure on 
prices.
State subsidies to heavy industries were also seen as a means to attach 
foreign capital to the industrialization effort. Two types of subsidies were 
practiced most frequently. The first was incorporated into the mechanism of state 
orders for equipment (mainly railway). They were normally given for three years 
in advance at constant prices which noticeably exceeded what the free market 
could offer. Hence winning a state order brought to a firm liberation from market 
uncertainties together with guaranteed income. The profitability of the state 
orders was so enormous that there were cases when a possession of just one such 
an order was enough justification for constructing an all new plant to cany it 
out (Liaschenko, p.317). The other form of indirect subsidy existed as a state 
guarantee for corporate loans. The following figures may give the idea of its 
significance: on January 1st 1914, government guaranteed bonds accounted for 22 
per cent of all French investment in Russia (Crisp, p. 198).
Finally, the Russian government made every effort to stabilise the 
balance of payments and the balance of trade of the country regarding a sound 
balance of payments as yet another important pre-requisite for the unimpeded 
inflow of capital resources. In so far as Russia could not compete in 
international markets of industrial products an emphasis was put on facilitating 
the export of grain and oil. The government’s obsession with agricultural exports 
was at odds with common sense. Witte’s predecessor, Finance Minister 
Vyshnegradski, had become infamous for his credo: We would rather stay underfed 
than lower our exports". Authorities were never tired of inventing new 
incentives for agricultural export. For instance, railroad tariffs - the
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railroads were mainly state-owned - were structured in such a way that it was 
cheaper for the grain producer to transport his harvest to a sea port for export 
than to supply it to a nearby city. In combination with import impeding tariffs 
exports promotion helped keep Russian trade balance in black and compensate at 
its account for deficit items in the balance of payments.
Despite certain effort on the part of the government the investment 
environment in Russia was far from being perfect. Foreign entrepreneurs were 
quick to discover that their Russian ventures tended to be a great deal less 
profitable than one could have expected them to be.
The Russian labour force was cheaper than that in Western Europe but 
this was neutralized to a great extent by the lack of skill and lower 
productivity. These defects were especially tangible during the first stage of 
industrialization. Since the depression of 1900-1906, though labour remained 
relatively cheap, productivity kept increasing at a record rate owing to product 
standardization and speeding-up of the production process. In 1913-1916, for 
example, in machine-building the increase of labour productivity was 32 per cent, 
in chemicals - 27 pier cent. However, general productivity level remained below 
European average (Gatrell and Davis, p. 140). *
Another negative factor to confront foreign entrepreneurs was the 
absence of industrial and social infrastructure. Therefore bigger than usual 
overhead expenses were inevitable. The foreign entrepreneurs discovered that it 
was customary in Russia to place upon plant owners responsibility for various 
services, which elsewhere fell within the scope of the municipality or the state, 
i.e., for laying roads and building bridges, establishing water supplies,
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building houses, hospitals, communal baths, etc., for the workers and their 
families. How great the costs of this type could be is evident from the balance 
sheet of a French company which was forced in 1894 to make an outlay of about 60 
million rubles for the construction of houses for workers and employees (Crisp, 
p . 2 5 2 ) .
In the 1890s, industrial returns were also undermined by fierce 
competition among foreign firms in the Russian market. Widely advertised success 
of first foreign ventures provoked a true investment fever. During that period 
the discount rate in Paris sometime fell as low as two per cent. Under these 
circumstances a seven per cent return on capital brought by pioneer foreign 
ventures in Russia made a deep impression on western investors. The word "Russia" 
had acquired magic force to mobilize money at call. Consequently, many foreign- 
owned firms in Russia were overcapitalized and overproducing. Another result of 
the feverish haste were mistakes and miscalculations made by foreign 
entrepreneurs in the exploratory stage of their projects when preparatory 
examinations were executed. In few cases these errors caused a prompt close-down 
of newly constructed enterprises, in many others - additional investment and 
soaring costs.
Furthermore, foreign entrepreneurs in Russia had to cope with obsolete 
commercial laws, arbitrariness on the part of state officials, enormous red tape, 
the existence of "informal" relations between civil servants involving bribes and 
favoritism. Every foreign company needed an Imperial Ordonnance to incorporate 
and later special permission to make any major change in its structure, such as 
increasing capital, floating loans or entering a new line of business. Foreign 
companies were prohibited from engaging in certain branches of industry. The
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Imperial government could withdraw its authorization at will. The attitude to 
legality of Finance Minister Witte himself tells much about the business climate 
in the country: in the opinion of the minister, in a contract between the
government and a private firm only the latter was bound by the law if a conflict
arose (Von Laue, p.208; see also McKay, p.277-278).
The analysis of the investment climate in Russia at the turn of the
20th century and during pre-war years would not be complete without mentioning 
that public opinion was biased generally very strongly against foreign capital. 
There was a widespread notion that foreign capital was destroying Russian 
agriculture, had seized natural resources of the country, was exploiting its 
population and transferring colossal profit abroad. Foreign firms would be 
accused of being responsible for an excessive increase in the price of oil, coal, 
iron, etc.(McKey, pp.290*293). Economic backwardness helped give use to national 
inferiority complex manifesting itself now and then in furious anti-foreign 
campaigns. After the Russo-Japanese War in particular, it seemed advisable to 
many companies not to stress their foreign character. The government itself was 
busy inspiring, through its agents, chauvinistic sentiments in llie people as an 
antidote to rising class consciousness.
Responding to these circumstances, foreign capitalists preferred to use 
a Russian registry for new firms, or to take over Russian companies. The share of 
companies operating with foreign status declined since the turn of the century 
from 22,4 per cent in 1904 to 8,1 per cent in 1913, although in reality foreign 
participation in the Russian industry was on the increase (Jones and Gerenstain, 
p.X). Many foreign entrepreneurs active in Russian business had chosen to change 
their nationality and eventually to Russify. In the main foreign capital had
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entered Russia in the form of participation in share capital thus the real 
magnitude of its intrusion remained disguised.
3.2.7. Behind the Mystery of the Second El Dorado
If average returns were not extraordinary and, on the whole, the 
investment environment was not particularly friendly, what could account for the 
readiness with which foreign investors were supplying their capital? One of the 
factors not to be overlooked was a specific composition of creditors and 
investors themselves. Big firms eager to open a Russian branch to preserve 
Russian market as an outlet for their products were rather few. Most ventures 
were financed by thousands of small investors who bought stocks and debentures 
offered to them by founders, promoters and underwriters - a parent firm, an 
individual or a bank. The profit of the latter was a multiple of the shareholders 
return and, what was even more important, it did not depend directly on dividend 
payments or on the economic performance of the venture altogether. All sorts of 
commissions, bonuses, fees and other income generating opportunities, open to 
insiders only, were the prime source of enrichment of this category of investors. 
An official investigation disclosed cases in which 70-80 per cent of mobilized 
stock capital had found its way into the pockets of founders and promoters 
(Liaschenko, p.232).
Russian loans had opened one more profit opportunity to a restricted 
league of powerful market operators. The issue of Russian governmental and 
railroad bonds poured golden rain on French banks. Within only ten years 
seventeen major loans were placed at nominal value 3.7 billion rubles. At the net 
bank commission of less than two per cent the net earning of French banks may be
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estimated at approximately 189 million francs. In addition, banking houses earned 
a commission on the service of Russian loans and have other related sources of 
income. Because of the mammoth amount of operations (and remuneration) involved, 
Russian loans were more attractive to banks then Turkish, Bulgarian or South 
American issues despite higher rate of profit of the latter (Crisp, p.212).
In the light of this data it is little wonder that many prominent 
industrialists, financiers and bankers in Europe had a vested interest in 
channelling rentier money to Russia. Success stories, such as that of the South 
Russian Dniepr Metallurgical Company paying its shareholders 40 per cent on 
initial investment, were widely publicized, helping to establish Russia the 
reputation as the new El Dorado. The names of Le Creusot, Hartmann, Châtillon- 
Commentary, Cockerill gave weight to new projects and opened the rentier’s 
wallet. Banks were particularly active in forwarding reports on investment 
opportunities in Russia. On some occasions it was a well-paid job: Crédit 
Lyonnais, for example, dispatched reports on a functioning coal mine which its 
Russian proprietor was anxious to sell in exchange for a commission of ten per 
cent of the shares of any subsequent company (McKay, p.89). As for ordinary 
subscribers, under the particularly depressive conditions of the capital market 
in major creditor countries, they normally showed stoic adhesion to Russian bonds 
and stocks which appealed to the conservative notion of a secure investment.
3J2.8. Foreign Capital and Monopolization of Russian Market
As was mentioned earlier, foreign-owned firms made a considerable 
contribution to the technological progress of Russian heavy industry. It is no 
less important that they accelerated tremendously the process of concentration of
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capital and production in the country. Foreign ventures, unlike their Russian 
counterparts, knew no shortage of capital. They had constant recourse to borrowed 
money. Russian firms, on the contrary, were chronically short of capital. On the 
Russian credit market money was 2,5 tunes more expensive than in France. Even 
leading industrial firms, such as Putilov in St.Petersburg, regardless of special 
patronage of the tsarist government, were compelled to use equipment a generation 
old. Foreign-owned plants instead were equipped according to modern standards 
from the start.
Consequently, the position of foreign-owned companies on the Russian 
market was exceptionally strong. Big firms went to great lengths to enforce it 
even further. Foreign capital initiated the monopolistic division of Russian 
markets. Upon French initiative and under French leadership two mammoth 
syndicates, Prodameta and Produgol, controlling the production and sale of iron 
and coal respectively, were organized in 1902-1904. By 1907-1909, syndicates had 
enveloped the majority of enterprises in all main industries.
The market power of the syndicates was enormous. For example, the 
biggest one, Prodameta, the association of thirty metallurgical enterprises (a 
mere 17 per cent of their total number in Russia), by 1911 had put under its 
control 90 per cent of the sales of assorted and sheet iron, 96 per cent of 
girders and pipes, 74 per cent of pig-iron products (Gatrell, p. 179). Produgol in 
its turn accounted for 60 per cent of the country’s coal output. The profit from 
metallurgical companies’ monopoly position allowed them to finance the 
acquisition of ore and coal deposits. Russian heavy industry became highly 
integrated. The consequences of monopolization for consumers were disastrous: not 
only had prices soared but, in 1911-1912, the country was hit by pig-iron and
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coal "famine" when members of Prodameta and Produgol held back a large proportion 
of output instead of supplying the growing needs of metal-working, engineering 
and other industrial customers. For the consumers the burden of tariff protected 
prices augmented owing to monopolistic pricing: the price of coal from 1912 to 
1913 rocketed by 40 per cent, the price of quality iron - by 26 per cent (1908- 
1909) (Haumann, p.35).
The creation of syndicates may be judged as having been a major attempt 
on the part of foreign capital to improve the investment climate in Russia during 
the period of the 1900-1906 depression. As was shown before, the tsarist 
government did a lot to attract foreign investors. In their turn, foreign firms 
and banks, using their market force, were quite persistent in their effort to 
make the most of the situation and adjust business conditions in their favor even 
further. Although the Russian government was extremely authoritarian, foreign 
capital proved to be a force not easily disposed of. Foreign entrepreneurs used 
various methods to exert pressure on the government. Close "informal" relations 
with mighty ministry officials and local administrators were instrumental in 
pursuing this end (see, for example, Haumann, p.36). Many top-level officials, 
after resigning from civil service, landed up in the boardrooms of big foreign- 
owned firms and banks. Their expertise and even more so their connections seem to 
have been indispensable in making business run smoothly. It was a normal practice 
that a multimillion state order would be placed with a handful of plants- 
"favourites". Thus, among several dozens metallurgical plants, there were six 
such privileged producers, all foreign-owned, to whom winning a state order 
meant, in 1902 alone, to get a factual subsidy of eight million rubles 
(Liaschenko, p.317; McKay, p.272).
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Another way of bringing pressure to bear was based on the exploitation 
of the pathological tsarist government’s fear of losing its credit standing in 
foreign capital markets, especially Paris. Government steps conflicting with the 
interests of big foreign firms in Russia would immediately entail an inspired 
press campaign in major creditor countries. As the Russian government cut down 
orders for railway equipment, speculations started to circulate that foreign 
investment was being expropriated gradually as the state consciously made the 
foreigner’s position untenable (Crisp, p.178; McKay, p.281). The message of this 
defamation campaign and a few others that followed was that the government should 
not deprive foreign firms of its active support. However, shortly after the turn 
of the century, the conditions of state finances could not afford to continue the 
substitution policy at its previous scale. Under these circumstances the 
government’s consent to syndicates - they were given a free hand despite the 
public protest - may be interpreted as a compromise: the government did not make 
new material obligations but left open a possibility for big firms to improve 
their standing by themselves although at the expense of the Russian public.
As the Russian government did not dare displease foreign banks, so 
their appetites grew. By 1910, the government had to face the repeated attempts 
of foreign bankers and industrialists to take over some of the important levers 
of governmental economic regulations. In 1907, in Paris the main Paris and 
St.Petersburg banks formed a company to which the Russian banks handed over all 
new operations entrusted to them and in particular all government concessions. As 
O.Crisp(Crisp, p. 186) rightly points out
the Implementation of this arrangement would have deprived Kokovtsov 
(Russian Finance Minister after S.Witte - A.K.) of the possibility of 
maneuvering between competing firms and of his right...of entrusting 
particularly profitable operations to Russian banks alone
as the French part had stipulated that the majority of the orders for industrial 
products, arising out of the transactions carried out by the new company, should 
be placed with French firms. It is symptomatic that the Russian government, when 
addressing itself to this case, had to cope with only slightly veiled blackmail. 
Indeed, the new company had as its initiator a French official in whose power it 
was to veto the admission of securities to the Paris Bourse. A few years later, 
in 1909, two eminent Paris bankers put forward a project to establish a bank in 
Russia to administer the allocation of railway orders to industry (Crisp, 
ibidem).
Having found itself on the defensive, the Russian government amended 
its strategy towards foreign capital. On the whole, its attitude to monopolistic 
market structures remained ambiguous. After all, its policy of "favored" firms 
had prepared the groundwork for syndicates. Nonetheless, later in the 1910, it 
effectively blocked the formation of a foreign-led American-type trust in the 
metallurgical industry. It had frustrated the attempts of French banks to put 
under control the distribution of state orders, introduced competitive bidding on 
railway equipment, opened court proceedings) against ProUugol, warned Prodameta 
that if market needs were not satisfied the government would increase production 
of state-owned enterprises and suspend import duties on metallurgical products 
and coal.
3.3. Evaluating Russian Experience
The events of the industrialization epoch in Russia have been 
extensively covered in the literature on economic history. Nevertheless, two 
important questions are still open to discussion. One concerns the appraisal of
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the contribution of the foreign capital to Russian economic development. The 
other deals with the efficiency of governmental economic policy towards foreign 
investment. In the publications on the subject one comes across quite contrasting 
views. Two examples illustrate the dispersion of opinions. John McKay gives great 
tribute to foreign entrepreneurs but denies the constructive role of the 
Government on the ground that many of government incentives were of long 
standing and less efficient that is usually believed. On the contrary, George 
Carson stresses the importance of governmental regulations but puts in question 
the contribution of foreign capital to Russia’s development by confronting the 
relatively modest amount of foreign investment to the enormous sum of total 
public investment in the economy.
In this thesis I share the view of those scholars who, such as Olga 
Crisp, consider it pointless, in the particular circumstances of Russian 
industrialization, to try to ascribe the merit of relatively successful 
industrialization to the activities of either the state or foreign capital. What 
happened was the result of a combined effort from both sides given that in the 
country and abroad existed general pre-iequisites necessar> to make this effort 
fruitful. The following considerations make basis for this conclusion.
3.3.1. The Role of the State
The notably authoritarian political organization made the state the 
chief economic agent in the country. No major economic development could have
6. In fact, the estimation by Paul Gregory of net foreign investment in Russia suggests 
that, for many decades before the October revoluUon, there had been no net transfer of 
resources from abroad in the Russian Empire as foreign debt payments exceeded net foreign 
investment (see Gregory, pp.95-98 and Appendix M).
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taken place without the state being involved. Under these conditions the absence 
of counteraction to foreign capital could already be seen as a form of 
regulation. In reality, the Russian government did more than that by explicitly 
favoring foreign capital.
Indeed, the incentives proposed by the government were not new. 
Speaking in broader terms, the liberation of serfs was the most significant 
incentive making any capital investment, those originating abroad included, 
possible. It was not each separate incentive that mattered, but rather a 
particular atmosphere which together they helped to create. Because of huge state 
investment in the railway construction and protective tariffs, foreign investors 
found in Russia the prospect of earning a higher rate of return than at home and 
the growing capacity to absorb capital. This winning combination made Russia an 
extremely promising and attractive outlet for foreign capital.
3.3J?. The Role o f  Foreign Capital
Ever since the early 1890s», net capital investment in Russia amounted 
to over eleven per cent of national product which was quite comparable with the 
rate of other European industrialized countries. The net inflow of foreign 
investment rarely exceeded 12 per cent of net domestic investment. However, 
foreign capital impact on the Russian economy was more profound than these 
figures show:
& public investment apart, Russian sourced investment was split among millions of 
small, often family-owned, businesses heavily relying on self-financing; it was 
very difficult and time-consuming to organize the financing of a big project. The
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recourse to foreign capital markets eased the concentration of capital and hence 
paved the way large-scale modem production in Russia. Without the stream of 
foreign capital the Russian industrialization would have been inevitably 
stretched over time, as well as having a different configurations. Instead of 
parallel advance in all the major branches of the complex-of heavy industries, as 
it was, there would have been probably consecutive increment of the industrial 
capacity;
the contribution of foreign investment should not be assessed in strictly 
financial terms alone. The technological and entrepreneurial aspects are at least 
equally important. The former was already discussed. As for the latter, foreign 
businessmen had brought with them not only their skill and experience, but also a 
new entrepreneurial culture, new approaches to decision-making in business, new 
relations among industry and banks, a new technique in marketing, etc. This 
spared Russia decades of accumulating experience and errors.
3.3.3. Some Conclusions
What possible lessons concerning the issues of the investment climate 
and the capital entry management system could one learn from the early Russian 
experience? The most instructive seem to be the following.
(i) The lane-term factors of the investment climate. Economic 
circumstances in the country were not simple. The economy was in transition, 
structurally it presented a mixture of precapitalist^ and more advanced 
capitalist-type elements, very much as it is now when it is a mixture of 
administrative-command and post-communism elements. The coexistence of such
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controversial elements was not, on the whole, really "peaceful". A great 
disparity existed between various sectors of the economy, basically between 
industry and agriculture, constituting an intrinsic weakness of both the economy 
and the society. That gave a particular "colour" to Russian capitalism: it was a 
victorious force but its capacity to expand was still restricted by external 
factors. The two dying classes - land nobility and commune-organized peasantry - 
were still strong. Also the state system did not correspond to the needs of the 
market economy.
Nevertheless, foreign capital showed quite extraordinary enthusiasm 
with respect to Russian investment opportunities. This can be attributed to two 
factors. The first was a general positive evaluation on the part of investors of 
the growth potential of Russia and, hence, of the revenue generating capacity of 
capital invested there. This estimate took into account enormous natural and 
human resources of the country but even more so it was the recognition of the 
fact that, finally, these resources were becoming open for being used according 
to the rules of the market economy. There were clear signs that the country had 
stepped on the path of reforms promising a gigantic outbreak of economic 
activity. The direction and the guarding lines of these reforms - 
industrialization, the consolidation of the market, the promotion of money and 
credit relations, etc. - were easily distinguishable and corresponded to the 
investors’ interests.
Strong confidence in the stability, the continuity and the 
predictability of a political situation in Russia constituted the second 
incentive prompting the expansion of foreign investment. Indeed, French rentiers, 
legendary for their conservatism, caution and obsession with the security of
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their assets, had chosen Russia as client préféré. This confidence, in its turn, 
seem to have rested on two circumstances. One, quite obviously, was the 
impression of solidity that the Russian political system made on contemporary 
outside observers. The other, more important for the argument of this research, 
was the relative openness of the Russian national economy. This claim could seem 
to be an overstatement. The export quota of Russia, in 1909-1911, was only about 
six per cent against 17.5 per cent in Great Britain, 15.3 per cent in France, 
14.6 per cent in Germany and 11.0 per cent in Italy (Bairoch, p.80).
But the "openness" in question is the kind that cannot be measured in 
international trade figures alone, but which shows itself in various signs 
testifying a considerable degree of responsiveness of the national economy to 
exogenous factors. Russia’s exposure to the international economy should be 
visualized in the context of the problems and contradictions of a country in 
which economic backwardness was coupled with imperial political ambitions. In the 
long run, as the subsequent collapse of the Russian economy under the pressure of 
the first world war demonstrated, the two proved to be incompatible. This 
contradiction remained a factor exerting great pressure on the economy as well as 
on the government, especially as the Industrial Revolution of the 19th century 
had given as its offspring a military-industrial revolution which diminished the 
importance of territory and population as power elements (see, for example, 
Holsti, p. 156-158). To resist this pressure Russia was in need of constant 
recourse to international commercial and credit markets. Such a dependence 
emerged initially during the first years after the Crimean War under the 
influence of the thesis that Russia should remain agricultural and import 
manufactured goods. This policy soon led to the situation which S.Witte, in one 
of his secret memoranda to the Tsar, described in the following words:
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The economic relations of Russia with western Europe are fully 
comparable to the relations of colonial countries with their metropolis 
(cited In Carson, p. 120).
The success of industrialization had helped Russia to become self- 
sufficient in some industrial products but it was not enough to alter the 
situation in principle. Although not necessarily big in volume and absolute 
figures, supply from abroad, together with ready access to foreign credit, 
remained strategically important. This accounts for many nuances in Russia’s 
conduct in the realm of international economic relations. Government’s concern 
for Russia’s credit standing abroad, a persistent effort to balance Russian 
foreign trade with a substantial surplus, as well as an obstinate tariff war with 
Germany at the turn of the century are just few examples illustrating this point. 
European bankers and industrialists were well aware of this particular 
sensibility of Russia and were right in regarding it a partner which could not 
afford to make reckless steps. If the political obligations of Russia as a part 
to several important international treaties are added, it becomes quite clear 
that the foreign creditors of the country thought they had every reason to have 
faith in their debtor.
Overall, the general favorable appraisal of the Russian investment 
climate, based on the evaluation of long term factors, proved to influence the 
investor’s decisions to a greater extent than individual defects of Russian 
business conditions. The legal status of foreign firms (in particular in the 
early years of industrialization) had disadvantages by comparison with local 
firms; business traditions in Russia differed significantly from what was the 
norm in Western Europe; the infrastructure was insufficient; the quality of the 
labour force was generally low, etc. And still foreign investors were willing to
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overcome or circumvent these obstacles once the general situation was seen as 
sound and promising. This behavior fits well with recent findings concerning 
motivations behind the foreign investment policy of big firms, which will be 
examined at length in the next chapter of this thesis. As it turned out, 
international investors appear to be more sensitive to general business 
environment in host country than to specifically designed incentive packages.
(ii) 77te efficacy of state regulations. The example of Russia brightly 
illuminates the advantages and limitations of import-substitution as a concept of 
national development. The inflow of foreign capital and quick inri11st.riali7.at.inn 
may be securely attributed, to a great extent, to the introduction of a new trade 
tariff and state subsidies to heavy industries. As the indirect indication of the 
efficacy of the state policy one may point to the fact that foreign capital was 
active in those industries in which it was channeled with the help of government 
regulations but was only marginally involved in other sectors of the economy. 
This very evidence, however, may be interpreted as a sign of the potential 
feebleness of governmental tactics. In sectors lacking tariff protection foreign 
capital tended to expand by means of commodity import rather than by direct or 
portfolio investment; modem technology was installed on a wide scale only in few 
privileged industries while in others foreign firms adhered to local obsolete 
technique; despite the implementation, in some cases, of really modem equipment 
and processes, local production by foreign firms was not competitive in 
international markets. The government’s reckoning that the inflow of foreign 
capital would increase competition and deflate prices, thus compensating for the 
upward pressure on a price level exerted by protectionist tariffs, was also 
frustrated as soon as foreign entrepreneurs initiated syndication.
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In the particular case of Russian pre-war industrialization, these 
developments may hardly be assessed as the failure of the government policy in as 
much as it did not address many of them directly. In more general terms they 
point rather clearly at at least two circumstances. First, import-substitution 
strategy tends to result in bringing about only a "closed economy"; second, there 
always exists a contradiction between business rationality and state regulations.
Two further observations are also noteworthy. First, shortly after 
having been allowed to operate in Russia, foreign capitals made quite a 
successful attempt to counterpose their own power structures and pressure centres 
to governmental structures and governmental pressure. Second, foreign 
participation never opened external markets to Russian products and Russian 
integration in the world economy remained a one-way street.
3.4. Socialist Russia: A Transplantation Experiment
3.4.1. The Thrust of Industrialization
The October revolution caused radical changes in every major area with 
maybe one exception: the revolutionary authority proved to be equally captivated, 
though for different reasons, by the idea of accelerated industrialization. 
Moreover, quite soon the Soviet government followed in the tracks of its 
overthrown predecessor by contemplating plans to use foreign investment as a 
foundation for large-scale industrialization. A governmental concessional program 
was announced as early as May 1918, only a very short time since the 
nationalization of foreign property and the abrogation of foreign debt. The two 
policies, contradictory as they were, had a common platform: the desire to 
enforce the new rule economically and socially. Nationalization was justified by
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the necessity to seize "the commanding heights in the economy"; the plans to 
invite foreign capital - by the need to expand these "commanding heights" and 
turn them into the stronghold of the socialist state.
For the new regime the increase of industrial production was of 
paramount importance both in short and long terms. First, the enhancement of 
industry (or merely the restoration of the industrial potential of tsarist Russia 
devastated in the years of the World War and revolutions) was a necessary pre­
requisite for expanding the material basis of those social forces whose support 
constituted the main strength of the Soviet regime. Second, large-scale modem 
industry with its higher degree of concentration, of economic, financial and 
labour discipline, of accountability, and better adaptability for monitoring and 
planning was seen as a vitally important counterforce to the anarchy of small 
producers, carpetbaggers and smart traders dominating the ailing economy of post- 
revolutionaiy Russia. They were considered by the Bolsheviks to be the greatest 
threat to the Soviet system now that the influence of big capitalist firms and 
banks had been undermined by nationalization. It was even more important, 
however, that, in the long run, industrialization was regarded not only as the 
guarantee of the survival of the new state surrounded by capitalist enemies but 
as a main path towards a prosperous communist society.
The necessity in the restoration and subsequent expansion of industry 
was more than self-evident. However, by 1920, when the Bolsheviks finally 
achieved victory in the Civil War, after the years of "War Communism", the 
troubles of military campaigns and foreign military intervention, after economic 
blockades and disastrous harvests, the capacity of Soviet Russia’s government to 
pursue the policy of industrialization seemed to be even more restricted than
124 Chapters. Russia's ‘Experience as a Capital Importing Country
that of the tsarist government at the turn of the centuiy. The economy lay in 
ruins. Large-scale industries had suffered most. In 1920, the production of iron 
ore was only 2.4 per cent of the output of 1913; of pig iron - 2.4 per cent; of 
steel - four per cent; of cotton manufactures - five per cent; of sugar - 5.8 per 
cent. Total industrial output had declined to less than one third of 1913 volume, 
total agricultural output was only half of the pre-war quantity. The value of 
manufactured consumer goods sold to the population had decreased by nine tenths 
(Hutchings, p.31; Baykov, p.8). The use of money and the velocity of monetary 
circulation became very limited, having given way to barter and rationing; owing 
to hyper-inflation, any substantial accumulation in a monetary form by private 
persons and firms, as well as by public bodies, became pointless.
Two possibilities for raising resources for industrialization had been 
discussed within the Bolshevik party at the beginning of the 1920s. Both 
possibilities had influential supporters. The one advocated by Trotsky was to 
transform the country into a military camp and mobilize resources through the 
expropriation of the peasantry and the utilization of forced labour ("labour 
armies" in Trotaky’s discourse). This was a path towards autarky and 
isolationism. The other, seemingly less radical and revolutionary, was to bring 
back economic incentives for production and to turn to foreign capital as a 
supplier of financing, technique and know-how. This plan was backed with Lenin’s 
authority. Lenin put great weight on Russia’s regaining its position in the 
international economy. He insisted that Russia should fully enjoy the advantages 
of the international division of labour and repeatedly claimed that foreign 
private capital invested under the control of the government in large-scale 
industries ("the state capitalism" in Lenin’s terminology) was in fact an ally of 
the socialist regime in its struggle against the element of unorganized petty
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bourgeois production. The bias given by Lenin to the policy of attracting foreign 
investment is fully evident from the following examples. Explaining, in 1923, the 
origins of the famous New Economic Policy, he mentioned in the first place the 
necessity to restore a favorable economic climate for foreign investment:
ITJhe practical purpose was always important to me. And the practical
purpose of our New Economic Policy was to lease out concessions (Lenin.
p.472).
Moreover, the pioneering "Goerlo" plan (the State Plan for the Electrification of 
Russia), projected under Lenin’s supervision in the yearly 1920s, envisaged that
out of 17 billion rubles of total investment six billion should be attracted from
abroad in the form of long-term credits (Dongarov, p. 46).
3.4.2. Concessions
In Soviet Russia the development policy relying on active foreign 
participation never progressed beyond a very initial preparatory stage. After 
Lenin’s death, the strategy towards foreign capital participation in the Soviet 
economy had been repeatedly addressed at Party congresses, each new discussion 
revealing growing hostility to this idea. Finally, in 1928, the victory of 
Stalin’s doctrine of "Socialism in One Country" put an end to this line of 
thinking altogether. This doctrine, in a different, Lenin-like phraseology, was a 
reprint of Trotsky’s plan of economic restoration put forward at the time of "War 
Communism", condemning the country to isolation and enormous hardships. 
Paradoxically, by this time Trotsky himself had turned into a convinced supporter 
of what he called "external New Economic Policy" (i.e., the policy of attracting 
foreign capital for the purpose of diminishing the strain of domestic 
accumulation) and, in 1925, he took the post of Chairman of the Chief Concessions 
Department of the Council of People’s Commissars (Government) of the USSR.
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For the greater part of the 20s, however, the impulse given by Lenin to 
the concessional policy was still bearing results. A necessary legal framework 
was established and organizational steps were made to enroll foreign capital in 
the concessionary undertakings in the territory of the USSR. Yet, the role of 
foreign concessions and joint ventures in the economy of the country remained 
negligible indeed. Their share in the gross capital investment reached only 0.57 
per cent (1927-1928); in the gross output of Soviet big industry - 0.4 per cent 
(1925-1926); in the sales of industrial products - 1.0 per cent (1928-1929)7 
(Dongarov, p. 118; Baykov, p. 126). According to an authoritative account, state 
revenue from the concessions amounted to only 14 million rubles in 1923-1924 
(E.Carr, p.455). These modest data do not surprise. What does surprise in fact is 
the evidence of considerable interest showed by foreign investors in Soviet 
ventures. All in all, in 1921-1934, several thousand offers were received by 
Soviet Concessions Commissions in Germany, Great Britain, the United States and 
France of which over two thousand were passed over to the Chief Concessions 
Department for further examination. However, only 163 concessions were 
sanctioned.
3.4.3. Against All Odds
The general positive response of foreign investors to the Soviet 
concessional initiative remains quite an intriguing feature of international 
economic relations of the 1920s and 1930s, especially if it is projected against 
the state of the investment climate in the country. The conditions were generally
7. In some special branches of production some concessions occupied quite important place: 
Lena Goldflelds in 1926 extracted one third of all the gold produced in the country while 
the Harrtman concession supplied one fourth of the world output of manganese (Dongarov. 
p.p.96-97).
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discouraging. The proprietors of Russian ventures faced numerous difficulties 
inside the country as well as beyond its borders. Soviet Russia was the object of 
a credit, transport and trade blockade set by its creditors - the major European 
banks and non-financial companies - and supported by their governments. This was 
their response to the nationalization of foreign property and the default on 
foreign debt. This impediment alone considerably increased the costs and risks of 
financing investment in Russia and hampered the sale on the world market of 
products originated in the country. As a result, many industrial sights formerly 
owned by foreigners which the government would be eager to lease never found a 
concessioner despite their obvious revenue-generating potential.
Far more frustrating were conditions in the country itself**.
a) Excessive red tape. As early as the 1920s Soviet Russia gained the features of 
a bureaucratic state. A concessional agreement usually required years of 
negotiations. Thus, the concessioner had to wait at least six months for the 
Government’s formal authorization of the negotiated contract.
b) Unsatisfactory legal protection of foreign ventures. The concessional 
agreement was the only legal document defining the rights of the concessioner. 
There was no legislation regulating property rights, the repatriation of capital 
and income, etc. The agreements were often compiled at the government’s bidding 
and included discriminating clauses. On top of that the government and local 
authorities were free to issue laws and orders imposing further restrictions on
8. The summary below follows the documents and reports published and commented by 
A.Dongarov in Chapter IV of his "Foreign Capital in Russia and the USSR"(1990) and by 
M.Os mova and O.Stulov in their arUcle "Foreign capital in our country: something new or 
well-forgotten old?" in Kommunist, No. 18, 1990, p.51*58.
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the concessioner, such as the Decree of the 10th of September 1926 committing 
concessional enterprises to buy governmental bonds for the sum of 60 per cent of 
their reserve capital.
c) The systemic inadequacy of the economic environment. The concessioner had to 
cope with such deficiencies as low productive though relatively expensive labour, 
the scarcity of material supplies, the unreliable transportation system, etc. 
Still more important by consequences, concessionary enterprises, being like any 
capitalist venture a market-oriented profit-seeking entities, had found 
themselves transplanted into the economy in which market values were neglected 
for the sake of the political-administrative control of the economy. In the 
course of a concentration process the internal market had been monopolized by 
state-owned trusts. They were as much political as economic organisation in the 
sense that the state order had more weight for them than all the objective 
economic indicators. State trusts could afford to be badly managed because, 
unlike the concessionary enterprises, they could not go bankrupt. As a result, 
the market mechanism, archaic and inefficient as it was after the black-out 
during the period of "War Communism", was even further distorted by non­
compromising state administrating. It was quite common that the concessioner 
would find it impossible to induce local suppliers to provide for necessary 
components as all their output had been already allocated according to state 
orders. In practice, the concession could survive only until the state lost 
interest in its existence. As soon as that happened, the concession started to be 
rejected by the environment as a "stranger" and an unwanted competitor. It is no 
wonder, therefor, that over 90 per cent of all the concessions were sold out 
before the term of the contract.
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d) Isolation from the outer world. The state monopoly of foreign trade and 
currency payments was responsible for another hard blow at the efficiency of 
foreign concessions. It restricted or even made impossible the usage of such 
traditional means of optimization of the economic performance of multinational 
firms as intrafirm trade and credit, high maneuverability of resources, easy and 
quick access to international markets, etc. The state monopoly of trade implied 
that all the foreign trade was to be carried out through state foreign trade 
organizations (V/O) only. The latter, entrusted to protect state interests 
against the interests of individual firms, would place the order of the 
concessioner on their own will. As many of the concessions had to rely quite 
heavily on supplies from abroad, they were extensively exposed to the 
arbitrariness of the V/Os and, eventually, to state administrating. Furthermore, 
when, as early as 1926, the government started to take measures to insulate 
Russian chervonets from the foreign market and to cut its link with gold, 
problems with expatriating profit and capital arose, gradually eroding reason 
d’etre of the existence of foreign investment in the Soviet Union.
e) General public hostility. Within the Soviet society foreign ventures were 
treated with suspicion, enmity and prejudice. This was the conclusion of a 
special investigation on the investment climate in Soviet Russia undertaken at 
the request of the Politburo of the Bolshevik party in the early 1920s. The cases 
of sabotage were frequent, foreign concessions used to be maltreated by local 
authorities and their Soviet partners. However, if at the beginning of the decade 
this attitude caused concern on the part of the government, only a few years 
later it contributed to the tension itself by putting on trial the employees of a 
number of foreign concession on a fabricated charge of high treason. This created
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social vacuum around foreign ventures and forced some of them, including a most 
successful Lena Goldflelds, to close down.
If the investment climate was so discouraging, what could explain the
anxiety of many foreign firms to establish business in Soviet Russia? In order to
answer this question it is necessary, first of all, to have a more detailed look
at the composition of concession-seekers in the 1920s. Mostly they were small
firms interested in organizing either commercial ventures or small-scale
enterprises producing simple consumer goods. As for bigger firms, apart from the
proposals of some major automobile firms to construct car assembling plants in
Russia, they generally abstained both from vast investments as well as from
investing in machine-tool industry and some other industries to which the Soviet
9government gave priority , while showing some interest in mining and timber 
industries. In the latter case former owners were active in recuperating their 
business in the form of a concession. Both patterns look logical. Small investors 
were eager to capitalize on the poor state of Russian internal market suffering 
from both the scarcity of goods and the inefficiency of state trade 
organizations. Russia's was a strong seller market. To enterprises with a short 
period of capital turnover involved in the production of basic goods (such as 
pencils and matches) it promised, at least in a short prospect, a quick and lofty 
return big enough to compensate for the inconveniences of doing business in 
Soviet Russia. And indeed, the Russian market was ready to accept prices securing 
producers one rouble of revenue on every rouble of costs (Os’mova, Stulov, p.53). 
In the case of large-scale industries were big foreign firms could be engaged the
9. As late as 1929 the Chief Concession Committee of the USSR was seeking to interest 
foreign Investors in building such important projects as the Magnitogorsk and Taganrog 
metallurgical works (Schwartz, p. 129). Owing to Insufficient home producUon. in 1932. for 
example. 78 per cent of all machine-tools installed were Imported (Nove. p.220).
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very same characteristics of the Russian market, in the isolation from the world 
markets, had quite an opposite effect: its underdeveloped state did not 
correspond to the requirements of modem capital-intensive mass production, 
presuming the extensive usage of numerous sub-contractors and the relative 
stability of economic environment necessary to justify a long-term investment.
3.4.4. The Chance Missed
The exception made by foreign capital for extracting and timber 
industries should be explained by the vacuum which emerged in international trade 
when Russia was forced to withdraw from its traditional export markets. Relative 
export strength in certain commodity sectors gained by pre-war Russia gave the 
Soviet economy a historical chance to retain its position within the contemporary 
system of international economic relations. In fact, when Lenin counted foreign 
capital among the sources of Soviet industrialization, he reckoned upon the 
indispensability of Russia in the framework of the international economic system 
as it emerged in the first decade and a half of the 20th century. In reality this 
chance was missed. A new economic system, in wliicli the USSR was to play only a 
marginal role, started to take shape at a very rapid pace already in the inter­
war period. These structural changes occurred because of the shock given to 
international trade and investment by the Great Depression at the beginning of 
the 30s as much as to the purposefully autarkic policy of the Soviet government.
Foreign ventures were extinguished because they did not fit the system 
- this was probably the main lesson of the Soviet experiment with transplanting 
capitalism. The system as objective reality was rejecting foreign investment 
despite officially proclamations and (halfhearted) actions. Also none of declared
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ends were achieved because Bolsheviks were soon forced to abandon their illusions 
that foreign ventures would prefer the ideal of harmonic development of the host 
country to other more pragmatic interests. The authorities could not submit to 
the reality that foreign investors were consciously using to their advantage the 
hardships of the country, miserable state of its economy and its markets, and was 
anxious to curtail this possibility. Soon, however, both the elite and the 
society developed a sort of idiosyncrasy to the very possibility that profit at 
all could be extracted by foreign capital in the territory of the country in 
whatever reasonable amount. By trying to put this perception into life, they cut 
the tree of foreign entrepreneurship in Soviet Russia.
4 INVESTMENT CLIMATE AND INVESTMENT RISK
4.1. Conceptualizing the Investment Climate
In section 1.2. the following definition of the investment climate was 
proposed: investment climate is a multiple category encompassing everything that 
the foreign investor takes into consideration when evaluating how well conditions 
in a particular country favor capital investment, including the economy and 
culture, ideology and politics. Defined in this manner, the investment climate 
becomes, rather unexpectedly, in a considerable degree a complex matter for 
conceptualisation.
This results, first of all, from the fact that, thus defined, the 
category of the investment climate appears to comprise quite a strong investor 
specific element in as much as the investment climate represents business 
conditions as they are evaluated, in every separate case, by a particular 
investor through the prism of his specific interests, strategies and advantages. 
So, unlike meteorology, strictly speaking, the same economic territory, in the 
terms of the above definition, may comprise as many investment "climates" as is 
the number of foreign investors1. A similar point has been made by Stephen J.
1. Of course, one may Interpret the relationship "Investment conditions - Investment 
decision” In a different way. Namely, that the Investment climate of a country Is an 
Independent variable equally affecting all would-be investors while what differs is 
investor's capacity to adjust to this variable. This approach is certainly no less
(Footnote continues on next page)
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Kobrin (1978) who wrote that political instability is clearly a property of the 
environment, while risk is a property of the firm. Such an approach explains why 
countries which, according to conventional wisdom, are least appropriate for 
foreign ventures manage, nonetheless, to attract foreign capital, as was the case 
of Soviet Russia in the 20s and 30s.
Further, the notion of the investment climate tends to be unmanageably 
extensive. It may be analyzed at macro and micro levels, in terms of economics, 
political science or, for instance, sociology.
Thus, at a macro level, it includes the economic and political 
situation in the countiy, as well as public sentiments and the national cultural 
background. Several parameters are usually referred to in this context, including 
the following.
Politics - the official attitude towards foreign ventures; the tradition of 
observing international agreements; the participation in the system of 
international agreements and agencies providing the iufi ¿structure of the world 
economic regime; the strength of public institutions; the continuity of political 
rule; the degree of pragmatism (or, conversely, idealization) of state politics; 
the efficacy of state apparatus, etc.
(Footnote continued from previous page)
unfounded than proposed In this thesis. However. It hardly offers tangible advantages since 
It does not make the task any simpler: every investor may prove to enjoy a unique 
combination of factors determining his adjustment capacity. At the same time, such a shift 
in emphasis would deprive the definition of the investment climate of its important 
component: the stress on the participation of investors In the formation of the perception 
of the climate.
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The economy - the general economic situation (crisis, stagnation, boom); the 
exchange regime; the rate of inflation; the state of development of the capital 
market and the banking system; the tariffs and non-tariff barriers; the budget 
deficit and the balance of payments; the conditions on the labour market. In 
particular, foreign investors are sensitive to regulations and conditions putting 
limits on the freedom of the movement of capital and to factors determining the 
costs of production - the cost and quality of labour, and the development of the 
transport infrastructure in the first place.
The social and cultural sphere - the public attitude towards private property in 
general and to foreign property in particular; the degree of the cohesion of the 
society on the essential strategies of economic and social development of the 
country; party and trade-union mobilization; the tradition of business ethics; 
management culture; the educational level of the population; traditions 
influencing consumption pattern, etc.
At a micro level, the investment climate shows itself in bilateral 
relations between the foreign investor and various state agencies, the foreign 
investor and local economic agents: suppliers and buyers, banks, trade-unions, 
and others. This level is veiy important. It is there the general estimates of 
business conditions by investors, based on the analysis of macro level data and 
other summarized input, takes the form of concrete relations between a foreign 
venture and a local environment.
The two levels interrelate. It is their combination that constitutes 
the investment climate since, for example, the effort of the central power to 
attract foreign capital may be undermined by the absence of motivation on the
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part of local authorities or paralyzed because of low executive culture. On the 
other hand, local initiative and involvement, especially in large countries, are 
essentual to the success of the policy of central authorities as they may 
compensate for the defaults in regulation on a national scale.
To cope with the broad range of factors forming the notion of the 
investment climate one needs to introduce a model which, at the cost of 
abstracting from certain aspects of the subject, would permit to focus on its 
most principle features. This thesis dwells on the problem of how to optimize 
strategy towards foreign capital (direct investment mainly) under the particular 
conditions of the transitional economy. This implies concentrating on the two of 
the major broad categories of risks faced by international business in such an 
economy: political risk and policy risk.
The two types of risk are interdependent. It is not always easy to make 
a straightforward distinction between them. First, for the foreign investor any 
country’s sovereign risk is the risk of change. Second, in both cases the issue 
in question is control by national authorities over the activities of foreign- 
owned ventures and the resulting constraints for the foreign investor. Political 
risk stems from political change. Respective theory mainly deals with those 
situations when the authorities decide on breaking the existing regime for 
foreign capital by administrative measures in order to achieve a radical and 
decisive change in control in their favour. Expropriation, understood both as 
formal public expropriation and as a cluster of government actions resulted in 
establishing a political environment urging forced divestment of foreign 
ownership, is one of the principal objects of research here. The policy risk 
literature, in turn, usually refers to those uncertainties affecting
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international investment which are related to the economic regulation options of 
the host-govemment within the continuing regime for foreign capital, i.e., 
exchange control, local contents, fiscal payments, licensing of foreign trade, 
etc.
4.2. A Framework for Analyzing Political Risk
4.2.1. Theories of Political Risk
2In brief, the main contributions to the political risk theory may be 
summarized along the following lines.
The host government may wish to extend its control over the local 
subsidiary of a multinational corporation to a degree which cannot be secured by 
traditional instruments of economic policy. Expropriation is the most radical and 
far reaching method leading to fulfilling this goal. Such a development is 
usually associated with drastic changes in the political regimes of host- 
countries, including wars, revolutions and other political turmoil. Hence,
2. Literature on political risk of foreign Investment is enormous (for a thorough review 
of the discussion of the 70-s see J.D.Simon, "Political risk assessment: Past trends and 
future prospects", Columbia Journal of World Business, Fall 1982. pp.62-71. and. for later 
discussion. W.Ting (1988). Chapter 1). This section of the thesis is based mainly on the 
following publications: R.Vernon. Sovereignty at Bay, 1971. London. Longman; L.H.Thunell, 
Political Risks, 1977, New York. Praeger: S.J.Kobrin. "When Does Political Instability 
Result in Increased Investment Risk?". The Columbia Journal of World Business, Fall 1978. 
pp. 113*122: S.J.Kobrin. "Foreign enterprise and forced divestment in LDCs", International 
Organization. Winter 1980; J.Eaton and M.Gersovltz. "Country risk: economic aspect" in 
R.J.Herring (Ed), Managing International Risk, 1983, Cambridge. Cambridge University Press; 
J.D.Simon. "A theoretical perspective on political risk" Journal of International Business 
Studies. Winter 1984. pp. 123*143; H.Slegwart et al.. Global Political Risk: Dynamic 
Managerial Strategies, 1989, Basel, Helblng&Lichtenhahn; H.Picht, V.Stuven, "Expropriation 
of foreign direct investments: Empirical evidence and implications for the debt crisis" 
Public Choice, 1991, Vol.69, pp.21-38; H.Cole. W.English. "Expropriation and direct 
Investment". Journal of International Economics, 1991, Vol.30. pp.201-212.
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political stability at the grassroots level in the periphery of society and 
government political stability are among major concerns of the political risk 
theory. Though ideologically-motivated expropriation is possible, normally forced 
divestment is a means rather than an end. This implies that expropriation is not 
necessarily a byproduct of political regime discontinuity. The host government 
may be determined to make this step as a result of a rational decision-making.
Political risk is too amorphous a subject to be easily adapted to a 
systemic quantitative analysis. To overcome this difficulty, the mainstream of 
theory follows the assumption that recipient countries have governments that 
pursue a consistent set of objectives and that the people of this countries have 
observable and stable attitude towards foreigners, private property, and 
contracts. However, the theory allows for several departures from this 
assumption. The concept of "crazy state" accounts for a situation when the 
behavior of the representative citizens is irrational (Eaton and Gersovitz refer 
to the example of Iran after the Islam revolution). This and other "paradox" 
cases confront the investor with a political environment bearing risks which are 
particularly difficult to identify and foresee. For obvious reasons such cases 
strongly resist any generalization or formalization. The most the literature can 
offer the business is a recommendation to be especially prudent in approaching 
them.
Rational governments can decide on expropriation on the basis of some 
rational cost-benefit calculus. Yet motivations may be different. Some 
governments aim at maximizing country’s welfare. Others pursue the goal of 
retaining power or increasing their popularity with the people (a self-interest
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concept). Restraints on foreign capital may serve to divert attention from 
pressing problems by merely giving the appearance of effective action.
According to a public-interest hypothesis on expropriation, the 
rational government will only expropriate firms if it believes it is able to run 
them reasonably well on its own. Hence, the ability of a foreign firm to avoid 
hostile actions on the part of the government depends on the quality of 
technology and managerial skill it has transferred to the host country while the 
propensity of the authorities to nationalize a foreign venture is almost entirely 
dependent on the managerial and technical capacity to run the enterprise. From 
this viewpoint, extractive investment is more exposed to expropriation risk 
because basic technologies are easily accepted in the market. In recent years, 
owing to the globalization of economy, foreign ventures of transnational 
corporations have become protected not only by internalized technology but also 
by being deeply integrated into the international production structures of their 
parent companies. Their value as a property plunges down dramatically if they are 
pulled out of this international context.
A social-political hypothesis seeks to explain expropriations that do 
not show a sectoral concentration. This concept hinges on such factors as 
national sovereignty and national identity, national aspirations and national 
frustration as key determinants of expropriation, with the host government using 
foreign ventures as a scapegoat for the country’s problems (the propensity to 
expropriate model). This approach does not regard the host government as the only 
or even the most important initiator of political risk but rather considers the 
risk to be a product of the host-countiy social-economic environment as a whole
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while the government passes on this risk to transnational corporations in an 
attempt to diminish its own exposure to internal pressure.
The recommendations of the political risk theory to the managers of 
firms planning to internationalize (apart from those built on pure common sense 
such as insure yourself, or pass the risk to someone else, or hide the fact that 
you are foreign, or make your investment short-time) rely heavily on the 
postulates of the rational concept of public policy, i.e., the theory 
extrapolates on the premise that the government policy is correctly designed to 
secure net value achievement - a positive ratio between the values it achieves 
and the values it sacrifices. Quite predictably, the strategic line of defence it 
proposes to investors is to make provisions to maximize the cost of expropriation 
and minimize its benefits for the authorities.
The theory is less explicit when dealing with risks originating from a 
broader social-political environment in the host-country. Concepts worked out 
under the assumption that the national propensity to expropriate depends on the 
frustration of nation’s aspirations related to economic development imply that 
political risk is higher in countries in which welfare and economic expectations 
are low in comparison with the level of aspirations. However, the obvious 
scarcity of applicable results has entailed, in recent years, a noticeable shift 
of emphasis from political risk assessment towards research on conflict 
management.
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4J2.2. Choosing an Approach
Political risk analysis ranges from political science oriented 
approaches to empirical based forecasting services. The latter seek to provide 
quantitative measures for political risk. Nonetheless, they are still very 
subjective as the matter itself is hardly appropriate for quantification. The 
former instead, remaining at a broad conceptual level, provide some very useful 
insights opening possibilities to generalize on business conditions in a 
particular country.
As follows from the definition of the investment climate accepted in 
this thesis, for the authorities of the host-country to model political risk as 
it is perceived by the foreign investor would mean to place themselves into the 
references system of the investor and, on this basis, to extrapolate his 
decisions. We assume, therefore, a hypothetical investor who relies in his 
conclusions on the methodology of the political risk theory outlined above and, 
of many types of political risk analysis, gives preference to scenario creation 
as an instrument to forecast political disturbances.
Such an investor, contemplating starting business in Russia, will 
immediately face the situation, in political science terminology, of low 
political performance. Spontaneous resorts to violence (or acts in which violence 
is threatened or for other reasons is very likely); weak legitimacy of the polity 
(very substantial amount of citizens does not consider it worth of support), and 
consequent uncertainty about the persistence of the polity over time; plus 
crippled decision and executive efficacy of the state - these are only some of 
its features. In other words, it is exactly the situation of government
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disturbances and mass political disturbances which both the theory and common 
sense treat as expressly inappropriate for the realization of an investment 
project3.
The analysis, however, cannot be terminated at this point. 
International competition urges TNCs to take risks. As Jeffrey Hertzfeld (1991, 
p. 84) claims:
global companies cannot hedge their bets by holding back from the (ex|- 
Soviet market and waiting for the picture to clear. ... Five years from 
now. conditions may be somewhat more predictable, but by then first movers 
will have established advantageous positions both with I ex)-Soviet 
customers and with [ex]-Soviet partners. These early movers will have not 
only the benefit of prime position but also a significant jump in on the 
learning curve for survival and growth in this unique environment. And 
they will have earned the support of the now-emerging generation of |exl-
4
Soviet reformers and entrepreneurs...
In fact, political stability in a society does not mean the absence of 
any disturbances altogether; political continuity is not equal to unchangeable 
policy. Hence, the importance of diagnosing the nature, depth and endurance of 
the disturbance, basing on a premise that relations between the foreign firm and 
the host-authorities are hardly ever without a conflict. As it was once observed, 
it is not the conflict itself that is dangerous, but rather its mismanagement.
3. According to Dexter Baker, chairman of the U.S. National Association of Manufacturers, 
"The risks in Russia are greater than in any other part of the world" (The New York Times, 
May 4, 1992).
4. Clearly, there is no unanimity as regards experts investment strategy recommendations. 
Harvard Professor Larry Sammers praises the value of the "waiting option" for investors. 
Referring to the ex-Soviet Union, he points out that "being the second one in is almost as 
good as being the first one in. and Is a lot safer" (The International Economy, June/July 
1990, p.83).
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4.3. The Sources of Political Risk in Russia
4.3.1. Government Risk
Since, by definition, political risk represents itself in 
administrative actions, understanding motivation for government moves is 
essential for scenario creation. Of course, this does not diminish the risk 
itself but allows the investor to pass from the state of uncertainty about 
government actions to the state of prognosticated (or calculated) probability 
associated with a particular action. According to modern decision theory (see, 
for example, Harsanyi, 1977; Elster, 1986), the possibility to apply the 
principle of mutually expected rationality is central to make the above passage 
feasible. The concept of rationality initially was about a choice of the most 
appropriate means to a given end. However, a more general concept of rationality 
has proved to be more appropriate for political forecasting in the circumstances 
of profound socio-economic changes. It accentuates ends rather than means and 
treats choices among alternative ends as rational if they are based on clear and 
consistent priorities or preferences.
Hence, the evaluation of government risk takes the form of a 
comparative analysis of the alternative ends option facing the government in 
confrontation with its actual choice in terms of the rational concept of public 
policy (see above). If the priority or the set of priorities chosen by the 
government meet the criteria of the latter, one may expect to find a certain 
degree of longevity and continuity, as well as necessary public support, as 
characteristic features of the national economic policy. Otherwise, the most 
probable scenario will be an inconsistent and chaotic policy multiplying 
pressures on the government and eventual scapegoating.
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On the face of it, the first government of post-communist Russia has 
shown distinctive qualities of pragmatic and technocratic rule. It has proclaimed 
devotion to the cause of profound renovation and restructuring of the national 
economy according to market economic principles and indeed has been pursuing 
internationally recognized economic reform policy. The government expected 
obviously that such an approach would acquire it a good reputation with the 
international business community and influence favorably political risk 
assessments by foreign investors in as much as rigorous following of a 
predetermined economic pattern made its policy more cohesive, transparent and 
predictable.
The accentuated devotion to technocratic rationality demonstrated by 
the Yeltsin/Gaidar government (a characteristic feature of the majority of post­
communism governments also in Eastern and Central Europe), i.e., the attachment 
to what is presented as the policy dictated by pure economic common sense alone, 
is, to an extant, a legitimate reaction to the excessive emphasis on ideology of 
the previous regime. At the same time, in a sense, it is a forced technocratism. 
Governments which assent to power as a result of social upheaval are doomed to 
reforms, reed or illusory, in order to demonstrate that they differ from the 
regime they took over and, thus, to justify the change and reinforce their own 
legitimacy. All the revolutions, and perestroika and the events that followed 
were a revolution, try to follow this pattern. The initial success of the 
Bolshevik revolution was later consolidated owing to the enormous transformation 
pressure evoked by this event in the society. The major fault of Gorbachev’s 
management of perestroika was that, having initiated a revolution, he failed, at 
a certain moment, to come up with initiatives radical enough to correspond with 
its dynamics.
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There is little doubt that the post-Gorbachev leadership of Russia has 
drawn lessons from this experience. From the outset it was keen not to lose 
reforming momentum in its politics. However, from the very first moment, it has 
found itself in a very difficult situation. The breaking up of the "real 
socialism" doctrine which, in the absence of any constructive alternative, had 
been one of the main reasons for the seeming stability of the society, has left a 
tremendous ideological and conceptual gap. The resulted vacuum has not been so 
far filled. What emerged was a society without a sustaining ideology and a polity 
without a ruling party or a party block. The primary legitimacy of the government 
relied basically on two pillars: the personal authority of the head of the state 
(the authority based on the negation of the past rather than on a positive idea 
of the future) and the belief that this government is important as a symbol and, 
in a sense, a guarantor of a democratic process in the country.
Under these conditions the selection of the monetarist big-bang
5doctrine was a self-evident step prompted by the instinct of self-preservation . 
Under Gorbachev, economists were trying to work out an economic programme that 
would have accounted for the specificities of the domestic economy and would have 
led towards a welfare society. Under Yeltsin, for political reasons mainly, the 
task has been simplified. The government has set an objective of establishing a 
capitalist society and, in order to fulfil it, has borrowed its economic 
philosophy ready-made from conservative Western experts. By doing this, the 
government has chosen to neglect some important facts. First, that monetarist 
economic concepts were elaborated in conditions utterly different from those now
5. Moshe Lewin, one the leading scholars of Soviet history In the United States, pointed 
also at the "knee-jerk response" factor behind what he called the flood of slmpleminded 
programs In Russia: "Since the previous system was bad, we must now do the opposite" 
[Dissent, Spring 1992, pp. 172-175).
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confronting Russia. Second, that standard recipes for overcoming economic 
backwardness are non-existent: otherwise there would be no poor and backward 
countries left in the world. Third, that the IMF orthodoxy implicitly hinges on 
constructing premises for foreign investment expansion irrespective of country’s 
own interests.
The Yeltsin/Gaidar government took over when the country was facing one 
of the deepest crisis in its history threatening to undermine the basics of 
national survival. However, it did not opt for an anti-crisis strategy but rushed 
to price liberalization instead in the hope that foreign investment would pour in 
as production fell. This choice has wiped out savings, wages and pensions, and 
virtually devastated the economy, mounting hardships over hardships for the 
people, without clear economic or social benefits .
Yet the regime enjoyed tangible political dividends:
(i) by putting claim on public support on the grounds that it was a government of 
action ready to take responsibility when others had failed. Exploiting public 
fears concerning the threat of the restoration of totalitarism, it sought to 
consolidate its legitimacy, insisting that the survival of the government was 
equal to the survival of democracy and vice versa. The message carried by the 
pro-government press (see, for example, Izvestia, April 17 and May 22, 1992) was
6. According to official statistics, in the first calendar quarter of 1992 compared to the 
same period of 1991 the output in Russia decreased (per cent): GDP - 15; oil - 15; rolled 
metal - 15; industrial wood and paper • 27; machines and equipment - 29; consumer durables 
- 9-29; meet, cheese, margarine and serial - 23-35; whole-milk -45; sausage - 50. The 
reduction in production of separate items was even more impressive. Thus, the production of 
long-haul locomotives decreased by 82.4 per cent (Rossllskata gazeta, April 6, 1992, p.2; 
Delovoi mlr, April 9, 1992, p. 7).
easy to read: "Maybe you do not like what we do, but we are the democrats. If you 
do not want the come-back of Bolshevism, support us whatever we do, otherwise you 
are reactionary". The democratic credentials of the government was one of the 
reasons why a mass revolt did not follow the introduction of drastic economic 
measures as many had forecasted. Another reason was linked to the fact that the 
government was in a position to shift the responsibility for the hardships 
accompanying its politics to the former regime.
(ii) by providing itself with international backing. Gorbachev paved the way by 
extensively relying on the international public opinion and, even more so, on 
official and semi-official support and solidarity from the West to compensate for 
the failures of his internal policies. Gorbachev owed his international 
popularity to the bold disarmament policy and to the new political thinking he 
introduced. Yeltsin has subjected his country to the International Monetary Fund. 
In exchange he has received more leverage on his political opponents who, as 
follows from the intrigue of the Parliament-govemment confrontation during the 
sixth Congress of People’s Deputies in April 1992, were forced to submit to the 
reality that they could not remove the deputy of the IMF without risking being 
deprived of the foreign currency from the IMF.
(iii) by offering a deal to the upper level of Soviet and Party nomenklatura 
still retaining, under various camouflage, their influential positions. 
Nomenklatura was a stronghold against perestroika as it was threatening their 
privileges and class interests. Government free-market reforms have prepared 
grounds for wildcat privatisation which appears to give nomenklatura exceptional
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chances to keep for themselves their privileged position, now as first generation
7
capitalists .
Radicals in the Russian government have claimed that they would lead 
the people to a new civilization. Their practical philosophy, however, awakes in 
the memory a historical analogy no promoters of free market democracy may be 
proud of^. As Yeltsin and Gaidar seem to believe in the absolute universality of 
monetarist tactics, Stalin and his entourage were insistent on applying the same 
and invariable package of economic reforms first to different and very unlike 
parts of the former Russian Empire and, later, to the countries of Eastern 
Europe. Just as Yeltsin and Gaidar are prepared to liquidate a large part of the 
Russia’s economic potential in the name of the triumph of capitalism, so Stalin 
sacrificed Russian agriculture to the ends of accelerated socialist 
industrialization. As a result, the country’s economy was damaged in such a 
profound manner that no subsequent effort has succeeded in recuperating it. The 
government’s devotion to a dogma accompanied by a total lack of interest in the 
real conditions for development in the country have impelled the prominent 
Russian economist Georgi Arbatov to define the official credo as a "neo-Bolshevik 
brand of capitalism" (International Herald Tribune, May 12,1992).
7. The following is the "classical" example of «nomenklatura privatisation». A state 
research institute, the Central Research Institute of Complex Automation of Light Industry, 
spun off a private company, installed the secretary of its former Communist Party 
organization as president (the director of the institute was a share-holder) and then sold 
the firm 100 IBM-clone computers at ridiculously low state-subsidized price. The company. 
PICO Inc.. then began selling off the computers at market prices, up to 100 times the 
purchase price. (The International Herald Tribune, May, 18, 1992).
8. I owe this insight to Boris Kagarlitsky's writings.
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The example of current Russian politics has shown that between 
demonstrative technocratism and realism may lay an abyss. Speaking in terms of 
the business climate for foreign investors, government risk in Russia appears to 
be not so much the threat that the cabinet may easily fall owing to the 
unpopularity of its policy, especially with the Members of Parliament. After all, 
reform-minded governments have never been particularly stable. More important is 
the damage its dogmatic policy may cause to the reputations of the market as the 
institution. In turn, this will substantially restrict the prospects for foreign 
investors. It is mass disillusionment in "market democracy" that could cause 
discontinuity in policy. The official propaganda goes to great lengths explaining 
to the public that illegal business, sharp dealing, the grabbing and looting of 
state property, the expropriation of wage-earners through hyperinflation, 
racketeering and organized criminality are not congenital to a market-based 
economy, but it refuses to accept that all these are consequences of a one-sided 
economic strategy. Judging from press publications, more and more people need to 
be persuaded that the actual chaos in the country was not the intended result of 
government reforms. In the presence of certain prerequisites, generalized belief 
may become specific fears, antagonisms and hopes, leading to a hostile outburst 
which may not only sweep away the regime but devastate (at least for some time) 
nuclei of a market economy in Russia.
Under these conditions it would be erroneous to estimate government 
risk on the evidence of how much the administration seems to be determined to be 
rigorous in pursuing a once announced strategy. The result, in terms of policy 
continuity, can be the opposite. The ability of the government to correct its 
macroeconomic policy according to the constantly changing conditions of the
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volatile Russian economy has acquired the importance of the main precondition for 
providing continuity of a democratic pro-market policy in the country.
The corrections in question are not of the type which a defaulting 
government feels obliged to adopt in order to win back some of the slipping away 
public support. Flexibility is often confused with weakness. In reality, more 
adaptability would mean that reforms (and reformers) have entered the state of 
maturity. The frontal attack on the bastions of planned economy has failed. This 
proves once again that in economics, first, there are no simple straightforward 
dependencies at the macro level; second, believes in the automatism of the 
process of accommodation at the micro level are false. Flexibility in politics, 
though to such a degree which does not result in the oblivion of the ultimate 
end, coupled with a prompt reaction to the specific challenges of every 
particular phase of transition emerge as two major qualities distinguishing a 
successful government in Russia.
Clearly, a new interpretation should be given to the relationship 
between the nation-state and international financial agencies. Normally, private 
business regards it as positive for the investment climate if nation-states 
actively co-operate with the latter and enjoy their blessing and financing. 
However, if the International Monetary Fund persists in its dogmatism as the 
further decline in output - as is likely - will urge Russia’s government to ease 
off its shock-therapy grip, the conventional approach is going to lose its point. 
The IMF will undermine its own aim of promoting foreign investment if it remains 
under the delusion that in an enormous country such as Russia one may concentrate 
on one set of problems and forget about twenty others no less important.
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4.3J2. Post-communist Nationalism and Regionalism
From the point of view of investment risk, nationalism and regional 
separatism are of particular importance. First, ethnic tension is often a cause 
of persistent political instability fraught with veiy serious conflicts up to 
mass violent action. Second, foreign property is a "natural" victim of 
nationalistic wrath.
Taking into consideration that the USSR was a country of over one 
hundred nationalities, it is precarious to generalize on the nature of 
nationalism there. But, on having examined a variety of cases, one can reach the 
conclusion that across the territory of the former Soviet Union this phenomenon 
has a certain common characteristic which is particularly relevant to the 
investment climate: in many cases the epidemic of nationalistic (separatist) 
upheaval had bureaucratic-economic origins.
The proliferation and rapid success of numerous nationalistic colored
organizations and movements was engendered by the patently sympathetic attitude
of a significant section of the local Party and managerial apparatus striving to
gain greater autonomy from the central authorities in Moscow. Often nationalistic
9sentiment was inspired and manipulated from above by local elite . Klaus von
9. Recent data on leadership In economic enterprises and economic Institutions show that 
by 1989 the nationalities were fairly well represented in the leadership in their Republics 
(with the exception of Russia. Uzbekistan and Moldova). Contrary to common belief, the 
representation of natives in the leadership In the majority of republics exceeded their 
share In the populaUon ISotsiologicheskle Issledovaniia, 1990, No. 7. p. 40).
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Beyme (1991, p. 107) from the University of Heidelberg claims* :^
The main problem of ethnic strife is that large parts of the elites In the 
non-Russian republics have ceased to look upon the Soviet Union as a 
vehicle of (sic!) career mobility.
Boris Kagorlitsky, a prominent activist of the democratic movement in 
the country, in the book Farewell Perestroika made the following eye-witness 
account of the political events in Estonia in the late 1980s (B.Kagarlitsky, 
1990, pp.40-41):
(T]he P|opular] Flrontl became the major factor in the intra-Party 
struggle for power; it advanced demands which had the total backing of 
local apparatchiks but which for the time being they had decided not to 
proclaim in their own name. Finally, it could mobilize mass support, rally 
thousands of people around these slogans and, in effect, win for the part 
of the local leadership the kind of mass social base that it had never had 
before. ...The support for the PF of many of high-ranking members of the 
Party's leadership, including the ideology secretary, I.Toome, was a 
secret to no one.
Such a situation was typical of many parts of the USSR. Still now, already in 
independent republics, many leaders with a nomenklatura background continue to 
play vigorously the nationalistic card in a search for mass support.
Within nationally homogenous territories the aspiration of local 
leading bodies to reinforce their position by transferring to them rights which 
previously belonged to Moscow has given an impulse to regionalism. It is 
particularly pronounced in territories rich in natural resources, such as Western
10. A similar argument was put forward by Seweryn Bialer from Columbia University In 
Foreign Affairs, Winter/Spring 1992, p. 170.
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Siberia, or enjoying specific geographical advantages potentially transferable in 
an economic strength, such as Kalinigradskaia oblast’ (ex-Eastem Prussia) or the 
island of Sakhalin in the sea of Japan.
National-bureaucratic and regional-bureaucratic trends cannot be 
explained by ambitions of the local elite alone. They have roots in profound 
disillusionment in admimstrative-command economic management which alienated 
both individuals from the results of their activity and peoples from their 
habitat. However, this congenital deficiency of the Soviet economic mechanism 
itself was often interpreted in such a manner as to present its devastating 
consequences, equally affected all the regions and peoples of the country, as the 
result of a deliberate "hegemonic" and "imperialistic" policy of the center 
pointed against national republics and peripheral districts. In the years of 
perestroika, this brought to life numerous concepts of "independent development" 
advocating safeguarding local economies from all-Union market and reducing 
economic ties with other republics to a minimum while relying on alleged success 
in the external (Western) market.
These concepts gained a positive response in the part of the society 
and made those who did not bother about the national question before more 
nationalist-minded. Observers have taken notice of the awakening of a particular 
type of rational, composed nationalism in all the ex-socialist states. Josef 
Joffe, foreign editor of the Süddeutsche Zeitung, wrote in the International 
Herald Tribune (March 22, 1990)1 *:
11. See also on this topic Jürgen Habermans. "Der DM-Nationalismus" in Die Zelt, March 30. 
1990.
154 Chapter 4. Investment Climate and Investment 'Risf^
The...most important lesson of the East German voting (in favor of 
one Germany] is this: Economics is more important than nationalism or 
ideology....[T]he East Germans behaved like any normal "democratic" 
electorate: They voted their pocketbook. ...|N)ot so much "Deutschland iiber 
alles" as "Deutsche Mark weber alles".
Joffe is echoed by the prominent Estonian economist, Mikhail Bronstein, who wrote
in an analysis on economic nationalism in the Soviet Union (EKO, 1988, No. 12,
p.92):
It is a reaction to the "piracy" of all-Union departments, to the 
persistent shortage of good quality production and to the impossibility of 
obtaining modern technique and technology.
4.4. Consequences for the Investment Climate
4.4.1. Chances and Threats
Conventional belief is that militant or aggressive nationalism is
always a threat to international business. The case of the ex-Soviet Union,
12however, on the face of it at least, may seem to be different . Post-communist 
economic nationalism, at the level of decision-making elites at least, does not 
look similar to bellicose, xenophobic nationalism characteristic of the 19th and 
early 20th centuries; nor to that of former colonial countries that, having 
obtained political independence, sought to achieve economic independence through 
protection and the pursuit of inward oriented development policies; nor to the 
"new" economic nationalism of developed countries which emerged as a reaction to 
the process of globalization. The nationalism in question involves a strong dose
12. For example. President of a New York research firm. John W.Kiser III, claims:"I think 
the nationality problems present investors with more an opportunity, not a threat...those 
In the naHnnaHtips are very aggressive and anxious to do business with the West" (The 
International Economy, June/July 1990, p.81).
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of economic materialism, combined with noticeable indifference towards 
ideological nuances, along with a belief that ex-socialist countries should be 
quickly integrated into the modern industrialized world. Formerly in the Soviet 
Union and now in the Russian Federation, the indispensible component of all 
independent national and regional development programmes was and still is a 
demand for freedom to participate more actively and more directly in the 
international market.
Inasmuch as national aspiration for economic welfare is linked to an 
export-led-growth doctrine, post-communism nationalism may provide certain 
opportunities to foreign investors. Indeed, having gained sovereignty, most ex- 
Soviet republics undertook prompt measures, mainly legislative, to attract 
capital from abroad. However, in the long run, this type of nationalism is likely 
to prove to be as much a destabilizing factor as any other type by contributing 
to what Harald Knudsen called the "national frustration" level determining the 
nation’s propensity to expropriate.
Bureaucratically sowed nationalism and regionalism developed first as a 
weapon in political struggle within the Soviet elite in the years of the eclipse 
of perestroika. As such the two were aimed explicitly against the center and, 
implicitly, against other Union republics and the existed economic integration 
within the Soviet system. Vigorous attacks on co-operational ties and the 
division of labour within this system, on the one hand, and the propaganda of 
accelerated internationalisation, on the other hand, were the twin facets of the 
same political strategy. As a result, the negative consequences of the 
disintegration of the economic complex of the USSR, especially for large-scale 
enterprises, were downplayed while the capacity of local economies to enter
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external markets and to attract international investors was exaggerated. Had the 
Soviet economy operated successfully, the cost for republics and regions to go 
off on their own would have been so self-evident that this sort of propaganda 
would not have been readily accepted. However, the growing economic chaos, fueled 
not least by separatist pressure, reduced the public estimates of the loss 
involved in breaking away.
Economic reality was quick to correct speculative schemes. The 
enormous, almost insupportable cost of hasty disintegration has already become 
evident: according to Academician Abel Aganbegian, eighty-five per cent of the 
production decline of the CIS states after 1988 resulted from severing of 
economic ties and the contraction of inter-republic trade by the former republics 
of the USSR (EKO, 1992, No.3, p.68). Consequently, this has raised expectations 
tied with internationalization and foreign investment. These are the expectations 
of economic growth and increase of the living standard, improvement in the
quality of life, fighting down the pollution, etc. They may prove to be ill-
founded. In economics, as Paul Samuelson stresses repeatedly in his famous text­
book, there is not such a thing as free lunch. Professor Bronstein (EKG, 1988, 
No. 12, p.92) is quite explicit on this point:
(L)et us come down to earth. The West gives nothing away for free. In
order to buy goods and technology from them, we must sell our goods In
Western markets. But what Is there to sell? ... We have tried to clarify 
what are our raw material, human and technological resources and who are 
our potential customers and competitors in both internal and external 
markets. The conclusion have been of little comfort: with our current 
production methods and the quality of our output we have, to put it 
mildly, very modest opportunities for competing in external markets.
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Realizing this is certain to bring disillusionment both to elites and 
to the people, and to result in polity changes. In terms of the rational theory 
of public policy, such changes could provide net value achievement only on 
condition that all relevant values in the society are known. The politically 
biased estimation of relevant values causes distortions that make the policy 
short-lived. Sooner or later governments come to the point at which they have to 
convince their citizens that national well-being is protected and enhanced by 
their actions. For post-communist countries this presents the challenge to move 
from the stage of monetarist experiments, called "stabilization phase" in the 
vocabulary of the IMF, to the stage of growth in domestic production. Frustrated 
hopes for international support, even though from the beginning unjustifiably 
exaggerated for political reasons, will backfire, forcing the government to 
implement a more restrictive approach to foreign trade and foreign capital.
The developments in Poland, whose example Russia’s reformers seem to be
following, may serve to illustrate the case. The whole reform package of 1990 was
subordinated to the objective of creating favourable conditions for foreign
capital. It was never forthcoming. Smaller Hungary and Czechoslovakia, which
never rigorously committed themselves to big-bang methods in reorganizing their
economies, attracted 2-2.5 times more foreign private capital. As a result, two
years after the reforms were launched, the industrial output in Poland has
dropped by nearly 40 per cent and the official GDP by 20 per cent.
Unfortunate combination of economic stagnation, rigidity of economic 
structures and markets and extremely law occupational and geographical 
mobility of labour produces strong sources of adjustment pressure and 
gives rise to economic arguments for import protection and government 
intervention (K.Gawllkowska-Hueckel. A. Zielinska-Glebocka, 1992, p. 10).
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Frustrated expectations concerning foreign capital inflow can lead to 
the deterioration of the investment climate as nationalistic agitation makes it 
difficult to estimate realistically the actual capacity of the national economy 
to attract investments. The governments of the newly independent republics and 
local authorities in Russia have taken only recently the burden of responsibility 
for the fate of their peoples and their territories. Before, the central 
government in Moscow was a customary target for criticism with regard to its 
alleged incompetence and negligence when managing local resources and industry. 
At present the new regimes are willing to get the most of direct relations with 
foreign investors. If the evidence from the negotiations concerning the first two 
large-scale foreign investment projects in the territory of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States - the development of Tengiz oil field in Kazakhstan and shelf 
oil around the island of Sakhalin - may be viewed as indicative of the prevailing 
attitude, making deals with the new regimes will not be an easy task for foreign 
investors. Foreign observers have noted two characteristics in the host-side 
approach: distrust with respect to commercial partners and the lack of realism in 
evaluating proper bargaining strength.
4.4.2. The Time-bomb of a Multipower Regime
As was already mentioned, militant nationalism and regionalism were key 
weapons in the hands of the opposition to Gorbachev and his perestroika. They 
were widely used for tactical ends, in Russia as much as in other Republics, to 
achieve immediate results in undermining Moscow’s central authority and loosening 
traditional power structures. Later these circumstances have given ambiguity to 
regionalism in post-communist Russia. On the one hand, the shift towards 
recognizing the right of localities to take more responsibility on their own was
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progressive and democratic. In a vast country such as Russia, it is the only way 
to bring revival to many remote places which had never succeeded in drawing the 
attention of central departments to their problems or were mismanaged by them. On 
the other hand, at the state level the initiatives in this sphere were strongly 
biased by on-going political considerations. As the political situation has 
changed following the collapse of the centralist federal state, the new regime in 
Russia has failed to be consistent in its regional policy and to meet duly the 
increasing pressure "from below" inspired largely by its own declarations. The 
regime lacks a political infrastructure to impose its will in the provinces. In 
the meantime, the introduction of local democratic elections has radically 
changed the orientation of local bosses. They have become dependent upon their 
voters and could not be removed by a directive from Moscow any more. As a result, 
economically prompted regionalism does not find any counterbalance on the 
political side. From the point of view of consequences for the investment 
climate, however, the described inconsistency may have the effect of a time-bomb.
First of all, it is necessary to mention the dangers following from the 
precedent of m nogou I as tie [multipower] which was one of the most notable marks of 
the crisis of perestroika. In the context of the situation, the term described 
the collision of power triggered by the decision of some Soviet republics to give 
republican laws priority over union laws contrary to the Soviet Constitution. The 
Baltic republics, Moldavia and Georgia paved the way. However, it was the 
willingness of the Russian Parliament to follow suit that had given a critical 
impulse to the unfolding crisis of the federal system in the USSR. The logic of 
the current historical moment urged Russian legislators to close eyes to the fact 
that their own state was also multinational. By doing so, the Parliament has set 
an example of a non-constitutional action to local authorities in the territory
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of the Russian Federation (not only in national regions) which they did not fail 
to follow.
As a result, a situation of many levels of government have emerged. It 
is far from being unique. Surveys on investment possibilities in quite a few 
countries (for instance, Brazil, India) report that foreign investors who have to 
deal with different levels of power (central, state and regional) sometimes find 
it difficult to understand which one really controls the decision-making. Such a 
situation is never estimated as favouring the inflow of capital. What makes it 
especially adverse in the Russian Federation is the fact that the division of 
power has been still continuing. Moreover, often it takes the form of a 
disorderly process revealing, in some instances, all the characteristics of an 
economic war. This is especially true of the situation at the local level as 
regional bodies take actions bearing patently negative implications for other 
territories without warning other regions in advance or even without considering 
their full effect against a broader, than strictly local, background.
The desire to fence in the local market has come to dominate regional
13politics . Some districts have adopted legislation regulating the export of 
industrial products and food, including shipments to the neighbouring territories 
of the Russian Federation, and have given it precedence over respective federal 
laws. As for the nation-state level, the clear signs of confusion and indecision 
have been noticeable over the principles and instruments of territorial and 
sectoral management. What makes the situation even more complicated is that
11. How far the process of autonomizaUon of regional markets has gone is clear from the 
degree of regionalization of prices. Thus, in March 1992, the same model of a household 
refrigerator in Izhevsk cost only 30 pier cent of Moscow price, in Briansk - 45 per cent, 
and in Kemerovo - 165 per cent (Ekonomika I zhizn', No.21, May 1992, p.7).
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lacunae in the governing structure leave place for new powers. One of them is 
"producing associations" organized by highly positioned officials and managers 
and closely resembling the functions of traditional Soviet ministries. On the 
other hand, there are rumors of "spontaneous privatisation" meaning that some 
productive units no longer take orders from anybody.
According to these indications, mnogovlastie is veiy much different
from a conventional process of redefining authority between the central state and
local governments. In Russia the latter seek to redistribute wealth across the
country in a revolutionary manner by unilateral measures whereby rights are not
14endowed but captured . This raises legitimate questions about the relationship
between national and local policies towards foreign capital, as well as about the
capacity of the nation-state to be representative in relations with foreign
15business Local authorities, especially those in republican, insist on
14. Political blackmail has become a favourite means of protccUng national and regional 
Interests. Regions widely and often successfully use the threat of secession whenever there 
Is a conflict with the central power. How precarious the situation is show's the collision 
between the government in Moscow and the authorities of a tiny district of Severo-Eniselsk 
in the back-woods of Russia. The latter did not hesitate to proclaim the Independent 
Scvcro-Enlseisk Republic to gain control of a very prospective gold mine on the territory 
of the region Ignoring the Constitution and the Federal law on mineral resources. The 
status quo was reestablished only after the personal interference of Vice Prime-Mlnlster 
Yegor Gaidar who «returned» the district under Russian Jurisdiction after having paid off 
local authorities with a promise of 100 million roubles of subsidized state credit on the 
development of the mine (Izuestia, June 29. 1992).
15. The saga of a project for developing a 750-million-barrel oil field in Russian Far East 
is quite eloquent. The exploration of the field near Sakhalin Island in the Pacific Ocean 
started In 1974 with the participation of a Japanese firm. In 1990, Island's authorities 
decided to boost up oil production as a part of a plan to secure Sakhalin's financial 
independence with the aim to transform the island In a special economic zone. Moscow 
authorities claimed the oil. In order to get more freedom to pursue his plans, the governor 
of Sakhalin insisted on organizing an International competition for the development
(Footnote continues on next page)
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oversight of agreements and contracts at least and more often on the right to 
choose and to veto.
4.4.3. Conflicts over Natural Resources and Special Economic Zones
Quite a number of important legislative acts regulating the modern 
Russian economy had their origin in the peripeteias of the political struggle of 
the last months of the agony of the Soviet state. This only naturally leads to 
doubts concerning their durability, which no investor can ignore. Now that the 
political conditions have changed, the major weak point of these regulations 
becomes ever more evident. They bear the stamp of separatist logic and, at the 
moment of adoption, were designed to attract local elites on the side of the 
partisans of sovereign Russia in their struggle against the attempts of President 
Gorbachev to create a new federal state with a strong center. As Russia gained 
independence, these acts and regulations have come to be contradicting to the 
objective of preserving common market space within the Russian Federation. 
Clearly, in perspective, such regulations are likely to form a basis for tensions 
in relations between the central power and local authorities.
(Footnote continued from previous page)
contract on the conditions worked out by local experts. The Russian Republic s oil ministry 
in Moscow selected a consortium with major American interest, while the governor of 
Sakhalin Island, ten thousand kilometers from Moscow, gave the contract to a rival bidder, 
a consortium with important Japanese participation. Moscow overruled him but that did not 
put an end to the struggle between local and central authorities. The conflict has been 
deepening, making the future for of the project uncertain.
Chapter 4. Investment Cimate and Investment Risf^
This danger deteriorates the political environment for the foreign 
capital in general and at least in two cases it may have a direct impact on 
foreign investors.
The question of control over natural resources is one of such cases.
The extractive sector, at least during some initial period, promises to become a
major target of international investors and thus has enormous strategic
16importance . Many of deposits are located in the autonomous republics or other 
territorial formations in Siberia and the north-east of the European part of 
Russia. The second Congress of People’s Deputies of the Russian Federation, in
1990, endorsed a programme providing for the transfer of full powers of control 
over resources to the localities; but it envisaged also the sale by the 
Federation of oil, gas and other raw materials to other Union republics and in 
the world market. The programme implied that Russia would be able to join the 
ranks of the world most prosperous nations as soon as it jettisoned the "burden" 
of the rest of the USSR. The authors of the programme preferred not to elaborate 
on a possibility that extracting regions might choose to jettison the "burden" of 
the rest of the Russian Federation at a certain point.
Although, in May 1992, a new Federal Treaty was initialed by 14 of the 
16 autonomous republics, the document raised strong objections in all such 
republics rich in natural resources which did not want to share control over 
their mineral wealth with Moscow. Thus, the Republic of Bashkortostan, a major
16. The CIS, particularly Russia which produces between 80 and 90 per cent of the region’s
oil. according to estimates, may have up to a quarter of the world's undiscovered oil and 
more gas than any other country. The CIS has 141 giant oil fields each holding more than 
500 million barrels of oil. The Western Siberia basin alone contains 16 per cent of the 
world's discovered reserves, but less than a fifth of them Is being produced.
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supplier of oil, in a special supplement to the treaty proclaimed land, minerals, 
natural and other resources in its territory property of its population. Issues 
related to the utilization of this property will be regulated by Bashkir laws and 
agreements with federal government. The republic has also proclaimed itself an 
independent participant in international and foreign economic relations, except 
areas it has voluntary delegated to Russian Federation". The former autonomous 
republic will independently establish principles of taxation and payment of 
duties to the federal budget. Such unilateral actions and the reaction they 
provoked on the part of the central authorities have pushed forward the spiral of 
confrontation. This only delays the moment when the inevitable division of power 
and control cam be settled to the satisfaction of all parties involved increasing 
uncertainty costs for investors.
The second case deals with the creation of free economic, or
17
enterprise, zones . In September 1990, the Russian Parliament passed a bill 
giving freedom to local authorities to establish such zones within their 
territories. The decision was taken without a serious preliminary examination of 
the complex nature of this form of international investment promotion. The 
concept of the zone economy as well as the role of the zones in reforming the 
national economy were not altogether clear. However, this did not hamper the 
parliamentary decision because it perfectly fit the logic of the unfolding "war 
of sovereignties". For the Russian leadership the free zone ideology was 
instrumental in taking whole vast regions out of the direct control of federal 
economic bodies. Vice-Governor of Chita oblast’ recalls in his interview to 
Rossiiskaia gazeta (July 18, 1992) the time when "for purely political reasons 
the than Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, at present its
17. In more detail the economics of free enterprise zones is analyzed in chapter 6.
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President, was signing heaps of orders affording the status of the free economic 
zone to various territories".
Local authorities were enthusiastic about the new regulation as it 
provided them with legitimate grounds to evade certain fiscal obligations before 
the federal budget while putting forward claims for additional financing for 
infrastructure and construction projects. Moreover, since the allocation of 
investment resources remained one of the main levers of control in the hands of 
the central power, attracting foreign investment seemed to provide an opportunity 
to diminish this control. As regards the political motivation, it tightly related 
to the general aspiration of local authorities to more independence from the 
center. Finally, it is important to keep in mind that in a country with a 
disarrayed monetary system and the chronic scarcity of all types of products 
foreign currency and imported goods have always a special appeal to the public. 
Dozens of plans of organizing free zones were announced within a very short time 
but only few were carried beyond a very preliminary stage as the break-down of 
the Union economy progressed.
In sovereign Russia the interest in developing free economic zones has 
revived. However, in the absence of what could have been a state programme, the 
wild-card principle of allocating zone privileges is likely to end in conflict. 
The problem is that, at least during an organizational period, the free zones 
demand a lot of initial investment which stipulates the redistribution of budget 
funds in their favour. Free economic zones belong to those regulation instruments 
that bring costs to all regions of a country while often benefiting only a few. 
Under present conditions this may have two outcomes. Either regions which do not 
plan zone expansion protest if their neigbours will intend to establish theirs,
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or all regions will seek to get a zone status to parts or the whole of their 
territory whatever irrelevant are local conditions. Eventually, the realization 
of the idea of free economic zones will be blocked in both events.
4.4.4. The Consequences of the Living Standard Collapse
Yet another danger facing foreign investors relates to the formation of 
certain features of the social environment in the country. Any nationalistic 
doctrine, including those according with bureaucratic rationality, carries a 
potential for xenophobic intolerance. This potential could develop into reality 
fueled by discontent, demands, and mobilization originated outside the realm of 
ethnic/nationalistic sentiment. As has been shown earlier, economically motivated 
resentment provoked directly the surge of nationalism in the USSR in the late 
1980s. This nationalism/regionalism gained support from the population not 
because the majority were living under miserable conditions, but because the 
people were told that their republic (region, district, etc.) had been robbed by 
other republics and the center and that they would have been much better-off if 
they had stopped subsidizing others and seceded from the federation. That was the 
controlled and quite selective nationalism of reasonably prosperous people 
anxious for more prosperity.
The economic catastrophe that followed the breakdown of the all-Union 
market has brought about the downfall of "accustomed" absolute standards of 
living affecting millions of people in all the parts of the former Soviet Union 
(for data see Chapter 5.2.1.) and has led to related relative shifts in economic 
welfare among population groups within newly organized state entities. This 
changes the premises for economic nationalism: now it will focus on the defence
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of the livelihood of millions of common people and become much less controlled 
and selective. It will be pointed against everything which is seen by them as 
ravaging their livelihood. As the traditional image of the "enemy" - the central 
power in Moscow - cannot be used anymore to channel public discontent, it will 
turn elsewhere. Since modernization and competition tend to destroy the 
"inefficient" life support system of the increasingly marginalized part of 
society (Kollontai, 1992), this latter starts to fight for protecting and 
conserving its basis of survival against the invasion of market forces referring 
not only to economic, but also to social, cultural, ethnical, religious and other 
means.
Ethnic and nationalistic demands together with regionalism represent 
specific political risk to foreign investors. But, in terms of strategic 
investment planning, it is important to recognize its genesis in the CIS as 
reformulated economic resentment. This claim is especially relevant with respect 
to the Russian Federation. Nationalities, inhabiting it, have had a common 
history for centuries. They existed in the framework of a single Russian state 
long before the establishment of the empire. Although, at a local level, there 
are social forces that see their task as being "to rupture the course of history" 
and assert their national identity, which has disappeared under the pressure of 
Russification, but even more so under the pressure of modernization, the 
stability of historical ties between the peoples of Russia over centuries 
indicates that cultural and religious differences alone cannot account for recent 
ethnic tensions. In this context, risk evaluation of nationalism and regionalism 
in Russia has to be implemented through the prism of the development of economic 
reforms and related expectations.
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Indeed, in the foreseeable future any serious political counteraction
seems improbable. In the country in which over one hundred registered parties
keep splintering, in which parties boasting four thousand card-holders are
considered large while, according to public poles, only ten percent of the
electorate have a clear party loyalty, nationalistic and regionalistic slogans
remain the most secure keys to mass support. The government in Moscow has tried
to tackle this problem by installing a new centrally controlled apparatus in the
place of the old. Under political pluralism, however, this tactic has no future.
The only constructive response is to create an environment in which separatism
will be explicitly counterproductive as it is known that a key to political
survival of new regimes is the ability to channel the energy of the masses away
from politics into economic activity. A combined package aiming at strengthening
the state and economic reform is needed. It is not clear that the correct
18approach has been found . The 1992 reforms have only increased the enormous 
disparities in initial economic conditions within the Russian Federation as well 
as in the CIS leading to the growth of inter-ethnic and regional tension.
4.5. Policy Risk
4.5.1. The Concept of Policy Risk
Political risk apart, foreign investment is very likely to be exposed 
to what has come to be known as policy risk following the adoption by host- 
countries of formal industrial policies and the conscious and deliberate setting 
up of entry-control and management systems to deal with foreign investment and 
business (Ting, 1988). In recent years this type of risk, though less dramatic
18. Public opinion polls reveal that over the first half of 1992 the number of Russian 
citizens who think that there were no positive changes to inspire hope and optimism has 
increased substantially to over 55 per cent (Izvestta.. August 11. 1992).
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than political risk, has been regarded more and more by analysts as central to
the strategy of transnational corporations, owing to its particular relevance to
the challenges of the current stage of relations between exporters and importers
of capital. This stage has two distinguishing features. One is the growing
acknowledgement by host-countries of the positive contribution of foreign
19investments to the development of the national economy . Rapid 
industrialization, dispersion of technology and managerial skills, and the 
inclusion of local producers in international selling networks are the 
consequences in terms of national development most often ascribed by the 
literature on export-led growth to foreign direct investments of transnational 
corporations. The other feature is the desire of host-goveraments to derive the 
maximum benefit from the presence of foreign capital in the country. Accordingly, 
foreign ventures have become subject to sometimes more and sometimes less 
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In order to increase technological and other benefits from foreign 
investors, these regulations normally include various incentives but may also 
incorporate some disincentives in the form of tax provisions, production and 
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19. It Is useful In this respect to compare the results of two comprehensive surveys of 
national control of foreign business entry. One was carried out by Richard Robinson (1976) 
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main finding was that, at the beginning of the 1970s, host-countries were typically 
striving for the control over foreign Investment to pass to local capital. Conversely, a 
1989 OECD report on international direct investment revealed that reluctance to accept 
multinational enterprises as partners in the development process was by then largely a 
thing of the past.
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than political risk, has been regarded more and more by analysts as central to
the strategy of transnational corporations, owing to its particular relevance to
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measures restrain the freedom of operation of transnational corporations but on
their own they are not policy risks as is sometimes argued (see, for example,
Ting, 1988, p.45). It is the dynamics of these regulations and the uncertainty
20accompanying them which represent policy risk .
In contemplating a foreign venture, the investor would never fail to 
consider the benefits and risks of the project. Such an analysis, however, is 
necessarily tentative because it normally bases on extrapolation in what concerns 
country-specific risks. In the case of policy risks this approach appears to be 
particularly precarious. Policy risks are established within the host-country’s 
legal framework, which remains the sovereign domain of national legislators. 
Policy risks are tied to a subtle and latent process of day-to-day policy-making 
and, unlike political risks, need not be preceded or accompanied by explicit 
social confrontations. It is particularly difficult for foreign firms to foresee 
and "manage" some seemingly minor corrections in regulations (such as a slight 
percentage point change in national component content) which, nevertheless, can 
have a very strong impact on the investor.
It is more feasible and practical to estimate the prevailing trend 
underlying the fluctuations in a host-country’s capital entry management policy 
in order to determine whether or not it is moving towards liberalization. Such an 
analysis should account for three sets of facts: (i) the economic philosophy of
20. L.Thunell (1977) proposed making a distinction between risk and uncertainty. When the 
decision maker has full information about the objective probabilities for all possible 
outcomes, then there is a risk for a certain outcome, but when he does not know the 
objective probabilities, or even all the possible outcomes, then uncertainty is present. 
Except perhaps for the most simple decisions, it is in reality always the latter case that 
exists. However, decision makers often act as if there were objective probabilities, 
thereby converting an uncertainty Into a risk.
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the nation-state as it is revealed in official programmes and declarations, and 
real action; (ii) the actual set of regulations concerning foreign investment and 
their efficiency in the context of stated goals; (iii) factors which may 
necessitate unexpected adjustments in the current official economic course.
Clearly, policy risk and political risk, i.e., discontinuities stemming 
from political change, are interrelated. The dynamics of the national capital 
entry management system (CEMS) is never determined solely by economic 
considerations. The government is a political and public body and its decisions 
necessarily depend on the configuration of the country’s social landscape. 
Therefore, the most drastic changes constituting policy risks tend to have the 
same roots as political risks, with profound social instability in first place. 
The replacement of the government of one political orientation with the 
government of a different political orientation is one of the most probable 
causes of policy risk. At the same time, political decisions are often made from 
economic necessity. As the dividing line is difficult to define, the relative 
artificiality of distinguishing between political risk analysis and policy risk 
analysis should always be kept in mind. This implies that, first, the two 
inevitably overlap; second, that policy risk conceptualisation is valid only with 
due reservations. In fact, one can assume three situations in which the 
abstraction from the political component of investment risk is justifiable. The 
first is that of a politically stable rational government. The second occurs when 
a certain type of economic policy becomes an overall imperative to such an extent 
that, whatever a government’s political attachments, the authorities have no 
choice but to pursue it. Finally, we have to consider situation characterized by 
the existence of certain in-built guarantees, pertaining to the organization of 
the society itself, which secure a necessary continuity with regard to government
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obligations (for example, the traditions of the "state of law" that have
developed in democratic countries facilitate a smoother passage from one economic 
policy to another).
Of these three situations, the first seems the least plausible and most 
theoretical, especially if applied to the realities of countries undergoing 
restructuring, while the other two appear to be quite credible. Our second 
assumption in particular seems to be relevant as the globalisation of production 
has made all industrialized countries of a certain level of development dependent 
on an international market that forces them to respect some common rules of the 
game. A noticeable standardization of investment regulations has occurred, and 
host-countries cannot ignore this development without running the risk of being 
marginalized. Nonetheless, however important the impact of the international 
environment may be, it cannot remove national factors altogether. Consequently, 
policy risk evaluation assumes a more specific investigation of national economic 
and political dynamics.
4.5.2. The Genesis of Russia’s CEMS
The principle feature of Russia’s capital entry management system is 
volatility. This is hardly surprising as the whole country is in the state of 
flux. The formation of the system began only recently, at the earliest in the 
second half of the 1980s, and since then has been implemented in very complicated 
conditions. The period in question should be split into three stages. The first 
corresponds to the creation of the foundations of the system. The second was 
characterized by the state of confrontation and strife between the central 
government and the republics, which resulted in the introduction of some radical
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amendments giving the system a more liberal and up-to-date stance. In the third 
and current period, against the background of a serious economic crisis, the CEMS 
has become increasingly controversial as short-term priorities tend to prevail 
over longer-term interests.
The First Staee (1987-1990): The making of the system. The foundation 
of the CEMS in the Commonwealth of Independent States was laid by an edict on 
joint ventures adopted by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 
January 1987. As the first law on foreign private property since the 1920s, it 
had principle importance as one of the milestones of perestroika in economic and 
political thinking. It was the factual recognition of the realities which the 
Soviet leadership had preferred to ignore over decades, namely, that the leading 
to autarky socialist path of development had failed, that Soviet industry needed 
western assistance and that the efficiency of privately owned enterprises was not 
inferior to that of publicly owned as was postulated by the official teaching. 
However, the positive content of the 1987 joint venture law did not correspond to 
its historical importance. It was revised in May 1989 and again in March 1990, 
but the amendments did not eliminate its inherent weaknesses.
The main problem with the joint venture law lay in its attempt to 
include foreign capital in a state property-based economic system, with only the 
smallest possible concessions to market principles. As a compromise between 
conservative (protective) and pragmatic approaches, it provided, despite all 
amendments, numerous loopholes for state intervention in the management and 
operation of foreign business (see Kozlov and Kuznetsov, 1989). Consequently, 
policy risk was very high. For a substantial period of tune there was no foreign
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investment law as such, and also no property law, leasing law, land law, joint- 
stock company law, etc. Under these conditions joint venture and other foreign 
investment contracts provided, presumably on an ad hoc basis, only very limited 
protection.
It would be incorrect to claim that the inconsistency of the joint 
venture regulations was not evident to legislators. Soviet law, inappropriate for 
a commercial system, was being rewritten to promote and protect market exchange 
among individuals and corporations. Simultaneously, bilateral investment 
agreements were concluded with a number of major industrialize countries in order 
to facilitate the activities of foreign investors in the Soviet Union. 
Characteristically, these agreements were ahead of national legislation as 
regards the degree of freedom and protection they guaranteed to investors. 
Bilateral investment agreements, prepared in 1988-1990, stipulated that host- 
govemments would
(i) afford foreign investors national (i.e., non-discriminatory) treatment;
21
(ii) not engage in acts of expropriation without fair market compensation ;
(iii) guarantee repatriation of profits; and (iv) submit any disputes to third 
country arbitration.
These efforts, however, were not free from the ambiguity so typical of 
perestroika in general. By introducing the concept of private property, 
entrepreneurship, private leasing, etc., the newly established legislation
■■■■" ...........— i.
21. The adoption of the notion of "fair market compensation” implied the extension of 
investment protection beyond "property" in the sense of tangible movables or immovables. 
For the first time in Soviet juridical practice, "property" came to include the market 
value of of the ongoing business once established, or alternatively, the capitalized value 
of its prospective income flows.
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constituted a revolutionary step forward in the context of Soviet economic and 
social history. At the same time, the practical utility of these norms, 
especially from the point of view of protection of the investor, was marginal. 
Thus, the 1990 law on property did not acknowledge private property in the sense 
adopted in market economies. Rather, all property (other than some household and 
related items) was conceptually joined to the state or the people, and the rights 
of labour. Thus Article 1(6) of the law on property stated that the use of 
property must exclude the alienation of the worker from the "means of production" 
and the exploitation of man by man. Article 1(2) provided that an owner may 
"possess, use and dispose" of property; however, this phrase appeared in all 
socialist property laws, and in itself does not clarify the degree of investment 
protection. On the other hand, many progressive norms, such as the inviolability 
of private property, were formulated in a very general way, thus leaving space 
for bureaucratic bodies to impose arbitrary interpretations. As for the 
international treaties, their ratification was delayed.
The Second Stage (1990-1991): Radicalization. The beginning of the 
1990s saw a new situation concerning the development of the national capital 
entry management system. The central authorities were experiencing growing 
pressure to move towards greater policy liberalization. On the economic side 
official policy-making was mostly affected by a rapidly progressing disruption of 
the national economy and, externally, by the exacerbation of the foreign debt 
problem. The Soviet Union had lost its once high standing as an international 
borrower. Interest rates on the Soviet debt were rapidly increasing forcing a a 
search for alternative sources of foreign finance. Private portfolio and direct 
investment, and official aid could have become such sources. In order to tap them 
the harmonization of the Soviet foreign investment control and management
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practice with what were internationally acknowledged standards was essential. 
This was both a requirement of private investors and a necessary prerequisite for 
obtaining access to an international aid-package.
In the sphere of politics some important new realities were also to be 
taken into consideration. The factual dissolution of the union state was gaining 
momentum. The Moscow government had to face the "war of laws". In many national 
republics legislators were far more radical than their colleagues in the Union 
Supreme Soviet. Central authorities soon found themselves no longer powerful 
enough to block or override local legislative initiatives. What emerged was a 
peculiar type of competition between parliaments which was, on the whole, 
conducive to better quality legislation. In addition, as the republics expressly 
ignored the task of maintaining co-ordination between the different levels of 
legislation, the desire to preserve a centralised state increasingly forced the 
centre to show flexibility in compiling Union laws.
The results of the factors aforementioned showed in the course of the 
elaboration of a Union law on foreign investment. The projects of the Union law 
and its Russian Federation counterpart were brought out practically 
simultaneously, in the autumn of 1990. The Russian law proved to contain more 
incentives and guarantees to foreign capital. In particular, it made provision 
for the foreign investor to obtain full market value compensation in foreign 
currency if his property had been nationalized. The compensation was to be paid 
at the expense of the republican department which had taken the decision to 
liquidate the foreign venture. This clause was intended as a precaution against 
bureaucratic arbitrariness. The debates that followed revealed more support for 
the approach expressed in the Russian draft. Shortly after, similar articles
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found their way into the text of the next Union law dealing with foreign 
property, the Fundamental Principles of Investment Activities in the USSR 
(effective from December 10th, 1990).
On the whole, both the Soviet and Russian investment legislation of 
that period followed the principle that internationally accepted norms must be 
implemented also within the country. The most important innovations were the 
following, (i) The circle of investors was enlarged. In addition to foreign 
juridical bodies also foreign individuals, states and international agencies were 
allowed to invest in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, they were allowed to create 
100 per cent foreign-owned companies, (ii) Foreign capital was granted the 
national (non-discriminatory) regime of investment, (iii) The law provided 
guarantees against expropriation and other actions leading to an equal result.
Predictably, the new norms were greeted enthusiastically abroad, but 
this did not result in any substantial increase in foreign investment coming into 
the country as the gap widened between the letter of the law and its real content 
as stipulated by the actual situation in the country. Thus, the law established a 
national regime of investment for foreign capital, which anywhere else in the 
world would be a substantial advantage. However, in the Soviet Union it meant 
little because the regime itself had yet to be created. National enterprises 
worked under such uncertain, volatile and generally unfavourable conditions that 
this norm, as things stood, could not have acted as an incentive. In addition 
there was a lack of clarity concerning many other rights of foreign investors. 
Completely worthless beyond the country’s borders, the rouble remained the 
greatest stumbling block. On the other hand, the controversial juridical status 
of land and natural resources was a further discouragement.
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During this second stage the Soviet capital entry management system 
demonstrated the contradictoriness that distinguished the final period of 
perestroika as the leadership hesitated to make the ultimate choice between 
market and administrative models of economic management. This also may be traced 
in the legislation on foreign investment. The Fundamental Principles of 
Investment Activities in the USSR, for example, together with many progressive 
articles, contained a clause that permitted state bodies and officials to 
interfere in the management and operations of foreign-owned businesses "within 
the limits of their competence" (see Art.20:2). This was explicitly contrary to 
prevailing international practice which demanded, as was fixed in some republican 
laws, that all relations between foreign firms and state institutions should be 
regulated only by contract. Taking into consideration how strong the position of 
state bureaucracy still was in the economy and society in general, such catches 
in legislation left foreign entrepreneurs ultimately unprotected against 
administrative dictates. Furthermore, the regulations had not been worked out in 
detail. Many fundamental laws still remained on the books. Yet as fast as new 
laws had been adopted, events had consistently overtaken them. Outstanding 
problems had accumulated a critical mass making an explosion inevitable.
The Third Stage (1991-1992): One step forward. two steps back. Despite 
all the drawbacks in the formation of the CEMS, the impulse given by perestroika 
to the process of internationalisation of the Soviet economy was so powerful that 
the flow of foreign investment into the country increased throughout the whole 
period from 1987 till 1992. The dynamics of the registration of new joint 
ventures was as follows: 1987 - 23; 1988 - 1.076; 1990 - 1.584 (Evstratov et al.,
1991, p. 158). In 1991, the number of joint venture registered with the Finance 
Ministry of the Russian Federation was increased steadily to reach one hundred
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registrations on a monthly basis. Although in reality only 42 per cent of 
registered businesses later really started operations, by the end of 1991 foreign 
investors had put about one billion dollars into the Russian economy (Ekonomika i 
zhizn’, No.5, February 1992). Disappointingly, the following year, 1992, did not 
confirm the tendencies of the previous period. New registrations evened out, and 
within the first three months of 1992 twenty foreign firms announced plans to 
discontinue their business in Russia. Up to this point no major company had 
withdrawn its activities. These developments provoked a very worried reaction on 
the part of officials and experts who feared them to be an early sign of 
forthcoming mass disinvestment from Russia. The restraint demonstrated by 
international investors was a response to the Soviet Union’s crackdown and a 
further deterioration of the economic and political situation. The same factors 
had an impact on the CEMS.
On the one hand, after the collapse of the Soviet Union the situation
ceased to exist, with the exception of the Russian Federation, in which investors
had to cope with conflicting instructions from union, republican and even local
regional authorities, all eager to establish control over enterprises in their
territory. On the other hand, a variety of national regulating regimes had at
this time already emerged within the Community of Independent States. At
present, they are very close to one another though, of course, not totally
22identical . One may expect that, if collaboration within the frame of the 
Commonwealth does not expand, republican capital entry management regulations
22. Differences mainly concern the list of industries where foreigners may invest only 
under license or special permission, as well as the list of industries in which foreign 
participation is particularly encouraged; regulations of foreign ventures in banking and 
insurance; the right of foreigners to lease/own and dispose of land; the freedom to 
participate in the management of Joint-stock companies: the international trade regime of 
foreign and Joint ventures.
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are likely to become ground for competition between former Soviet republics for 
foreign capital, thus weakening their bargaining power.
In Russia, probably the most decisive feature of the third stage has 
been the degree of disorganization of the capital entiy management system, 
exceptionally high even by the standards of the country. The critical state of 
the budget and the balance of current payments led lue authorities to embark on 
emergency measures which eliminated or depreciated many foreign investor 
incentives, privileges and guarantees. The foreign investment law as adopted by 
the Supreme Soviet in July 1991 turned out to be much less liberal than the draft 
published half a year before. Characteristically, in numerous cases the law was 
overridden by the instructions of executive bodies, which was expressly illegal. 
At first, foreign partners in Russian joint ventures (JV) found their current 
accounts with Vneshekonombank blocked. Then fiscal authorities began to 
"interpret'^!) two year income tax holidays for the JV envisaged by the law as 
one year and to levy tax, with the exception of few priority industries, on 
reinvested income (Ekonomika i zhizn’, No.5, February 1992, p. 13). Soviet JV 
partners were called on to increase budget payments. The Central Bank of the 
Russian Federation obliged JVs with a foreign capital share of over 30 per cent 
to sell 50 per cent of foreign currency revenues to a rouble stabilisation fund 
and a foreign debt servicing fund contrary to the law’s postulation that 
"currency revenues of these enterprises resulting from the exportation of proper 
production are left completely at their disposal" (Law on foreign investment in 
the Russian Federation, Art.25). Foreign exchange and trade regulations were 
tightened, preventing joint ventures from achieving the currency self-sufficiency 
required to transfer dividend payments abroad.
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These events have demonstrated that despite all the publicity given to 
official plans to promote foreign capital inflow, this objective has actually 
remained low on the government’s agenda. The government has concentrated on a 
current stabilisation programme, whereas long-term investment policy, the
correction of structural dislocations and, closely related to them, foreign
capital entry regulations have been left without due attention, if not
sacrificed, for the sake of a balanced budget and other monetarist priorities. 
Second, these events have distinctly proved that, while there is foreign
investment legislation in Russia, along with a state Committee on Foreign 
Investment, there is nothing like a state capital entry management system as yet 
in the form of a combination of interrelated policies. This is evident from the 
chaotic state of the regulations themselves, but if additional evidence were 
necessary it would be sufficient to compare three important laws, on foreign 
investment, on land, and on taxation, adopted by the Parliament one shortly after 
another. As regards foreign businesses, they appear to stem from three different 
conceptual approaches, the latter two laws substantially narrowing the effects of 
the former.
4.5.3. Policy Risk in Russia
The previous brief review of Russia’s foreign investment regulations 
demonstrates that they have been extremely volatile, controversial, short-lived 
and incomplete, thus representing almost the whole spectrum of qualities 
characterizing high policy risk. This finding is hardly surprising. Policy risk 
cannot be low when the economic and political situation in a country is generally 
so clearly unstable. As Russia, first as a Soviet republic and later as an
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independent state, was struggling through the most critical period in its post­
war history, the succession of governments of different learnings could do 
little, at least in the short run, to influence the course of events once the 
relative equilibrium of a planned system had been destroyed in the absence of a 
clear design of a mechanism to replace it. Policy-makers were constantly 
overtaken by events, political or economic, or both. Therefore the decisions 
adopted always bore the stamp of emergency measures even when they were 
supposedly meant to provide a frame for long-term policies.
Nonetheless, it would not be correct to conclude that the experience of 
recent years has been predominantly negative. In comparison to the situation 
before perestroika some really revolutionary steps have been taken leading to the 
construction of what may be considered as a good foundation for a CEMS in the 
future. One result appears to be particularly important from the point of view of 
the foreign investor: the acknowledgement of the principle that foreign investors 
deserve encouragement and remuneration for the risks they run in supplying their 
capital to a foreign country has penetrated the juridical system of the country 
and to an extent, through publicity given to discussions on foreign investment, 
the social mentality. Equally important has been the legal fixation of basic 
guarantees protecting foreign property and the right to expatriate profits. The 
apparent progress in the updating of other juridical norms dealing with different 
aspects of business and property relations in the country will undoubtedly also 
have a favourable effect on capital inflow. All this must eventually eliminate 
many of the contradictions which still erode the organizational structure of the 
Russian economy. Overall, it is important to see that despite all fluctuations, 
the principal line of development of foreign investment policy has been oriented 
towards a more liberal and open approach.
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The positive changes have most of all affected what can conditionally 
be called the higher levels of policy. Lower levels, i.e., the way the government 
ideology is applied, have remained less affected. In the actions of the present 
government of Russia ostentatious liberalism has coexisted in a picturesque 
manner with unceremonious administration, leavingforeign experts wonderingwhich 
of the two represented the authentic concept of government policy concept. In 
practical terms this inconsistency in regulation passes much of the actual 
decision-making power on to ministries and their substitutes, and other lower 
levels of economic authority. They played an important role in the previous 
system, but lately have been losing importance, and their prospects and future 
role are unclear. As a result they still retain some levers of control, although 
their formal responsibility for the performance of the economy has almost 
vanished. This transitional situation has created a climate of low executive 
morality and illegal actions. Corruption and the shadow economy have developed to 
such an extent that they have ceased to be simply events in a criminal chronicle. 
They have instead become so much a fact of investment climate and policy risk 
that only a rare domestic or international press publication on foreign 
investment in the CIS does not comment on this subject. Foreign investors 
complain that their projects falter because of excessive red-tape and unmotivated 
last-moment changes in contract conditions with Russian officials seeming to be 
more interested in new trips abroad than in the result of the talks.
Above it was argued that government ideology is an important part of 
investment polity. Evidently, it is no less important that central authorities 
have been able to impose their ideology throughout the whole bureaucratic 
hierarchy, especially in a country with a weak democratic tradition. Liberal 
economic policy can bring results when it relies on an extensive market mechanism
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and the authority of law. Both are missing in modern Russia. It would not be 
right to claim that the Yeltsin/Gaidar government has not realized this. On the 
contrary, the importance of functioning market relations as a foundation for 
efficient state and civil society has been repeatedly stressed by government 
spokesmen as a motivation for drastic reforms. Still, a conflict between 
liberalism and administrating has represented one of the main problems of the 
regime. It has not only been the question of imposing the freedom of enterprise 
by way of command. It is also characteristic that accentuated liberalism of many 
of important government decisions appears good on paper, but in reality has only 
given more space for administrative arbitrariness.
The government privatisation programme is an example at hand. In 
official plans it played an enormous role. It was often stressed that the future 
of the country depended on the success of property transformation. With this 
reform the government tied its aspirations for massive capital inflow from 
abroad. A principle point here was the investment exchange rate of the rouble. 
The authorities, not in the least instance prompted by obligations imposed by the 
International Monetary Fund, decided against a special investment rate. It was a 
fair choice from the point of view of liberal economic theory. Given practical 
conditions prevailing in Russia, this has only brought about new actual and 
potential contradictions. Indeed, under the state voucher plan the value of fixed 
capital stock to be distributed among the population was determined at 1.400 
billion roubles, at ten thousand roubles per voucher. In dollars, at the average 
exchange rate for August 1992 of one dollar for 162 roubles, this would be 64 
dollars. However, according to official statements the implementation of a single 
exchange rate would not mean that foreign investors would be able to buy state 
property at bargain prices as the latter’s acquisitions would be subject to
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special taxes, payments and licensing to be fixed in some cases on an individual 
basis (Izvestia, July 25, 1992). It is not difficult to see that in terms of 
policy risk the second decision cancels many of the advantages of the first as 
(i) a final judgement on the conditions of property sale is postponed; (ii) the 
method adopted assumes many further specifications still to come thus increasing 
the uncertainty and cost associated by a foreign investor with a venture in 
Russia; and last but not least, (iii) much decision-making is left to the 
discretion of lower-level administration. In other words, the main defect of 
government economic policy is that the government consciously takes decisions 
which it cannot then implement. Inevitably, it almost immediately finds itself 
compelled to make exclusions for different categories of businesses, regions, 
branches, etc., which eventually not only neutralize the regulation but also 
provide a basis for corruption and executive chaos.
The duality described follows directly from the gap between official
policy, which is often designed as if a market mechanism already functioned in
the Russian economy, and the actual state of affairs characterized by the agony
of the administrative-command economy. Moreover, the problem is that this agony
has not been the result of the assault of market forces but rather a product of
self-destruction of the system as the elimination of centralized management has
led to a chaotic monopolistic-bureaucratic structure instead of the market:
The leadership of the country, after having taken the path leading 
to complete repudiation of ideological and political motivation of
production in favour of economic motivation, failed to offer the people, 
who in majority had only a subsistence wage, anything more than extra 
emission of paper money. Liberalization policy under a structurally
deformed economy turned out to be a direct road towards economic 
disorganization and alone It was a sufficient condition for a crisis 
(Ol sevich. 1992. p.33).
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Until this duality is overcome, foreign investment policy risk will 
remain high. In order for it to decline it is necessary to introduce changes to 
the policy, i.e., to remove it from the one-sided pressure of neo-liberal 
ideology and to reorient it towards structural problems such as the creation of 
competitive and balanced markets. The realization of this goal would give the 
economy the type of stability necessary to avoid the U-tums in current 
regulations so harmful to fruitful foreign investment strategy.
5 SETTING PRIORITIES FOR CAPITAL ENTRY REGULATIONS
5.1. The Foreign Capital Sector in a National Economy
5.1.1. "Enclave”Investment versus "Integral"Investment
Many of the elements of market formation are so implicit in the 
thinking of Western politicians, academics and businessmen that they are rarely 
spelled out. In ex-socialist countries the situation is different. Some market 
related notions, which are commonplace elsewhere, are still to be impressed on 
the public mentality as well as on the mode of thinking of managers, politicians 
and senior state executives. One of the major psychological and ideological 
barriers to be overcome is to acknowledge that market efficiency has nothing to 
do with "fairness" especially in the simplistic terms of the vocabulary of real 
socialism. When, in 1987, foreign capital was allowed to invest in the Soviet 
economy, the authorities were careful to assure the public (and this was 
reflected in the appropriate legislation) that the rights and interests of the 
Soviet part were more than equally protected, while it remained unclear what 
would be the motive to attract foreign capital into the country. Quite 
predictably, these half-hearted measures produced less than satisfactory results 
because they ignored what seemed to be a fundamental rule once noted by Eugene 
Theroux:"The TNC moves instinctively towards what is good for itself. Five years 
later, in 1992, the conviction that economic reforms could not bring results 
unless supported by foreign capital has become widespread. Statesmen and scholars
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have been competing to publicize the thesis that the central prerequisite for the 
successful integration of the ex-Soviet economy in the world market is to create 
an environment that makes foreign investment profitable.
This shift in emphasis marks an impressive progress in the spreading of 
a market philosophy. Unfortunately, in addressing foreign economic relations it 
appears to suffer from the same defect that is characteristic of the 
stabilization programme in general. It is one-dimensional in that it 
oversimplifies the relationship between state and market and puts too much faith 
in the self-regulatory mechanism of the latter. The concept of the unrestrained 
superiority of the market may lead to a certain aberration in economic policy as 
it leads to the conclusion that foreign firms, as representing market forces, 
should be treated more favourably than national enterprises which clearly carry 
the legacy of an administrative-command system. This claim has rarely been 
explicitly articulated even by the most radically-minded reformers. Nonetheless, 
a steady current of publications and statements promoting externally financed 
development and the civilizing mission of foreign capital has been strong enough 
to provoke fears of the imminent "sale" of Russia within a certain part of the 
population.
%
The comprehension of the commercial, profit-oriented nature of the 
modem export of capital is indispensible as a foundation for a functional 
capital entry management system. It would be wrong to deduce, however, that 
prompting of market relations and economic openness are enough to secure the 
inclusion of foreign' capital in a national productive system. The national 
competitiveness approach outlined in the first part of this thesis leads us to
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make a distinction between the two possible variants of relationship between the 
foreign owned/controlled sector and the national economy: enclave and integral.
In extreme cases the difference between the two is clear-cut. Free 
export producing zones and their variations provide an example par excellence of 
the enclave-type variant in as much as they quite often have physical boarders 
separating them from the rest of the country. In other circumstances the 
difference may be not so explicit. The relationship between the foreign venture 
and the national economy does not depend directly on the share and the forms of 
participation of foreign capital in the venture or on its juridical status. The 
distinction between enclave and integral investment is basically qualitative and 
is related to the strategy pursued by the investor in respect to the local 
affiliate.
Enclave-type investments are usually motivated by a thrust toward the 
extemalization of costs. This makes them sensitive to a particular combination 
of conditions to be found in the host-country, namely, [relatively] cheap labour- 
force and land, abundant mineral resources, advantageous geographical position or 
particularly favourable fiscal legislation. For such an investment the general 
state of the local economy is less important than changes in these conditions, 
whenever they result from the dynamics of the internal economic situation or from 
shifts outside the host-country which nonetheless modify its relative 
attractiveness as an off-shore production platform. Thus, an increase in the 
welfare of the host-country accompanied by improving living standards may compel 
those international companies which search for cheap labour to disinvest.
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It would be incorrect to claim that, opposite to integral investment, 
enclave-type foreign ventures are export-oriented and that their business policy 
is determined by the logic of profit optimization at the level of transnational 
complexes. Integral-type foreign-owned firms may also supply across the border 
and they are definitely not autonomous in decision-making. The crucial point is 
that the latter constitute part of the national industrial-production complex of 
the host-country, while the former remain outside it. The criterion should be the 
contribution to the growth of the value-adding capacity of the national economy. 
Nowadays the value added is in the technology and knowledge, in the adaptability 
of the labour force, and in the production of the sophisticated parts and 
components rather than in the assembling of finished products. Those countries 
are richer that have that capability within their borders.
Foreign capital comes to the host-country for profit, but it is not 
indifferent to the future of the country the way in which the method of profit 
extraction will influence its value-adding capacity. It is reasonable to assume 
that the influence is likely to be more positive if the investor binds his profit 
expectations to a general increase in the efficiency of the local economy and the 
growth of national welfare rather than to the availability of some fixed 
conditions. In the first case, foreign capital comes in to grow with the economy, 
in the second - to grow despite it. The following example tells us much about the 
difference between the two variants. As foreign investment in economic enclaves 
is infamous for its footlooseness, foreign involvement in the Australian motor 
vehicle industry has demonstrated a different pattern. The US General Motors 
Corporation, the largest automobile manufacturer in Australia, established its 
local affiliate, GM-Holden’s Ltd., in 1931 and did not repatriate profit until 
twenty five years later. In the meantime, the automotive industry had developed
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from a minor assembler of motor vehicles to a point where it became able to 
produce component parts. By the mid 80-s, in response to government regulation, 
local component content reached on average 85 per cent. GM began construction of 
a plant to supply four hundred thousand engines for inclusion in its J-model 
produced worldwide.
Sometimes it is claimed that outward-oriented foreign direct 
investments are more efficient than host-country market oriented FDI because they 
belong to a more competitive environment of international markets. This is not 
valid for open economies. Openness eliminates the tendency to set up subsidiaries 
producing small volume/high cost products as they may be easily imported. Only 
those FDI that require a strong local marketing base tend to be established in 
open economies.
Integral investment has become a prevailing form of foreign direct 
investment in relations between industrialized countries. There foreign 
affiliates are, on average, analogous to domestic firms in value-added per 
worker, compensation per worker, and R and D expenditures per worker. Thus, in 
the United States the American component of automobiles produced by Honda is fast 
approaching the American content of the automobiles made by Chrysler (Dialogue,
No.4, 1991, p.4). On the other hand, according to a recent study,
local content levels of U.S. transnational corporations in the EC are high 
enough and their operations are rationalized to the extent that their 
behaviour is, in many cases, indistinguishable from that of European-owned 
corporations (World Investment Report 1991, UN, New York, p.35).
Since, under these conditions, foreign direct investments contribute to high- 
quality productive activities in the host-country, the presence of transnational
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corporations spills over into more and better jobs, higher productivity and 
improved products.
Integral investments are positive in as much as they add to the 
national capital base over a longer period of time thanks to reinvestment, as 
foreign capital, technology and know-how have an immediate impact on national 
productive forces and, moreover, foreign firms directly participate in developing 
the efficiency and competitiveness of the national market in terms of both and 
demand.
For economically backward areas and newcomers to the world market, the 
choice between the two variants of foreign capital inclusion cannot be left to a 
market structured mechanism alone. The incompatibility in efficacy between the 
local and modern productive systems inevitably leads to the concentration of 
value-adding activities in a few core countries and their enclaves and enclave­
like sites in periphery countries. The latter on their own do not have enough 
capital, competence, skills and infrastructure to employ existing manpower in 
sufficiently competitive production. Corrective regulations are necessary to 
compensate for local market failures but also to resist competitive pressures 
existing in the international investment market.
5.1 Ji. The Constraints of Export-led Growth
The factor of competition is very important. Although integral 
investment promoting policy appears to be preferable from the point of view of 
the interests of the host-country, it is not always easy for the host-govemment 
to maintain it. First of all, the host-country’s economy and the development of
Chapter S. Setting Priorities for Capital IEntry ¡Regulations 193
national production factors must achieve a certain minimal level of maturity and 
sophistication. Given these conditions, there is still such a situation as 
competition between industrializing and newly industrialized countries for 
external sources of financing. It undermines the bargaining power of capital 
importers in bilateral deals with transnational corporations, and makes them 
devalue their demands and soften conditions.
If a host-country, already suffering from an erratic domestic economic 
situation, becomes exposed to the influence of external competition this only 
naturally pushes decision-makers towards the enclave variant in as much as low 
production costs and appropriate exchange rate policy appear to be sufficient 
incentives for export-oriented foreign direct investment. This has proved to be 
the case in Russia. The question "What can we offer to attract foreign 
investment?" has been increasingly raised there. The response of a growing number 
of experts has been pessimistic: hardly anything more than cheap labour, 
inexpensive resources and a liberal fiscal legislation yet to be created. The 
experts generally agreed that Russia possessed an outstanding industrial 
potential which could not, however, play a significant role as a "bait" for 
foreign capital after having been disabled by the severance of traditional 
integration links, the shortage of capital investment, the infrastructural 
collapse, price increase and the hegemony of producers over consumers. This 
potential might be revived only by way of capital injections which, within the 
country, are no sources. Hence the position formulated by Russian Vice Prime- 
Minister Anatoly Chubais: foreign investors may be attracted only by cheap 
manpower and low prices but certainly not by our fixed capital and even less so 
by the quality of products (Izvestia, June 9, 1992). This statement logically 
introduces yet another question: "In comparison to other countries trading in the
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same market of cheap production factors (the countries mentioned most often are 
Central European and South-East Asian states, Pakistan,Turkey and Mexico), what 
will be a niche for Russia?" The answer was particularly low prices. At least 
this was suggested by Chubais’ criticism of the plans to increase domestic oil 
prices to a world market level as undermining Russia’s position as an outlet for 
foreign investment.
There are at least two considerations that bring into question the 
possibility for Russia to enjoy the advantages that help smaller countries to 
profit by acting as off-shore export platforms for transnational corporations. 
The first has to do with the financial aspect of the export-oriented foreign 
capital sector. Russian authorities should be prepared to pay, directly or 
otherwise, by way of generous infrastructure and incentive provisions for every 
job created by foreign investors. The available evidence suggests that the price 
may be really high. In 1979, the British Government gave the US-owned silicon 
manufacturer, Dow Coming, 34 million pounds sterling in Regional Development 
Grants and other assistance, thus bringing the cost per job to 272,000 pounds 
sterling (Grant, 1982, p.61). In 1982, the American Hyster Company informed 
public officials in five US states and four nations where it had production 
capacity that some Hyster plants would close. Operations would be retained 
wherever they were most generously subsidized. Within six months Hyster had 
collected 72.5 million dollars in direct aid. Britain alone was reported to have 
offered 20 million dollars to save 1,500 jobs in Scotland (Dialogue, No.83-1, 
1989, p.5). Taking into account the dimensions of the Russian economy, much 
bigger than that of any other pursuing export-led growth, one may rightfully 
assume that host-govemment expenses would be enormous unless foreign
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participation is limited to a restricted number of projects, which is in 
opposition to official plans for large-scale foreign capital enrolment.
The second consideration reflects some external restraints. It would be 
erroneous to expect that Russia will be permitted to disregard the rules of the 
existing international trade regime. The majority of economies with an extensive 
enclave-type sector are sufficiently small not to provoke retaliation if their 
policies break certain rules and conventions. If, for example, a large country 
provides particularly generous concessions to exporters while limiting imports, 
the reaction of other trading nations will be sharper than in the case of a small 
country. The export policy of Mauritius, which is actually a single huge export 
processing zone, has never attracted attention internationally. China is already 
too big and too important to pursue a similar policy without arousing concern in 
other countries. This was revealed by debates in the US Congress, in the spring 
of 1991, on renewing for another year the Most Favored Nation status that assured 
China low-tariff exports to the USA. Many congressmen expressed serious 
reservations on this account pointing out that the US was running a $10.4 billion 
visible deficit in trade with China generated by imports from Chinese free 
economic zones that came to the US by transit through Hong Kong. (The trade with 
mainland China was more or less in balance, with a $1.4 billion surplus in the 
US’s favour in 1990.) Experts evaluated the debates as a demonstration of US 
determination to put Chinese trade practice more in line with the existing 
international trade regime by means which the Chinese could not ignore. Within 
the frame of the European Community a somewhat similar reaction was provoked by 
the Irish Republic export encouraging regulation: the EEC has directly intervened 
to end a generous "tax holiday" concession on profits on exports.
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As has already been argued in this thesis, attempts to base the 
competitiveness of a country like Russia on defects inherited from the previous 
system have limited, if any, prospects. There are a considerable number of 
developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America in which the adoption of 
an export-led growth model has entailed the development of a considerable 
enclave-type foreign-owned production sector, but only in a few of them has the 
"magic" of the model worked and the national economy developed to such a degree 
that foreign manufacturers showed interest in cooperating with domestic 
manufacturers1. A closer analysis shows that all these successful cases, which 
are practically limited to the East Asian "Four Tiger" NICs, have considerably 
less common features than it is generally accepted. At the same time, each case 
owes so much to particular circumstances, the roots of which are deeply planted 
in national culture, history and social tradition, that there is no convincing 
evidence that the "model" itself has resulted in their success.
If there is anything common in the machinery behind the economic 
miracle of the "Four Tigers", it is the fact that three of them - South Korea, 
Tai wan and Hong Kong - benefited enormously from American and other economic and
1. Two indices may help to quantify the difference between enclave and integral foreign 
industrial Investment. One is the index of «related party» trade, i.e. the share of the 
trade between a foreign-owned subsidiary and a parent company in the total exports and 
imports of the host-country. This index is not easy to calculate for source problems. The 
other index is similar to the first one though not idenUcal to it. It depicts the share of 
the affiliates belonging to mother-comparties from the same home country in the host- 
country s bilateral trade with the respective home country. For the countries in which 
these Indices are small there are more reasons to believe that foreign investments are 
better integrated than in those countries where they are high. In 1989. among the seventeen 
developing countries in Asia and Latin America belonging to the United States trade and 
investment cluster, the United States affiliate percentage share of bilateral trade was 
below 10 per cent for South Korea, Taiwan, Venezuela and Thailand. It was about thirty per 
cent and over for Mexico, Brazil, Singapore and Malaysia \World Investment Report 1991. 
United NaUons, New York. p. 731.
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political support as anticommunist outposts during the Cold War. This, and the
fact that American capital also tried to use them as its bastion outposts in
trade wars with Japan, established a specific situation in relations between the
nation-state and transnational corporations there. Local authorities found
themselves in a position where they could be reasonably selective about foreign
investment. Foreign investment proposals have been evaluated in terms of how much
they open new markets, build new exports, transfer technology, intensify input-
output links, ana increase the value of their countries as foreign investment
sites (see Wade, 1990). Against this background it no longer seems to be
incidental that in Latin America, where countries did not enjoy equal economic
and political consequences of the Cold War factor, export led development has
2
never produced similar results .
The West is still to determine its attitude towards post-communist 
Russia. Many of its recent actions have left room for uncertainty as to whether 
they should be attributed to a remaining inertia in political thinking, with the 
former USSR still treated as a probable, enemy or whether they were signs of a
recently developed tactic aimed at weakening further a newly emerged competitor
3in the world market . Whatever the answer, it is clear that, precisely because 
of the size and economic potential of the country and the change in the
2. Mexico, to take one example, stepped onto the path of export led (ELG) growth in the 
60s. almost as early as the South Asian Tigers. In the 70s. the practice of ELG became 
widespread on the continent. However, only Chile can boast of "success" in terms of 
economic growth, balance of trade and payments, albeit at the cost of the impoverishment 
of the majority of the population. However, this growth was not based on the production of 
manufactured goods. Instead. Chile succeeded in ELG based on the use and even more so on 
the misuse of its natural and agricultural resources.
3. In the frame of the Marshall plan the United States allocated to Western Europe a sum 
equal to 77 billion dollars at 1992 prices, which made up 14 per cent of the federal budget 
for 1948. Forty four years later U.S. Congress failed to decide on aid to Russia at the 
level of 620 million dollars, representing four-tenths of the current federal budget.
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international political environment, restructuring in Russia will never enjoy 
such a positive external contribution as that experienced by Western Europe, 
Japan and some South-East Asian countries in the post-war period, although it may 
benefit eventually from the competition between the biggest industrial nations - 
chiefly the United States and Germany - for influence over the Commonwealth 
nations as they develop their rich natural resources and open their markets to 
the West. Therefore, it is necessary for Russia to search ever more insistently 
for internal resources for a successful transition.
With this in mind, it is important to realize that an enclave-type 
foreign-owned sector may be instrumental in employing labour and supporting the 
budget and the balance of payments, and this justifies its presence in many
4
countries, but it is hardly possible to expect from it anything more . 
Environment and incentives for integral-type investment (ITI) have to be created 
in a different way. IT I incentives are largely identical with those that 
encourage domestic economic growth and rapid expansion of the private sector. 
This claim is not altogether unusual or original. In fact, it follows directly 
from the concept of an open economy set out earlier in this thesis. Economic 
growth makes an open economy still more open as it enforces its standing in the 
world market and boosts its attractiveness for foreign capital at the same time. 
Consequently, regulations which are originally not focused on foreign capital 
nonetheless participate in forming an investment climate. That is why it is 
possible to speak about a narrowly defined and widely defined capital entry 
management system. It is the latter that is dealt with mainly in the present 
chapter.
4. See for further analysis Chapter 6.
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5.1.3. The Market Size as a Competitive Strength
It is a fact that the greatest capital importers are not among the 
developing or newly industrialized countries. They are the United States and the 
European Economic Community. Excluding intra-EC foreign direct investment, the 
stock of inward direct investment in these two regions constituted up to 79 per 
cent of total world figures in 1980 and 54 per cent in 1988 (World Investment 
Report 1991, p.32). Both regions acquired eminence as destinations for foreign 
investment because of their enormous markets. Owing to the outstanding absorbing 
capacity of the latter much of the FDI was geared to serve them, making the 
locational advantage of market size an important variable facilitating the high 
levels of foreign direct investment. Not of minor importance was the impact of 
state regulations. Laura D’Andrea Tyson (1990) reached the following conclusion 
on the pattern of behaviour of foreign multinationals in the United States: 
"Where they are most American, U.S. policies have encouraged them to be so". In 
fact, although the United States has no explicit federal policies for attracting 
foreign investment, it often does so through the back door by the threat or 
actual practice of import protection.
Much can be learnt in particularly from the EEC. Something similar to 
the present situation in the former Soviet Union occurred in Western Europe after 
the Second World War. Economic structures had been destroyed; political 
instability, shortages of consumer goods and equipment, and fears of financial 
chaos were very substantial. After stagnating through much of 1947, European 
growth accelerated in 1948, coincident with the release of Marshall aid. However, 
several decades of sustained high growth that followed were related to Europe s 
own effort. Fortunately for Western Europe, there were leaders in the 1950s who
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were wise enough to create the new integrated structures of a common European 
market out of the ruins of opposing disintegrated structures. The Common Market 
programme attracted foreign direct investment from many countries through the 
pull of projected market growth as well as the possibility (real or imagined) of 
future difficulties in exporting to the region from outside the EC. At a later 
stage, foreign direct investment flows intensified as transnational corporations 
sought to gain access to new technologies, to make alliances with firms with 
complementary technologies and to amortize their fixed expenditure by expanding 
their market share. Many transnational corporations in a wide range of industries 
have found it necessary to position themselves strategically in the EC in 
anticipation of demand growth resulting from the unification of the European 
Community.
The size of the internal market and favorable prospects for demand 
growth also lay behind the expansion of foreign investment in tsarist Russia. As 
was shown earlier, railroad construction was the fuse for an explosion of market 
activities in the country. Russia soon gained fame as a country in which one 
could sell almost anything in enormous quantities. Foreign companies rushed in to 
secure a local presence as they subscribed to the belief that the pay-off for 
early investors could be great as the market expanded and matured further on. 
The Russian Government recognized the importance of the demand factor for 
encouraging foreign production investment. In order to sustain high cumulative 
demand for industrial products it stuck to a policy of forced redistribution of 
income from agriculture to industry and from country regions to cities. The cost 
of this policy, as many historians claim, was quite high. What is valid for this 
analysis, however, is the fact that Russia, though relying heavily on foreign
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capital, managed to avoid colonial-type industrialization and within a short 
period of tune came to possess a diversified industrial complex.
Unlike newly industrialized countries, modem Russia comes to the world 
market as a major industrial power. Owing to this and to Russia’s huge territory 
and high population, the internal market of the country could in the near future 
become as important a component of the world economy as the US and the EC 
markets, and transnational corporations could be as motivated to enter it as they 
are in respect to the latter. Clearly, such a scenario will remain hypothetical 
until the deficiencies inherited from the administrative-command system and the 
shock caused by the collapse of the centralised union state are not largely 
overcome. Host-country oriented foreign investment projects could not be numerous 
until conditions for profit repatriation are missing. Hence the importance of 
rouble convertability and the development of exports. However, monetary surgery 
has made sustaining export expansion even less plausible in as much as it has 
resulted in considerable damage to the real part of the economy, the major 
generator of export earnings, in the form of sizeable output and unemployment 
losses (according to official estimates, 25 per cent of the GNP and 13 million 
respectively by the end of 1992 against five million at the beginning of the 
year ). To an extent, these developments were the natural outcome of the 
institutional changes typical of a transition to a market economy. However, they 
have undoubtedly been exacerbated by policy negligence of important realities in 
terms of both supply and demand.
5. In June 1992 there were 202.879 officially registered unemployed In Russia. The figure 
in the main text allows for different forms of hidden unemployment, such as sending on 
"vacation" the employees and workers of those enterprises which stopped production due to 
the shortage of supplies.
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5.2. The Fate of Russian Industry
5JS.1. The "Decapitalisation” of the Russian Market
The stabilisation programme implemented in Russia has hit hardest at 
the two essentials of the market: the purchasing power of the population and the 
capacity of enterprises to accumulate capital. Consequently, this has blocked the 
establishment of the private proprietor as a central figure in market relations.
Government measures followed a repressive approach with respect to 
accumulations and current income. First of all, the Government applied a 
confiscational price and fiscal policy to the population, basing on the arbitrary 
assumption of a "monetary overhang". At the beginning of 1991, private 
accumulations in the form of liquidity, bank deposits, state securities, etc. 
equaled more than 500 billion roubles. A twenty times price rise in the first 
trimester of 1992 reduced this sum to 20-25 billion roubles at January 1991 
prices. Inflation shock provoked by the pseudo-liberalization of prices (the 
monopoly of state enterprises in many sectors reduced the price reform to yet 
another administrative, though uncontrolled, correction of prices) brought them 
for some product groups to a level at which they were affordable to only one per 
cent of the population. In general, about 90 per cent of Russians found their 
monetary income to have fallen below the official poverty line. The price reform 
was coupled with the introduction of new indirect taxes ranging from five to 28 
per cent over the retail price. In January 1992, according to official data, the 
real income of the inhabitants of Russia was equal to only 40 per cent of what 
they had earned one month before. At the same time, the people were forced to 
spend 4.8 times more on their current needs than before while fiscal payments
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increased 5,5 times. Relating the cost of basic foods to pension and minimum 
wages, several analyses were projecting a decline of kilocalories for low-income 
consumers to a level which the World Health Organization defines as starvation.
This resulted in the collapse of the living standard and mass 
impoverishment, but not only that. No less serious were the consequences in terms 
of the psychological component of the internal investment climate. The government 
failed to compensate the holders of the state debt, i.e., practically every adult 
in the country, or to introduce any safety-net such as the indexation of deposits 
in state savings banks, generating a deep crisis of confidence in the monetary 
and financial sphere. The expropriation of life-time savings of Russians 
coincided with the Yeltsin government’s confirmed of its obligations to foreign 
creditors. The government was conscious of not angering foreign creditors whose 
money they thought to be necessary to build capitalism in Russia, but they 
refused to recognize the rouble savings of the people as the foundation of new 
property relations in the country. In the second quarter of 1992 the share of 
savings in the monetary assets of the population fell to a rock-bottom level of 
two per cent. This impoverishment and the expropriation of private wealth taken 
together created a deeply inappropriate environment for mass privatisation of 
state property, regarded by the Government as the hard core of the second phase 
of transition which had to bring about the revitalization of the Russian economy.
The impoverishment of the population was paralleled by the erosion of 
the financial self-sustenance of state-owned enterprises. Lack of resources has 
broken down the state capital formation system which previously consisted of two 
elements: centralized investment funds and the investment funds of state-run 
enterprises. According to the prognosis of the Economic Ministry of Russia, by
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the end of 1992, as against 1990, capital investment from the first source would 
fall, in comparative prices, from 53.5 billion roubles to 13.5 billion roubles, 
and from the second source from 73.8 billion roubles to 36.5 billion roubles 
(Ekonomika i z h iz n No.23, June 1992, p.l). In other words, the prognosis in 
1992 predicted a decrease of two and a half times in new investment in fixed 
capital over two years (in 1990-1991 the decrease was about eleven per cent).
Simultaneously, the tight monetary policy of Russian Federation Central
Bank caused shrinkage in the working capital. The accretion of money supply in
circulation was kept tens of times below the increase in prices while the access
to bank credit was restricted. As a result, the economy was hit by an
unprecedented payments crisis as businesses did not have enough working capital
to pay for deliveries, to promote sales and repay credit. The debt of state
enterprises in the course of mutual settlements increased within the first
quarter of 1992 from 32 billion roubles to 800 billion roubles according to the
Central Bank figures, and to two trillion roubles (a sum greater than all cash in
circulation) according to the experts of the Confederation of entrepreneurs
(Izvestia, May 20, 1992; Ekonomika i zhizn\ ibidem.). The crisis pushed to the
edge of bankruptcy thousands of enterprises, including the acknowledged leaders
of Russian industry such as KAMAZ, the largest and one of the most modem truck
6plants in Europe . One of the first joint-stock companies in the country, it was 
often praised as an example of efficient management and production. Ironically, 
the firm was found delaying the repayment of over ten billion roubles of short­
term bank credits only a few days after one of the major national newspapers
6. The chain reaction of defaults on current payments. In fact, was a latent form of mass 
bankruptcy which did not turn into a storm of forma] bankruptcies only because, before the 
decree of President Yeltsin, there was no legal possibility to proclaim a state-owned 
business bankrupt.
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alluded to it in support the thesis that public enterprises were run 
incompetently and therefore failed to resist the crisis while private and semi­
private firms were more prepared to face it.
Under these conditions prospects for both the privatisation of the 
economy and its sectoral find technological restructuring looked bleak. The 
majority of enterprises to be privatised did not belong to what might be called a 
competitive, market type. Withdrawn from their habitual environment within 
protracted productive chains, and deprived of state financial support, they have 
become a tough and risky investment for domestic investors, but no less so for 
foreign capital. Against an unfavourable political risk background, the 
demolition of industry and the suppression of the consumer power of the 
population represented the two most improbable prerequisites for promoting 
integral-type foreign direct investments. However, this does not exclude the 
possibility of some important acquisitions of the Russian industrial property by 
non-residents as a predictably low juncture in Russian industrial property market 
is likely to make almost any deal a bargain for foreign currency holders.
5.2.2. Privatisation and Bankruptcies
The performance of state-owned enterprises is central to the formation 
of the pattern of foreign direct investment in the Russian economy. Indeed, 
privatised state property will inevitably be the main object for foreign 
investment until progress in privatisation changes the balance between public and 
private sectors in favour of the latter. On the other hand, during a certain 
transition period, the activities of state and municipally-owned enterprises will 
still determine the business environment for foreign ventures in the country.
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Hence the conclusion that government polity towards state-run firms has and will 
have important consequences for the type of inclusion of a foreign-controlled 
sector in the national economy.
Some Russian reformers seem to share the belief that privatisation, in 
particular with foreign participation, is able to transfer automatically both 
enterprises and the economy as a whole to a new higher level of efficiency. In 
reality the link between the cause and the result proves to be more complicated. 
A shift to a modern level of efficiency is impossible unless there is a
persistent effort to strengthen national competitiveness. Therefore, it would be
disastrous for all practical purposes if policy-makers in Russia confused the 
reorganization of the public sector with its simple demolition. To do this would 
cause heavy damage to the national industrial complex and weaken the Russian 
position in the world economy in the future. On this point, Professor Mario Nuti 
inferred a significant generalization from the experience of Central and Eastern 
Europe:
The state sector, which In the necessary delays of privatisation continues 
to exist and to provide the bulk of productive capacity, should not be
ignored, neglected and penalised (original underlined] (Nuti, 1992, p. 17).
However, the fact is that reform in Russia is once again being pushed
in a direction leading to yet another economic bloodletting. Many experts express
fears that under present conditions the implementation of a State programme on
privatisation and a Presidential decree on bankruptcies may bring national
industry to a standstill. The Chairman of Russia’s Central Bank Victor Gerashenko
made the following comment (Izvestia, August 8, 1992):
taking into consideration how poor is our society, it would be much easier 
and cheaper to privatize the economy when it is put its knees. In this
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case, however, it is unlikely that the sale of property would be executed 
in the interests of all the citizens as potentially strong enterprises may 
become a bargain for certain groups of our society.
The decree on bankruptcies was inspired by an understandable desire to 
liberate the economy (and the budget) from inefficient enterprises and, moreover, 
to do so in the best traditions of neo-liberalism. Enterprises were left on their 
own, and it was for the market to decide winners and losers. The problem with 
this decree, however, was the timing and the way it treated, or mistreated, the 
specifics of the division of labour within industry. The payments crisis has 
weakened the financial standing of almost every state-owned enterprise in the 
country. The crisis resulted from the misfunction of the monetary and financial
7
system, the low performance of existing market structures , and contradictory 
state regulations which tried to combine administrative measures against 
monopolists with price liberalization. The decree gave enterprises only three 
months to overcome their financial difficulties. Taking into consideration that 
in many cases these difficulties had causes more general than mismanagement 
within a particular firm, the enterprises were practically charged with the task 
of developing a modem market out of a semi-natural economy almost overnight. The 
government itself admitted de facto the unreality of this plan when it promised 
to issue about 500 billion roubles of extra credit to enterprises during the 
second quarter of 1992. The credit expansion increased the budget deficit 
dramatically, but this sacrifice in terms of the monetary stabilisation programme 
will not bring long-term results unless supported by a more fundamental maneuver 
in the reform strategy.
7. By March 1992 Russian industrial enterprises had failed to sign normal one-year 
agreements with their suppliers for more than the half of the input they needed, which 
caused great Irregularity In their work (Goskomstat Report in Ekonomika I zhizn'. No. 17, 
April 1992).
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Furthermore, the desire to get rid of inefficient businesses by pushing 
them to default came into conflict with the structure of the economy as left over 
from central-planning days. At that time the national economy was perceived as a 
large single household, and economy of scale was considered to be the major means 
to cut costs. In reality, of course, this did not prevent unnecessary parallelism 
and overcapacity in some branches. Nonetheless, on the whole, a situation emerged 
in which, according to Aleksandr Vladislavlev, Chairman of the presidential 
Council on Entrepreneurship,
the bankruptcy of even few and. on the face of It. insignificant 
enterprises is able to put in coma the whole economy (Ekonomtka I zhizn'. 
No.23, June 1992)8.
Indeed, statistics demonstrate that ex-Soviet industry appears to be particularly 
subject to monopolies at the level where it really counts: individual and 
narrowly defined product groups (Vestnik statistiki, No.l, 1991, pp.4-7). In 
other words, ex-Soviet enterprises are more narrowly specialized than it is usual 
in the West. As a result, there is often just one national producer of a 
particular product9.
It is quite obvious that one of the objectives of the decree on 
bankruptcy was to speed up the privatisation of public enterprises. According to 
the privatisation programme, bankrupt enterprises are subject to obligatory 
privatisation. To become the owner of such an enterprise two requirements must be
8. The following example is now already a "classical” Illustration of the aforesaid. In 
1989. the domesUc cigarette industry was forced to drop the production of filter 
cigarettes when a small factory in Armenia stopped the supplies of a special tissue 
necessary for that purpose. At a later stage this shortage developed into a "tobacco 
crisis" which provoked considerable public discontent.
9. The survey of 7.664 items produced in five sectors (machine building, metallurgy, 
chemical and timber, construction and the "social sphere”) revealed that 5,884 product 
lines, or 77 per cent, were supplied by only one producer (Vestnik statistiki. Ibidem).
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met. First, winning the open competition for the right to manage the enterprise 
during a recovery period (from six to 18 months) which is granted to the bidder 
who has offered the highest money deposit. Second, fulfillment of the objectives 
of the recovery program. Purchasing an enterprise for the price of a deposit 
could be a real bargain allowing for the fact that, as was argued before, in the 
cases of many firms financial strains appear to be imposed by external factors. 
Nonetheless, the investment market in the country is so underdeveloped and 
restricted on the supply side, that in practice only three categories of 
investors are in a position to buy out a sinking firm. They are the employees of 
the firm, other state or privatised firms that have established business contacts 
with the bankrupt enterprise and therefore are interested in keeping it afloat, 
and foreign investors. In the second case privatisation can reinforce existing 
monopolies. The programme provided for such a possibility prohibiting the 
organization of joint-stock companies on the basis of concerns, associations and 
unions with the participation of state-owned enterprises. However, neither the 
programme nor the decree give consideration to a situation in which a firm 
completely changes its production profile and its relationship with the national 
economy as control passes to a foreign investor.
It is not difficult to forecast that foreign participation in the 
recovery' of bankrupt enterprises will not be massive. Normally, it demands the 
intimate knowledge of affairs of the firm to be reorganized which is particularly 
difficult to acquire for the foreign investor. This may restrain foreign 
investors unless their intention were to detach their acquisitions from their 
previous environment and include them in a new one. Under these circumstances, 
contrary to what was argued by A.Chubais, the fixed assets of Russian enterprises 
can be of interest to foreign investors. The claim that the level of production
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of Russian industry is considerably below world standards is correct as a general 
description. Many production chains included both modem and outdated 
enterprises, and the condition of the weakest link often determined the quality 
and the technological level of the end product as well as the efficacy of the 
whole chain. Moreover, modem and efficient enterprises were penalized by the 
centralized system of profit redistribution. Profits above industry-assigned 
averages were claimed by the state while high-cost producers were compensated. 
There were no incentives to fully utilize the capacities of new technologies and 
modem plant or to increase productivity. It was common that many new factories 
failed to achieve projected output figures for decades.
All or many of these bottlenecks and deficiencies inherent in the 
administrative-command system cease to be an obstacle for retum-generating 
investment as soon as the object of investment, usually an enterprise with a 
sufficiently high technological level, is transferred into a new stimulative 
environment. The experience of Eastern and Central Europe demonstrates that, 
though transnational corporations seek to invest in the most competitive and 
modern plants and factories, they nonetheless usually find it necessary to 
"streamline" their new property. This is exactly the process of detaching the 
competitive core from the ballast, which often includes cutting out the network 
of traditional suppliers. Hence the threat that the most modem and efficient 
enterprises, after having become foreign property, will be reoriented in such a 
way that they can no longer be considered integral-type investments.
This threat tends to increase because of the stresses of land-slide 
privatisation. The Gaidar government has opted for a give-away scheme of 
privatisation based on investment vouchers. Within three years 8,000 companies
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will be subject to sale. Voucher-holders will not be the only category of buyers. 
A certain number of shares may rest with the state or be acquired at an 
advantageous rate by the workers and employees of privatised enterprises. 
Nonetheless, the issue of participation certificates will entail a tremendous 
fragmentation of capital ownership rights. Probably the main problem with this 
scheme is that it does not provide any visible evidence that the change in 
ownership will promote profit maximization and business efficiency. No new 
capital or expertise will be introduced into troubled companies. Furthermore, the 
individuals receiving a share in privatized enterprises, if ownership is broadly 
spread, will not have any influence over the specific competitiveness of the 
companies they come to own. Since, with so little information available, the 
acquisition of assets will comprise a considerable chance element, new owners may 
soon discover their property to be uncompetitive and unprofitable. In other cases 
enterprises competitive in their operations may fall into the hands of 
entrepreneurially incompetent individuals who could ruin the business. As a 
result business conditions in the country may become even more chaotic and 
insecure making the inclusion of foreign owned ventures in the national 
productive system still more questionable.
5.2.3. How Much Foreign Investment is Enough?
President Bush, following continuous appeals for aid from Russia, once 
commented:"I don’t know that there’s enough money in all the world to solve 
Russia’s economy”. He touched upon a very sensitive point. There is a growing 
awareness that quantitatively, foreign capital’s involvement in reorganizing the 
Russian economy, either as aid or in the form of private investment, will remain 
modest in comparison to the scope of the process itself.
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The Russian Federation state privatisation programme would like to see, 
in 1992, the inflow of foreign investment in the sum of ten billion roubles. The 
question of the credibility of this projection apart, it is nonetheless tricky to 
determine the real meaning of this figure. It looks hefty if compared to the 15 
billion roubles that the Government has planned to raise from the residents of 
the country. In US dollars, however, this sum is less than 800 million, though it 
is still quite a respectable sum if put against the one billion dollars in 
foreign direct investment expected to come, in 1992, to Eastern and Central 
European countries which started their privatisation effort much earlier. And 
yet, by international standards, the programmed inflow is more than modest. In 
the world of transnational corporations, the investment of 200 million dollars is 
regarded as giving a company an important presence in the country. The projected 
foreign investment inflow, if it becomes a reality, will amount to only two per 
cent of Russian imports from Westerns countries.
The abovementioned sum is also far from being impressive if compared 
with the declared needs of separate factories. A giant heavy-machine producer, 
Uralmash Zavod, alone needs 500 million dollars in investment to pull through the 
reconstruction stage, according to calculations presented by its management to a 
group of six American banks (Business Week, April 20, 1992, p. 18). In the rust- 
belt cities of Russia there are dozens of plants like Uralmash. They all 
constituted part of the military-industrial complex of the USSR, the conversion 
of which will need, argue government experts, a further 150 billion dollars in 
investment.
These demands may appear to be inflated. However, the following brief 
comparative study demonstrates that the total expenses of market transition can
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be expected to reach exceptionally high levels. The methodology uses 
extrapolations for Russia based on the amount of investment considered by foreign 
experts necessary to integrate the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) into 
the Federal Republic of Germany. As a minimum they estimated this sum at 2,000 
billion DM (1,120 billion dollars) to be spent within 10-30 years. For the 
purpose of our argument this figure may be taken as the price of transition from 
the economy of "really existing socialism" to a highly developed modern 
industrialized economy.
The Commonwealth of Independent States lagged behind East Germany in 
almost all relative indicators such as the number of telephones, or cars, or 
personal computers, etc. per one thousand inhabitants. The railroad density in 
the CIS was 25 times lower, and the automobile road density 15 times lower than
in the GDR. To achieve an equal result, per head investment in reconstruction in
the CIS has to be higher, but for simplicity let us assume it to be at the same 
level. By population the CIS was 17.6 times and Russia nine times bigger than the 
GDR. Hence, the Commonwealth’s demand in capital would be 19,700 billion dollars 
and Russia’s 10,200 billion dollars. Russia would need hundreds of years to put 
this capital into operation.
On the one hand, as the author of these calculations, Professor
Kovalevsky (1992), writes,
lit) is possible, of course, to create a market at smaller costs and
within shorter time, but then we shall get only a semi-colonial market in
the form of a raw-material appendage to developed countries.
On the other hand, it is utopian to imagine that this money will ever 
come to Russia. Even within the most developed triad of the world - the United
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States, the EC and Japan - foreign direct investment stock has never exceeded 
four per cent of the gross domestic product.
The answer to this dilemma is to attempt to bypass some stages on the 
road to a post-communist economy. To this end it is necessary to overcome a 
natural desire to mechanically imitate patterns which once were successful and 
instead to try to evaluate without prejudice the main trends in the international 
economy and the country’s own heritage. One of the major lessons to be learned 
from the economic history of the 20th century is that only a mixed economy has 
the potential to concentrate resources in priority spheres essential to the 
implementation of technological renovation and the achievement of an independent 
polity of development. The policy of relying on a government’s skill in mixing 
market mechanism and government planning, as the example of Japan and the ASEAN 
countries has demonstrated, is particularly attractive when the private sector is 
still in the infant stage (Okita, 1990).
Implementing a monetarist "model" has deprived the government of any 
levers of influence on the evolution of economic process. Meanwhile, incomplete 
system transformation • e.g., undeveloped financial markets, a lack of 
satisfactory functioning labour markets especially with respect to the 
determination and the differentiation of salaries, persistent monopolistic 
markets, state ownership, general impoverishment of the population - implied the 
persistence of structures and rigidities unsuitable for market signals to emerge 
or be received and responded to effectively. Indeed, the increase in prices 
resulted in the cutting down of the output of all manufactured goods instead of 
stimulating their production as one would expect. Simultaneously, the chaotic 
curtailment of investment activities gave an impulse to dangerous structural
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processes the progress of which might undermine Russian industrial 
competitiveness even further. Price liberalization contributed to a shift of 
financial resources to the extracting sector while manufacturing industries, in 
particular machine-building and chemical production, found themselves 
decapitalised (a 60 per cent and 66 per cent decline in capital investment 
respectively). This has only consolidated the most serious defects in the Russian 
economy: an excessive bias towards a capital and labour intensive mining industry 
and dependence on imported technology.
Price equilibrium and even privatisation, important as they are, are 
not sufficient to halt recession of production, prevent the erosion of national 
industry, raise productivity and efficiency and eventually to impede national 
competitiveness from sliding down into an irrecoverable position. This is the 
case for industrial policy. The earlier stated reform priorities must be 
complemented by a commitment to pursue profound structural changes in the 
economy.
Sometimes it is argued that the open declaration of a move towards a 
mixed economy as the objective of reforms in Russia would be a concession to the 
"old guard", leading eventually to the restoration of an administrative economy. 
In fact, it was the hasty enforcement of the market that has already brought 
about the restitution of some of the most rigid forms of administrative 
interference in the economy10. It is fair to point out that recent years have
10. For example, regional authorities have received from the centre the obligatory 
privatisation targets which they have to fulfil] by the end of 1992. They are the products 
of generalized statistical calculations and completely ignore the actual state of affairs 
in different regions of the country. Some historians were Quick to draw an analogy between 
this "marketisation planning" and the methods of the mass collectivisation of Russian 
agriculture in the 1930s.
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seen a shift of emphasis in Western academic research from market failures to 
"regulatory failures" as it was discovered that the cost of public intervention 
might exceed the benefit. In practical terms, however, this did not prevent 
industrial regulation from remaining an important part of policy-making in the 
modem industrial state.
In this context a foreign capital entry management system should be 
seen as a component of a national industrial policy. A relative (compared to the 
maxi-demand prognosis outlined above) shortage of foreign investment in Russia, 
as well as in other CIS countries, can be overcome through channeling the 
available resources according to preselected objectives. This should be done on 
the basis of the principles of "new" market-friendly interventionism that
favour|s) policies with the potential of broadening the scope and 
increasing the effectiveness of markets while recognizing that the primary 
responsibility for industrial development rests with enterprises. Put 
another way, the policies are aimed at 'helping industry help itself 
(OECD: Industrial Policies In OECD Countries, Annual Report 1991, p. 18).
5.3. Selecting Priorities for Foreign Investment
The problems facing Russia’s economy are mostly structural in nature. 
Some of them are products of the administrative-command system and bear the stamp 
of its main defect - the domination of politics over the economy. These problems 
will be solved as new forms of property and business relations spread across the 
country. Others are similar to those that all industrialized countries are forced 
to deal with, though the peculiarities of Russia’s previous development add to 
them certain country-specific features. The latter range of problems includes, 
inter alia, the shift of capital and labour from old and "dying" industries
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(shipbuilding, coal mining, metallurgy, textile industry, etc.) to new booming 
high-tech industries, and from industrial production to services; the 
strengthening of society’s capacity for sustained technological innovation; the 
protection and remedying of the environment. Worldwide, governments are engaged 
in helping national economies to cope with these challenges, whether it be called 
guidance planning in one country, or the Strategic Defence Initiative in some 
other.
Taking into account the seriousness of problems of this type in Russia,
it would be shortsighted to delay working out relevant structural policies.
Following the experience of industrialized countries, structural policies can
raise potential output by improving the allocation of resources, by promoting
technological change, by improving the quality of the factors of production and
by eliminating financial market rigidities and tax distortions. For Russian free-
market champions it would be useful to study more attentively the policy of the
first Thatcher government in Great Britain, whose monetarist sympathies were
beyond suspicion. The much-heralded privatisation programme involved only about
20 firms, accounting for a mere five per cent of value added. At the same time,
government spendings on industrial policy increased in 1980-1981 to the highest
level since 1975-1976. Furthermore, the Conservative government provided huge aid
to British Leyland because of an awareness of the impact that the collapse of the
major car producer would have on Britain’s important motor component industry. It
could be argued that British Leyland was a special case, but it does show, as Wyn
Grant (1982) pointed out, that even
the principles of social market approach can be modified when the national 
interest appears to demand it.
218 Chapters. Setting (Priorities for Capitai ‘Entry Regulations
This is the pattern the Russian government cannot ignore if it does not 
wish to see national industry decapitated11. Below I will attempt to identify 
some of the most immediate structural problems and to analyze the role of foreign 
capital in dealing with them.
5.3.1. The Industrial "Overhang”
Russia is over-industrialized, that is it has more industry than a
country of its size and its level of development should have. According to Marvin
12Jackson (1989, p. 12), the percentage of actual to expected normal share of the 
labour force in Soviet industry was 145 in 1975 and 154 in 1980. In absolute 
figures this means that about 16 million workers and employees in excess were 
employed in industry. Consequently, the share of employment in services was below 
normal. The Soviet economy did not follow the main trend in labour force and 
capital allocation of the 1970s and the 1980s towards the redistribution of 
resources in favour of services and infrastructural branches. This explains quite 
a sharp variation between the figures for 1975 and 1980: it reflects not only the 
further expansion of the countiy’s industrial sector but even more so the 
withdrawal of capital and labour from industry in the rest of the world.
11. As the previously quoted statement of Russia's Central Bank Chairman shows there is no 
absolute convlcUon among Russian experts that this is not precisely the purpose of the 
Gaidar government. There is another comment on the point made by the prominent economist 
Yurii Ol'sevlch (1992): "to 'frighten' producers, make them reduce the output and cut down 
costs, wages in first place, seems to be yet another aspect of the 'shock therapy' policy. 
The Inevitable curtailment of public production would cause bankruptcies and mass 
unemployment thus establishing a climate characterized by the underemployment of all the 
types of resources and high prices which are necessary for domestic and foreign capitalists 
to unfold private entrepreneurial acUvlty".
12. "Normal shares" are calculated from an equation matching the share of industrial labour 
force to the level of GNP per capita for 35 capitalist countries, using each country's 
actual GNP per capita.
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In its turn, Soviet industry itself was suffering serious structural 
deviations. Capacities were located in the wrong branches and sectors as the 
economy remained immune to the tremendous international relative price changes 
that occurred in the world markets in the 1970s and 1980s and led to major 
structural shifts world-wide.
First, most capacities were developed to produce machines and materials 
for the purpose of producing other machines and materials rather than to supply 
products for personal consumption, or for the needs of the social infrastructure, 
or for exports. According to available calculations, by the end of the 1980s, 80 
per cent of industrial production was consumed within industry and only 20 per 
cent found its way to household consumption (Pervushin, 1991). Correspondingly, 
over 55 per cent of the aggregate labour pay went to workers who neither directly 
nor indirectly (through intersectoral links) associated with production of 
consumer goods and services (in the United States this proportion was 33 per 
cent) {Communist Economies and Economic Transformation, Vol.4, No.2,1992, p.269- 
270). Counter to the world tendency, the amount of investment destined for the 
complex of industries providing for the needs of the inhabitants of the country 
had been decreasing in the total sum of investment up to 1990. In one of his 
interviews as Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev pointed out that only 6-8 per 
cent of the country’s productive capital stock was engaged in producing consumer 
goods {Der Spiegel, March 25, 1991, p.178).
Second, the balance between the capacities allocated for the production 
of materials and mineral resources and those manufacturing equipment and 
machinery was also distorted. The output of the primary sector rose to 40 per 
cent of all industrial production. As a result, in the Soviet Union the share of
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extracting industries in the gross national product was twice as large as in the 
developed countries of the West. The hypertrophy of the primary sector was caused 
not last by the fact that the economy of the country was developing on an 
unchanging technological base (the coefficient of new plant brought into 
operation yearly fell from 10.5 per cent in 1970 to 5.9 per cent in 1990). Under 
these conditions increment in industrial production was achieved by employing a 
constantly increasing amount of resources, hence the enormous consumption and 
waste of resources. This could have been avoided if enterprises had been 
transferred to a new technological platform.
Drastic structural changes can no longer be delayed. What makes this 
task somewhat delicate, also from the point of view of employing foreign capital, 
is that it involves two very sensitive strategic areas: the utilization of the 
non-reproducible component of national wealth • oil, gas and other mineral 
resources - and the fate of the military-industrial complex (MIC).
5.3.2. The Development of Natural Resources
The oil and gas industries in Russia have become matters for great 
concern. While experts point out that known oil reserves, at current extraction 
rates, will be exhausted in 13 years, many Russians fear that these resources can 
be misused and their country might become (or remain) a raw-material appendage to 
the West. Such a prospect cannot be completely excluded though it has very 
little, if anything, to do with the issue of whether foreign capital should or 
should not be allowed to develop the country’s natural resources. The crux of the 
matter lies elsewhere. To be a major exporter of resources does not preclude the 
possibility of also being a successful and important producer of manufactured
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goods. If a country has a weak standing in international markets it is not 
because one of its sectors has a developed export capacity, rather the problem 
lies with those sectors which do not show such a capacity. Russia’s future and 
the future of its natural resources are linked mostly to improvements in the 
general efficiency of the national economy: the higher the productivity level, 
the less is the relative consumption of raw materials. At present, the energy 
efficiency of the GDP in Russia is 2.2 times lower than that in the United States 
and more than three times lower than in former West Germany, Great Britain and 
South Korea. In fact, on this account Russia was placed 103rd in the world 
classification compiled by A.Illarionov (Voprosy ekonomiki, No.4-6, 1992, pp. 133- 
136). More specifically, the prospects of the oil industry in Russia depend very 
much on the technological renovation of the industry itself. Russia may well have 
up to a quarter of the world’s undiscovered oil but only a major technological 
effort can bring it to the surface. Another promising possibility is to recover 
previously developed oil fields using up-to-date extracting processes.
Taking into account the current economic situation in the country, the 
maximum possible utilization of foreign investment for developing national 
natural resources appears to be indispensable to the successful restructuring of 
the Russian economy. This will, first, take a great burden off the financial 
system of the country and, second, prevent pumping over resources from 
manufacturing to oil extracting and processing with the risk that the former 
remain undercapitalized. In fact, encouraging the inflow of foreign capital in 
this sector is probably the only way put an end to the dependence of Russian 
exports on mineral resources in the long run. For decades the economy of the 
country was locked in a vicious circle as the costs of oil and gas exportation 
came to absorb the lion’s share of the revenues it brought. In general, the
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energy complex consumed about 40 per cent of the Union’s industrial investment 
budget, yet coal and especially oil production were falling, gas output growth 
was slowing and the economy was facing energy shortages. A considerable part of 
Russia’s foreign debt has been accumulated owing to the mass acquisition of tubes 
and equipment for export pipelines. Now foreign consortia, despite the political 
and policy risks involved, are willing to provide capital for the exploration and 
development of Russia’s oil fields. This opens a possibility to channel released 
national funds to the development of those sectors which are important for 
improving national competitiveness but, at least at the current stage, cannot 
count on any serious interest on the part of foreign investors. Together with 
other measures aimed at rationalizing energy consumption, energy price correction 
included, this investment maneuver will have very positive structural 
consequences.
Now and even more so in the future, foreign participation in the 
development of Russia’s oil and gas might give an example of the type of text­
book reciprocity between foreign and home producers that leads to technology 
spill-over and stimulates a competitive environment. This effect could be brought 
about by the favourable combination of factors that has formed in the country. 
The most important of these is the acute interest that foreign investors have 
been demonstrating in Russian oil and gas exploration. The extraction industry 
is probably the only area in which Russia as a host-country can benefit from the 
rivalry of foreign firms. A second factor has to do with the state of the Russian 
oil industry itself. It would be erroneous to disregard completely the value of 
the experience it has accumulated. Some of this experience, especially in 
developing oil under extreme natural conditions, is indeed unique. It may be
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traded for technology and know-how with those foreign companies which need it to 
operate in Russia.
On the other hand, it is no less true that on the whole the Russian oil 
industry lags behind Western firms, which can only hamper the advancement of 
mutual interest in cooperation. This may be compensated for by state regulation 
which may become as important a factor of co-operation between Russian and 
foreign firms as the previous two. Extracting companies in general demonstrate 
more propensity to cooperate with host-authorities since their investments are 
more tied and more exposed to political risk than investments in manufacturing. 
Besides, as a lever on foreign companies, Russia may use its control over the 
vast network of pipe-lines in its territory (for example, the average length of a 
gas-line in the former Soviet Union was 3,500 kilometres). Experts agree that 
access to the existing network is crucial to the profitability of foreign 
ventures as production tends to move eastward to more remote deposits (East 
European Markets, June 12, 1992: 12:12/11).
The Russian authorities have been under great pressure to ease the 
public grip on the oil sector. This pressure has been exerted by such unlikely 
parties as international agencies, transnational corporations and local interest 
groups. The first criticized, in the name of price equilibrium, the practice of
oil price fixing. The second expressed discontent with chaotic and inconsistent 
regulations that increased investment risk and impeded any serious long-range 
planning. The latter sought more control over oil revenues. Much of this 
criticism is relevant. A substantial increase in relative prices of energy 
products is likely to reduce the waste in the short run and encourage supply in 
the longer run. Coherent foreign investment policy could provide a welcome boost
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to royalties and other taxes paid by foreign companies engaged in the exploration 
of energy resources. Finally, the settlement of the ownership rights dispute 
between different levels of authority is important for the establishment of due 
legal prerequisites for the development of the indu_ .ry.
At the same time, any adequate reaction to this criticism should allow 
for the fact that the exploration of natural resources and the energy sector were 
and remain among the most regulated areas of economic activity world-wide. The 
discovery of oil and gas deposits in the North Sea, to take one example, was 
immediately followed by state intervention in all countries involved. This was 
the result of a desire to derive maximum benefit from this unprecedented 
opportunity in terms of national welfare. In Britain, the government was strongly 
criticized for not having distributed oil lots through auctioning. Allegedly, 
this would have raised more income from the sale of exploitation licenses than 
the government policy of distribution by administrative discretion. The 
government successfully rejected the criticism on the grounds that the chosen 
approach better served British interests in realizing three objectives: the most 
rapid commercialization of petroleum reserves on the Continental Shelf; the 
provision of maximum budget revenues and, finally, the promotion of national 
industry and regional development in adjoining territories (MacKay and Mackay, 
1975, pp. 18-22). With hindsight the result of this policy may be' disputed. At 
that time, however, clearly determined and balanced means and ends helped the 
government to mobilize the necessary support for its polity and to succeed in 
realizing at least some of its stated goals.
Russia, in a sense, is in a situation similar to the one the North Sea 
countries addressed themselves to twenty years ago. It has to rediscover its
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natural wealth and to find ways to utilize it in the best way. The necessity for 
foreign participation is obvious, but it would not be expected to be 
conflictless. This is not because of government interference per se, but simply 
because national and foreign interests cannot coincide completely. Thus, for 
reasons of petroleum conservation, the Russian state wants foreign companies to 
rehabilitate old fields (about 20,000 wells with the capacity of 500,000 barrels 
a day) or to tackle technically demanding fields. Naturally enough, the companies 
instead want access to the biggest, cheapest reserves. This example once again 
demonstrates that capital entry regulations cannot take shape other than under 
conditions of a serious conflict of interests. The struggle for Russian oil has 
already begun. Numerous articles in foreign specialized journals, based on 
interviews with high-ranking employees of oil firms, give the impression that, 
despite considerable general interest, international oil producers practically 
exclude the possibility of expanding or starting business in Russia under present 
conditions. These publications are the background for the claims of some Russian 
authors for developing the capital entry management system by adding new 
privileges. However, in reality, according to the information of the Ministry of 
Fuel and Energy of Russia, in 1992 foreign firms have so far signed over 5,000 
contracts for the development of Russian oil fields.
Clearly, this does not imply that the investment climate in the oil 
industry is generally good. Foreign investors undoubtedly have hard tune running 
their oil ventures in Russia. However, the increasing inflow of capital suggests 
that some variant of equilibrium between the interests of the investors and the 
host-country has been established. This a new situation for Russian regulators 
which, probably for the first time since the opening of the country to foreign 
capital in 1987, offers a possibility for viewing the task of developing the CEMS
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not simply as the perpetual escalation of incentives. Oil policy is of vital 
importance for Russia and the CIS as a whole. The future of reforms and, in a 
sense, of democracy in the country depends on the degree to which oil revenues 
will compensate for the default of other industries and ease the material 
hardships of the population during the transition period. The state must preserve 
its role as a guarantor in respect to foreign and domestic oil producers, 
insuring that natural resources bring maximum returns to the national economy.
5.3.3. The Conversion of the Military Industry
The conversion of Russia’s military-industrial complex (MIC) to civil 
objectives has been of tremendous importance considering its position in the 
economy. About 80 per cent of the MIC is concentrated in Russia’s territory. The 
military-industrial complex included 70 per cent of mechanical engineering, 90 
per cent of all chemical industry and 75 per cent of the production of 
combustible and lubrication materials that made it practically synonymous with 
national industry (Piskunov and Lomakin-Rumjancev, 1992, pp.67-68). It employed 
directly 4.4 million persons, compared with 1.5 million employed in the Western 
European military industry; suppliers included, the number rocketed to 12 million 
(another estimate is 16.5 million). Military production consumed no less than 40 
per cent of electricity and textiles, more than 50 per cent of steel, aluminum, 
plastics, motor oils, etc. The demilitarization of the economy promises the 
release of a gigantic amount of resources, equipment and skill coupled with 
savings in energy and materials as great. To take one example, a 30 per cent cut 
in the MIC’s consumption of electricity allow the closure of all the nuclear 
plants in the republic with no damage to civil consumption. Energy conservation 
could have a potentially powerful effect on export earnings: a one per cent
Chapter 5. Setting ¡Priorities for Capital ‘Entry 'Regulations 227
reduction in domestic consumption would increase export earnings by nearly one 
billion U.S. dollars {The Economy of the USSR, p.43).
The conversion of the defence industry is more than just the 
introduction of changes in one, albeit large, industrial sector. It is an attempt 
to break away from a militarised economy, which the Soviet economy actually was, 
and thus to eliminate the fundamental cause of many of its structural 
deformations. In the militarised economy civil branches cannot compete with 
privileged military industries. For years the latest equipment and most skilled 
labour were allocated to military production. Civil industries were forced to 
compensate for the poor quality of machinery and labour by extra investment in 
productive capital stock. This did not solve the problem because, for the veiy 
same reason, new productive capacities also could not be employed efficiently. As 
the shortages of non-militaiy products mounted, more and more capital had to be 
pumped into machine-building and energy branches at the cost of other needs. 
Capital injections did not and could not result in any substantial break through 
in the technical and quality levels of the plant used by civilian industries as 
the money was to be spent on the maintenance of cumbersome and obsolete stocks of 
equipment and on increasing the gross volume of output in order to counterbalance 
the low quality and the short life-span of manufactured products. Hence the 
wasteful consumption of metal, energy and generally resources, as well as other 
structural deformations discussed above.
The first State Conversion Programme, endorsed in December 1990, soon 
revealed a wide range of weak points. One of the most significant errors was the 
miscalculation of the cost of conversion. The Programme proceeded from the 
assumption that cuts in the output of weapons and military hardware would
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immediately free resources for developing civilian production at defence complex 
enterprises. In reality no actual redundancy of productive capacity followed 
(Khokhlov and Samsonov, 1992). A partial cut in the volume of military production 
was not enough to allow the equipment to be re-tooled to manufacture civilian 
production. Besides, producers experienced a decrease in economy of scale: for 
example, a planned cut in production of tanks led to the cost of each unit nearly 
doubling (Ibidem, p.57).
As in the second half of 1992 the political and economic situations in 
the country changed dramatically, planned conversion was aborted and the stage of 
"wholesale" or "landslide" conversion began. The military sector found itself 
completely deprived of any state financial support as military orders shrank 
abruptly by 70 per cent. Within months the output of weapons and accompanying 
products was down by a substantial number of percentage points while civilian 
production, due to the absence of conversion subsidies, remained at best 
stagnant. Lack of resources resulted in the main obstacle standing in the way of 
conversion.
Under these conditions a search for funds has become one of the 
principle tasks facing conversion. It cannot be adequately supported by state 
financial injections while the consumer market for durable civilian goods and 
agricultural machinery, produced by converted industrial capacities, has 
virtually collapsed following the price reform. At the same time, the foreign- 
capital-based privatisation of MIC enterprises raises specific questions. 
National security aspects apart, the MIC remains a particular object for 
privatisation as it incorporates the core of the technological and industrial 
potential of the country. It has a pyramid structure. Resources producing
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enterprises constitute the base. Then follow factories supplying intermediate 
products. The manufacturers of technology-intensive final products are at the top 
of the pyramid. Analysts point out that the network of MIC firms is especially 
fragile because it represents a protracted industrial chain with a high degree of 
specialization and interdependence. This was one of the main arguments in favour 
of a very gradual approach towards the reform of military industry. It was 
claimed that the closure of the elite enterprises of the upper level would have a 
multiplying effect owing to the devastating impact on their "suit" (EKO, No.2, 
1992).
In reality, top-floor producers appear to be most vulnerable. Suppliers 
of mineral and other resources could easily find outlets within and outside the 
country. The producers of general-purpose components have a chance to adjust them 
to civilian needs at relatively little cost. Only final producers are specialized 
to such an extent that changes in the production profile inevitably entail a 
dramatic, from 30 to 150 per cent according to some evaluations, fall in 
productivity (Jzvestia, February 2, 1992). Moreover, because it is known that 
adjustment under competitive conditions is the more difficult the more 
sophisticated the product, one may expect that high-tech industries will suffer 
most from the opening up of the domestic market. Already converting enterprises 
tend to choose for civilian production articles which are technologically 
inferior to those they produced for the military.
In addition, in the Soviet Union four fifths of research and 
development financing was spent on military research (EKO, No.2, 1992, p.6). This 
money was also an important source of support for fundamental research and 
academic science, as a part of the military R & D budget used to be allocated
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eventually to civilian research centres. As conversion started, the number of 
people employed in military R & D decreased by 40,000 in 1990 and by 160,000 in
1991. To appreciate the implication of these figures it is enough to compare them 
to the number of staff in the Academy of Sciences of the USSR: 60,000 in 1991.
Clearly, it is of paramount importance for the future of Russia to
preserve the industrial and technological potential accumulated by the military-
industrial complex. It is not altogether evident that this task may be resolved
by purely market methods, in particular in the situation of economic openness.
The point is that the military sector had already been formed as an industrial
enclave under the central-planning system. It was fenced off not only
organizationally but even more by the technological gap which existed between the
military and civilian sectors. In the latter the general technological level of
enterprises was so low that they were often not capable of finding use for
13
materials, products or technologies offered by military branches . The mutual 
isolation of the two sectors, the technical incompatibility of many of their 
products, and the difference in standards and technological levels, all 
contributed to a difficulty for military industries to supply the internal 
civilian market (Krutsky and Kochetkov, 1992). At the same time, MIC enterprises, 
possessing state-of-the-art equipment and qualified workers to run them, can be 
very good subcontractors capable of manufacturing both mass and unique products 
for international markets. However, their isolation from external markets is by
13. Krutsky and Kochetkov (1992) report the following case. A chemical company in the Volga 
region produced "kevlar", an extremely resistant material, on the development of which the 
American company "Dupont" had spent 700 million dollars in 25 years. Not finding industrial 
buyers In the internal market, the enterprise started to manufacture artist's brushes with 
this material. These were sold in the domestic market at 2,5 roubles. It should be noted 
that this material cost in the international market (at the 1990 dollar exchange rate) 
almost one thousand times more than the producer was trying to obtain in the internal 
market for its "finished" product.
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no means less than from internal markets. In these they have no marketing 
positions of their own and must win orders starting from scratch.
Optimally, conversion should retain the high quality of MIC
manufacturing, eliminate the gap between military and civilian sectors and
promote the expansion of national industry into international markets. The way
conversion has been developing since the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
military enterprises have been forced to pass from the manufacture of products of
special technological value to the manufacture of simple consumer articles. The
abovementioned gap has been narrowing following the downgrading of a more
advanced sector to the level of a less advanced sector which is distinctly
counterproductive. Under these conditions, encouraging foreign assistance appears
to be a step in the right direction. After the extraction industry, elite
14converted enterprises may be estimated as the most attractive object for FDI , 
in particular as many of them do not need a massive infusion of new capital but 
rather access to international distribution networks in tandem with the relevant 
management expertise and marketing skills to disclose their competitive strength.
Predictably, different groups of experts maintain contrasting positions 
concerning the role of foreign capital in conversion. One group argues that 
"creating assembly plants based on enterprises undergoing conversion and 
belonging to foreign corporations and joint ventures is the most rapid and 
effective way to integrate our processing industry into the international 
division of labour" (Khokhlov and Samsonov, 1992, p.62). The other group demands
14. Academician Yevgeni Velichov, a noted expert in electronics, was quoted as saying that 
if the rouble exchange rate had been calculated on the basis of technical equipment and the 
technological potential of top-level military producers it should have been established at 
10-15 US dollars (Most, No.2. 1992. p.90).
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that "producers in [high-tech] sectors must at least be put into conditions more 
favourable than any type of joint venture or foreign companies" and that Russian 
ex-military enterprises should be equal partners when cooperating with foreign 
firms (Krutsky and Kochetkov, 1992, p.89; pp.91-94). It may be noted that the 
first proposal does not correspond to the goals of conversion as outlined above. 
It clearly bears the impress of the change in priorities in public mentality: 
from progress to survival. The second one pushes towards protectionism and has a 
visible relationship with the "infant industry" argument so often raised in trade 
theory discussions.
The two positions mark the range of choices for government policy. The 
uniqueness of the Russian military industry is in a halfway position in terms of 
technology and quality between the level of performance of domestic civilian 
sectors and that of the leaders of the international market. It is one of the 
greatest assets the country has and the basis for its competitiveness in 
industrial markets. As regards high-tech enterprises, it seems reasonable to 
protect them from becoming a bargain for foreign competitors. Financial 
bottlenecks may be overcome through the iiyection of portfolio investment. This 
form of investment is rarely discussed in Russian publications. Indeed, taking 
into consideration the magnitude of the problems in the ex-Soviet economy, it 
will not be widespread for other industries that the foreign investor would 
easily agree to be a minor shareholder. Especially as this type of investment is 
in practical terms penalized or at least discriminated against by existing 
legislation which does not foresee any privileges for firms with foreign 
participation below 30 per cent. However, MIC enterprises are clearly a case 
apart as is evident from the persistent interest that foreign companies show in 
establishing business relations with Russian former and current arms producers.
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Hence, the government should not delay in introducing initiatives establishing a 
favourable legislative and organizational framework for these relations. 
Portfolio investment will permit the preservation of competitive producers under 
national control. In turn, joint ventures with global companies will provide a 
bridge to world markets.
Modem competitive producers may not include a majority of defence 
enterprises. Hence, raising portfolio investment from abroad will not be feasible 
for all of them. Others should be protected in a different way, and some should 
not be protected at all. Different approaches have to be applied to different 
cases. However, the one that should be avoided is "wholesale" landslide 
conversion of the type that has been effective recently.
5.3.4. Technological Challenge
The Soviet centrally-planned economic system was infamous for its 
inability to provide for sustained technological innovation. In the 1970s and 
especially in the 1980s this defect became the cause of particular concern 
against the background of two pronounced tendencies. One was presented by the 
increasing world-wide evidence that innovation capacity had turned into a major 
strategic strength. The other was a progressive imbalance between the amount of 
material and financial resources and manpower invested by the Soviet Union in 
research and development and its inadequate technological performance in 
comparison with other industrialized countries. In the 1990s, technological 
innovation in the ex-Soviet economy slowed even further. Financial tension 
undermined the government’s role as a consumer of scientific and technical 
products. In turn, in industry, there was no incentive to use new and up-to-date
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technology. As a result, 1991 saw a levelling out of effective demand for R & D 
products.
The Soviet technological lag can be attributed in part to the existence 
of the two-tier structure of technology creation, diffusion and adoption. The 
lion’s share of research was carried out for military objectives. Naturally, it 
was concentrated on basic issues thus requiring a gigantic infrastructure and 
maximum spending. Civilian R & D instead was insufficient. The two tiers barely 
overlapped in the same way military innovations barely trickled down to civilian 
industries. Although military R & D enjoyed privileges unknown to its civilian 
counterpart, both faced similar problems: high costs, low quality and most of all 
the veiy slow pace of the introduction of R & D results into production. As for 
the latter, the reasons lay outside research institutions. The monopolism of 
producers and the pertaining scarcity of all types of manufactured items deprived 
the country’s economy of whatever incentive it might have for technological 
innovation.
i
This must change if Russia is to have any future in the approaching 
technological age. The conventional advice is to create as soon as possible a 
competitive environment and to open the economy. This is by no means 
inappropriate. However, the following questions should be asked. What will help 
Russian R & D to survive before competition among producers boosts interest in 
innovation? Will this interest be strong enough to pay the high price of 
technological progress? Why is technology policy not alien to countries with 
developed modern market systems?
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The structural problem with Russian science is that it has to become 
more integrated with industry, and to focus on generating new technologies, on 
engineering, and on the adaptation of basic research to industrial needs. The 
accelerating "brain drain" from Russia indicates a precarious situation in 
national R & D since state funding has been largely withdrawn. Some state 
laboratories in the sphere of basic research are going to survive but otherwise 
research has to pass through privatisation and reorient itself towards commercial 
sources of finance. Meanwhile, research institutions have come to face higher 
requirements in the terms of quality and efficacy. Applied research has to meet 
ever more rigorous standards as technology becomes increasingly expensive and 
the life-cycle of many products shrinks. This signifies that the ability to 
commercialize technology, to move a product from a concept to market quickly and 
efficiently is crucial for the prospects of both Russian science and industry.
World leaders in innovation differ from laggards in several respects 
(Nevens et al., 1990). They get products or processes to markets faster, use new 
technologies in products across a wider range of markets, introduce more 
products, and incorporate in them a greater breadth of technologies. Clearly, 
under present conditions Russian firms cannot follow this pattern. Incorporation 
of some of research centers into the structures of transnational companies may 
reduce tension in the upper-grade sector of the labour market. But, as yet 
another form of the export of highly-educated labour force and know-how, this 
settlement cannot solve the problem entirely.
What Russian R & D needs is the inflow of venture capital that would 
help to transform the accumulated intellectual potential into such ready-for-sale 
products as licenses, patents, samples of technology-based products and
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processes. These could be supplied to both domestic and international markets and 
would contribute to the welfare of the country in a much more positive way than 
the export of labour. There is no doubt that, at least in the visible future, 
venture capital as well as expertise in venture business can only come from 
abroad. Foreign investment for these purposes should be encouraged but 
traditional incentives may not be enough. Venture projects are known to be 
particularly dependent on the business environment. If national companies remain 
slow in responding to innovation no incentives to foreign capital will change the 
situation.
Hence what is necessary is a technology policy which, while helping to 
bridge modem research with actual production, would also serve as a component of 
a capital entry management system. In the United States where R & D, since the 
Second World War, has also come to depend on basic research for the military, the 
amount of venture capital has recently risen to 15 billion dollars. Much of this 
money is busy "translating" the outcomes of basic research into commercial 
products. If in the first instance just a fraction of this money was to do the 
same job in Russia, it would nonetheless have very positive structural impact.
Technology policy may concentrate either on the supply side or the 
demand side, or both. In the first case the government stimulates innovation 
through state financed science and grants to private research, proceeding from 
the assumption that industry would eventually benefit from technological spin­
off. This "model" is unlikely to prove instrumental in recruiting foreign venture 
capital under Russian conditions. First, because of the dramatic budgetary 
situation which will remain, according to all realistic hypotheses, a major 
constraint on all forms of government funding for many years to come. This does
Chapter S. Setting ¡Priorities for Capitai “Entry ¡Regulations 237
not suggest that state grants could be substantial enough to become a sufficient 
incentive for foreign capital. Second, it is quite predictable that government 
spending will essentially go to defense-related R & D thus restricting the 
possibility for foreign ventures to benefit from state technology policy. 
Besides, the unaided diffusion of military technologies is too slow to cause a 
radical change in national competitiveness.
The foregoing model once again puts trust in basic research as a 
generator of new products and new industries. It does not differ greatly from the 
traditional Soviet approach, with the minor variation that it allows for the 
existence of a non-state sector. Recently, under the influence of Japanese 
successes, the supply side concept has been increasingly criticized as misplacing 
the source of competitive strength. Instead, authorities are recommended to 
stimulate demand for innovative ideas **\ For Russia this type of technology 
policy promises tangible advantages. It does not require massive budget 
expenditure or involve the government in the precarious business of picking 
losers and winners among rival technologies and products. At the same time it 
contributes to the establishment of such an environment that would help domestic 
companies to become eager consumers of technology and aggressive innovators. In 
fact, an increasing domestic market for cut-edge technology is a fundamental 
prerequisite for the survival of Russian R & D and, eventually, for turning 
science into a profitable export industry and for attracting foreign money to it.
Unfortunately, no trace of any specific technological policy can be 
found in the actions of the government. At the same time, one can see statements
15. For dlscusslon see Voprosy ekonomiki, No.l 1. 1991. pp.3-49; EKO, No.4, 1991, pp.96-118; 
Harvard Business Review, March-April 1992, pp.24-31; May-June 1992, pp.140-157.
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such as that made by Igor’ Nit, the head of a group of experts working for the 
president of the Russian Federation, maintaining that Russia was not yet ready to 
accept foreign high-tech investment. Thus he insisted that such investment would 
not be covered by the guarantees of a state foreign investment insurance fund to 
be established in the country in the near future (Izvestia, May 12, 1992). These 
are very alarming signs that suggest that innovation policy does not receive 
necessary attention from the government.
5.3.5. Averting Environmental Collapse
Many of the industrial and agricultural regions of the former Soviet 
Union are on the verge of ecological breakdown posing an imminent threat to the 
health of present and future generations inside and outside the borders of the 
country. The 1988 official State of the Environment Report identified 290 
"ranges of severe ecological conditions". These ranges cover 3.7 million square 
kilometers, equivalent to an area ten times larger than unified Germany. Nearly 
60 million people live in severely degraded environments. The acuteness of the 
pollution situation demands that the state should regard it as a major priority 
that foreign investment contribute to the improvement of environmental 
conditions.
The greatest effect can be expected to come from the correction of 
those structural imperfections of the post-Soviet economy discussed earlier. 
Industrial restructuring, the elimination of "overindustrialization", should lead 
to the closure of inefficient plants, and increase efficacy in the use of inputs 
per unit of output, spur technological renovation with positive consequences in
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terms of pollution. However, there remain some specific ecology-related issues 
requiring the particular involvement of the state.
The first group of issues is linked to the absence or near absence in 
the country of an industry specialized in the supply of technology necessary to 
tackle environmental problems. For decades environment protection targets have 
not been achieved because of failure in the production and supply of pollution 
control technology and waste treating technology. This has been one of the most 
underinvested sectors of national manufacturing. Its budget constituted only a 
fraction of the costs of environmental damage which has been estimated at some 
100 billion roubles per year. This disparity has been translated into the 
continuous degradation of the quality of life and natural resources. In 1989, 
life-expectancy in the USSR fell below the 1965 level. The gap between the USSR 
and the OECD countries has increased leaving Russia out of the top fifty 
countries with the highest average life-expectancies.
The pollution problem has been underplayed for many years. Russian and 
foreign experts agree that there are many of its aspects still waiting to be 
discovered, such as the burden of hazardous waste increasing at the rate of 20 
million tons per year. This only stresses that ecology deserves all the attention 
it claims. It should not be overlooked, however, that the establishment of a new 
market-oriented system and the privatisation process also appear to be dependent 
on ecological conditions. Liability for existing environmental damage and the 
costs of environmental reconstruction interfere in the cost-benefit 
considerations of potential investors. Besides, the population would estimate the 
new system, inter alia, by the change it brings to the quality of life.
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The industry supplying technology, appliances, measuring and screening 
instruments, and so called "attachable" equipment (designed to complement 
existing technologies to clean waste) for environmental protection can become, 
with some government help, one of the hinges of the structural renovation of 
Russia’s economy. It is technology intensive, has an expanding and secure market 
at home and abroad (the market in environmental goods and services comes to 200 
billion dollars a year) and, on the whole, provides for higher production 
efficiency. It is a a field with very good prospects, in which Russian basic 
research and Russian cheap factors of production can merge with foreign capital 
in a potentially booming industry. Its output, among other things, may help save 
jobs at polluting factories which would have to be closed if cleaning equipment 
were not installed. Moreover, private foreign investments in the environment 
protection industry are likely candidates to obtain support from the governments 
of capital exporting countries that generally rank environmental protection high 
and are sensitive to the threats of transfrontier pollution. As a result, 
investors may receive risk guarantees and other incentives in home-countries as a 
form of environment-saving aid thus decreasing the cost of capital import for 
Russia.
The second group of issues reflects on the ecological dangers which may 
emerge following Russia’s opening to foreign capital. The country’s environment 
can fall victim to the consequences of the immigration of dirty industries from 
the OECD countries. A relocation of pollution intensive activities, in experts’ 
jargon, "from regions with a low level, or a high use, of assimilative capacity 
to regions where the assimilative capacity is still largely available" (1992 - 
The Environmental Dimension, Brussels, 1991, cfr. 11.2.3) is a pronounced 
tendency. Though the situation as discussed so far in this research may indicate
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that it is unlikely that the ex-Soviet Union would enter into the latter 
category, there are good chances nonetheless that Russia and other CIS countries 
could become recipients of dirty production which other nations are no longer 
willing to tolerate in their territory. This will happen if the formers fall a 
prey to the temptation to trade whatever is left of their clean environment for 
some extra material wealth. Of course, this would not necessarily take the form 
of physical transference of polluting enterprises. Taking into account that anti­
pollution protection in many Russian enterprises is inferior still to what is 
considered unacceptable in countries with more environmental awareness, such a
transference could somehow be justified if respective domestic productive
16capacities were closed . What is likely to happen, however, is that foreign 
firms will shift production from their own "dirty" factories to even more "dirty" 
Russian factories. If this trend is not resisted, Russia will find not only its 
environment deteriorating but also the objectives of industrial restructuring 
frustrated because healthy, growing and future-oriented companies are usually 
able to pay for pollution control out of rising profits rather than avoiding it 
while firms which are forced to shift their production to cheaper locations with 
lower ecological costs are likely to be behind in their technological 
development.
Environmental problems in Russia may be settled only if there is 
relevant state regulation. That markets by themselves cannot internalize 
environmental costs has become conventional wisdom almost everywhere in highly 
developed industrialized countries. Russian neo-liberals have still to learn 
that. Appropriate environmental laws, institutions and policies are central to
16. In 1988, on average Soviet factories and plants were two times more poUutive that 
similar American production facilities (Planovoe khoziastvo, No.4, 1991. p.99).
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environmental awareness and behaviour. Hence, it is crucial how high 
environmental policy stays on the government agenda. Inflation control, budget 
equilibrium, rouble convertability and privatisation seem to have completely 
absorbed the reform effort of the government. However, it is not acceptable that 
a passage to capitalism should include the repetition of all the awful 
environmental mistakes of capitalism to add to the already tragic experience of 
socialism. Besides, the neglect of ecological issues will eventually put Russia 
in opposition to other European countries where environmentalism is in the 
ascendent. The European Community is imposing increasing pressure on trading 
partners to conform to their environmental standards and is willing to use 
tariffs and other fiscal instruments to enforce such requirements (Baumgartel 
and Stadler, 1992). Therefore, environmentalism should already be a part of 
reform strategy at this point, the capital entry management system included.
Foreign investors, when establishing plants inside Russia, should be
called on to meet those environmental standards which will permit Russia to form
a unified regime with other European countries. In practice this means that
Russian environmental norms must be oriented towards the EC. So far there have
been no clearly defined environmental standards. An attempt to create a
competitive advantage on the basis of incorrectly defined environmental standards
has no prospects because, if environmental problems are allowed to accumulate,
they become more expensive to remedy, thus undermining the chance to reinforce
17competitiveness in the long run . Due attention must be given to the opinion 
that better environmental conditions would favour future investments. Russia 
should stick to codes of practice and guidelines, now being elaborated at the
17. Experts generally agree that a one to ten raUo correctly reflects the relationship 
between what it costs to prevent pollution and what is necessary to eliminate Its 
consequences [Planovoe khoziastvo, No.4, 1991, p. 100).
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international level, that have as their final objective such a global 
harmonization of principles concerning environmental protection costs that it 
shall be ensured that polluters cover the full environmental cost of their 
activities (the Polluter Pays Principle).
Unfortunately, the practical implementation of measures preventing the
CIS from becoming a "dustbin" for more prosperous countries is hampered by the
critical state of the national economy and a pertaining political crisis. In the
central-planning days powerful industrial lobbies succeeded in effectively
blocking attempts at making nature-protecting legislation more demanding and
punitive. Recently, possibilities for working out and in particular for enforcing
unified standards and policy in this field have shrunk even further. As has been
stated previously, the environment does not seem to be high on the government’s
economic agenda. However, even if we assume that the government at some point
would be recruited from the influential part of the opposition that represents
industrial circles in the country, this is still unlikely to introduce many
positive changes in environmental policy. The "captains" of big industry, who
would than actually control decision-making, can be expected to be no less
inventive in finding excuses to spoil the environment as they were during the
Soviet period. One way or another, there is a danger that environmental issues
will be pushed to the margins of the reform debate. Hope lies with the growth of
18public and international pressure for an environmental clean-up, on the
18. The "green" movement in Russia is disjointed and has not yet gained the political 
weight and mass support that environmentalists enjoy in Western Europe. In part this is due 
to the secrecy which surrounded environmental issues in general and environmental accidents 
in particular under the Soviet regime. Only in 1988 and 1989 for the first time were 
reliable environmental statistics revealed. With the dispersion of the knowledge of real 
environmental deterioraUon and the further liberaUon of political mentality in the 
country. Russian "greens" have a good chance of developing into an influential political 
force.
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political side, and with the growing awareness of the importance of environment 
stabilisation for national competitiveness and import of capital, on the economic 
side.
6 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FREE ECONOMIC ZONES
6.1. The Rise of Free Economic Zones in Russia
6.1.1. Joint Ventures and Free Economic Zones in the USSR and Russia
Joint ventures with foreign firms are historically the first and, at 
present, the most diffused form of foreign participation in the ex-Soviet 
economy. In Russia’s industiy joint ventures play a noticeable role. At the 
beginning of 1992, they employed 130 thousand persons and had a volume of sales 
above eleven billion roubles. In some branches their presence was quite 
substantial: by mid 1991, their share in telephone production was ten per cent, 
in computers - seven per cent, in textile equipment - four per cent and in 
footwear output - over two per cent (Ekonomika o zhizn’, No.5, 1992, p.13). 
However, according to widespread opinion, joint ventures have failed as an, 
attempt to induce foreign capital to participate more actively in restructuring 
and modernizing Russia’s economic potential. Major firms with solid reputation, 
controlling modem technology and huge capitals, have shown no particular 
interest in participating in JVs so far. Foreign partners preferred to invest in 
services rather than in industrial production. With few exceptions they were keen 
to extract short-term profit and withdraw instead of embarking on long-term 
projects as was initially hoped. Foreign firms have also brought with them a 
sophisticated technique of disguised transmission of profits abroad. Therefore, 
shortly after the green light was given in the Soviet Union to the creation of 
joint ventures with the participation of foreign firms, a search started for
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additional instruments to precipitate the inflow of production assets from 
abroad.
In this context special (or free) economic zones were regarded by many 
Soviet experts as the next major step towards the opening-up of the national 
economy and the intensification of foreign investment in the country. In recent 
years this topic has been the focal point of a heated and controversial 
discussion. Though having contributed a great deal to creating a clearer and more 
objective picture of the nature of the phenomenon of free economic zones, it has 
failed, however, to produce a unanimous view on the degree of the applicability 
of these entities under the particular conditions of the Soviet economy. In the 
meantime, the authorities have been surprisingly quick to pass decisions 
legalizing free economic zones in the country. First, in the autumn of 1990, the 
Russian Parliament, following President Yeltsin’s initiative, authorized the 
establishment of "free enterprise zones" in the territory of the Russian 
Federation. Several months later, President Gorbachev issued a decree approving 
the creation of zones throughout the whole Soviet Union. The dissolution of the 
union state has not weakened interest in developing economic zones. In summer 
1992, the Russian President signed an extensive decree on some measures promoting 
the development of free economic zones. Similar legislation was endorsed in the 
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan.
At present, on paper at least, Russia is second probably only to China 
in the spread of free economic zones. Twelve officially proclaimed zones cover a 
territory of 1.2 million square kilometres with 18 million inhabitants, making up
12 per cent of the population of Russia. At the same time, the performance of 
these zones in terms of attracting foreign capital has been negligible. This
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contradiction deserves attention. Analysis may be expected to reveal some 
interesting details concerning Russia’s investment climate. Besides, the formal 
inauguration of a number of free economic zones has not dismissed two main 
questions: (i) if a workable model, both adapted to the demands and conditions of 
the Russian economy and attractive to foreign investors, has been found, and (ii) 
if free zones are able to facilitate the transition of the national economy to a 
market system.
6.1.2. Theoretical Debate and Practical Politics
The early stage of the theoretical debate on free economic zones was 
characterized by the pronounced divergence, sometimes even the polarity, of 
opinions on the social and economic nature of these structures. This can be 
attributed not in the least degree to a confusion over the very notion of the 
free zone at the debut of the debate. The initial negative reaction on the part 
of some critics had its roots in a dogmatic Marxist mentality treating the export 
of capital almost exclusively in terms of exploitation and dependence. Typical of 
this thinking was the protest of an initiative group calling itself the "United 
Workers Front" from the city of Novgorod, a would-be free zone location, which 
warned their co-citizens that "the city and the district will be flooded with 
sharp traders and prostitutes; city enterprises will be manipulated by 
transnational corporation headquarters from abroad, Novgorod inhabitants will 
find themselves treated as second-rate, social inequality will become sharper, 
patriotic feelings will be oppressed" (Izvestia, December 27, 1989). This sort of
criticism, at least at the level of an academic debate, was soon overcome as the 
society disposed of many of its prejudices1.
As for constructive criticism, it was directed mainly against the 
excessively euphoric evaluations of the contribution of free export zones to the 
success of newly industrialized countries. It also placed in question the 
universality of a zone type prevalent in these countries. This latter criticism 
proved to be very helpful as it drew attention to the necessity of making a 
distinction between different types of free zones. Initially it was rather common 
that the desirability of developing free economic zones in the USSR was deduced
simply from the fact that they were widespread globally. In this respect the
following rhetoric was quite typical (Izvestia, ibidem):
Let us look around at the world that surrounds us, at the role which free 
enterprise zones play there. There are several hundred of them in the 
world. Peoples and governments of 80 states, who appreciate their
sovereignty and originality no less than we do. have decided on the
creation of free zones. They may be found in China. Egypt, Italy, and 
South Korea. In England alone there are as many as 25 of them.
In the course of discussion it became clear that in reality different 
countries had different types of zones. In industrialized countries free trade 
zones, enterprise zones, technological parks and free banking zones usually 
served as instruments for encouraging selected industries and services as well as 
a means of regional planning, with no special bias being placed on incentives to 
foreign capital. In developing countries instead free economic zones mainly
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I. Nevertheless, public scepticism with respect to the free zones remains a factor which 
should not be underestimated, in some regions it may present a particular problem, such as 
in Kaliningrad oblast’ (former Eastern Prussia) where, for historical reasons, the 
population remains very sensitive to any foreign presence.
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existed as export processing zones specifically designed to attract a massive 
inflow of foreign capital. The establishment of clarity in the classification of 
zones meant more than simply satisfying a purely academic desire for precision. 
As each zone type could be seen as representing a particular combination of 
interests and contradictions characteristic of relations between involved 
parties, a clear vision of the specifics of existing zone profiles was essential 
as a premise for choosing the right prototype for future Soviet zones. Thus, it 
became obvious that the experience of developing countries appeared to be more 
relevant to the needs of the Soviet economy as it was also struggling to attract 
foreign investments.
Amazingly, the discussion did little to address itself to the problem
2
of what constituted the political and economic nature of free export zones . The 
arguments of domestic and foreign advocates for the creation of free economic 
zones in the Soviet Union proceeded from the assumption that the zones were 
basically favourable to the host-country’s economy by way of definition. In 
numerous publications the zones were depicted as an efficient instrument for the 
importation of modern technology and management, and an increase in productivity 
and, eventually, living standards. Under the pressure of this propaganda the 
emphasis of the discussion shifted to the debate of technical aspects of zone 
programmes, first of all the type and scale of incentives and privileges to be 
granted to foreign investors, including tax reductions and exemptions, the
2. For details see O.Bogomolov. "Apertures to the business world", Sovetskie projsousy. 
No. 15. 1989; l.lvanov. "Free Economic Zones in the USSR". EKO, No.2, 1990; A.Kuznetsov. 
"Some particularities of Free Economic Zones in the USSR", Voprosy ekonomiki. No. 10, 1991: 
S.Lavrov, S.Prichod'ko, "Some problems of establishing Free Enterprise Zones". Voprosy 
ekonomiki, No.6, 1990.
For foreign representation of the debate see H.Dörrenbächer, "Sonderwirtschaftzonen - 
Ein Beitrag zur wirtschaftlichen Entwiklung der UdSSR?" Osteuropa Wirtschaft, Juni 1991, 
SS.81-105.
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elimination of tariffs and trade barriers, reinforced legal protection of 
property rights, etc.
A lot of attention was given to choosing the right name for the Soviet 
zone to be fixed in law. Clearly, it was more than a question of terminology. 
Initially the term "complex joint enterprise zone" was coined in the Soviet 
economic literature and in some official documents. This name was thought to 
underline the fact that, although aimed at attracting foreign capital, Soviet 
zones would not simply be export processing zones but would assist in broadening 
co-operation between Soviet and foreign firms on the basis of the exchange of 
technology and joint production for both Soviet and external markets. The zones 
were expected to funnel new technologies and management technique to Soviet 
enterprises, help improve the quality of products and make them competitive in 
international markets, and increase the production of consumer goods destined for 
Soviet buyers. In return the zones were to offer foreign firms commercial and 
financial incentives, as well as the simplification of red-tape coupled with the 
availability of a mature infrastructure.
However, the first legal document on Soviet free zones, a Russian 
Supreme Soviet decree dated July 14th 1990, talked about "free enterprise zones". 
This was something more serious than a play on words. The new term reflected a 
dramatic change in economic realities and thinking in the country, the change 
which had revealed itself most acutely in the general drive of regions and 
enterprises towards autonomy and independence. "Complex joint enterprise zones" 
were conceived as conforming to the perceptions of the early years of 
perestroika, i.e., under the assumption that transition to an open economy would 
be a gradual and centrally regulated process providing for the long-term
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coexistence of the planned economy and free market enclaves. Subsequent interest 
in the concept of "free enterprise zone" (FEZ) instead demonstrated, in its own 
way, that republican and local authorities had lost faith in the ability of the 
central power to stabilize the situation and started to look for a solution on an 
individual basis. A major nuance was that in the territory of a free enterprise 
zone all the firms and enterprises, not only foreign owned or joint ventures, 
were to receive special status with respect to property rights, taxes, tariffs, 
employment, etc. This signified that affording a territory the rank of a free 
enterprise zone would have meant withdrawing it from the control of central 
bodies effecting economic planning and administration. It was least for this 
reason that the idea of establishing free zones found very active promoters among 
politicians wishing for the weakening of the centralized state. That was why, as 
President Gorbachev’s (October 1990) decree on foreign investment demonstrated, 
the central authorities insisted on a concept of joint enterprise zones which was 
less radical and more selective in conceding privileges.
This short "comparative linguistics" study would not be complete if it 
were not mentioned that, as Russia became independent, the term "free enterprise 
zones" vanished from its official vocabulary. The notion of "free economic zones" 
has been put into circulation instead. Probably, this updating was designed to 
indicate that in post-communist Russia free enterprise should be the norm 
everywhere. On the other hand, objectively, the new wording stresses that the 
zones in question should be seen as a specialized instrument intended for 
achieving rather limited purposes.
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6.1.3. Economic Romanticism as a Concept of Survival
Official plans to promote free economic zones (FEZ) in Russia received 
very favourable response from regions. The prospect of opening up the regional 
economy within a short period of time and obtaining additional financial 
resources through capital import proved to be of great appeal to local 
leadership. The existing procedure of organizing a FEZ leaves the right to 
initiative with the local authorities. In the absence of a state concept of the 
free economic zone they are encouraged to develop their own projections. What 
consequences might this spontaneous approach have for the development of the 
zones themselves and for the interests of regions and the country?
The polish expert on free economic zones, Professor Jan Monkiewicz 
(1989, p.4, p. 13) once pointed out that the regional authorities had a tendency 
to fall into what he called "provincial economic thinking". He held it typical of 
this to disregard the fact that potentially FEZs carried many threats to the 
national economic regime such as disintegration, the reallocation of resources at 
the cost of other regions, and environmental and social problems. He marked 
"economic romanticism" as another feature of this type of thinking. It usually 
reveals itself in simplified ideas of what should be done in order to attract 
foreign investors and ensure the success of the zone.
These observations came to be very relevant to the situation in Russia, 
in which local interests appear to dominate the process of zone creation. 
Meanwhile, it seems to be quite obvious that any zone-related decision, if it is 
to be constructive, must not ignore certain general considerations following from 
international practice and national vital concerns.
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First, the success of the zone depends on a complex of economic, social 
and geographical factors effective within the country and abroad. It is important 
not to overlook the fact that the free economic zone, taken in general, is a 
mature phenomenon of the international economy. Many different types of zones 
have evolved: free trade zones, enterprise zones and technological parks, export 
producing zones and special economic zones, etc. Each type has its own logic of 
development which cannot be neglected. A clear understanding of the specifics, 
objectives and the mechanism of the zones and their role in the global economy is 
essential to the success of every new zone.
Second, a newly organized zone, particularly specializing in 
manufacturing, immediately enters into competition with hundreds of other zones 
world-wide. As a result the economy of the zone becomes subject to the direct 
influence of international market forces. All the main parameters of the zone, 
including employment, output volume, demand for infrastructural objects, tax 
revenues and other income, become a function of foreign investment which is, at 
the moment at which the zone is created, a quantity both undefined and variable. 
In turn, the foreign investor enjoys the liberty of choosing among a vast variety 
of zones. Rivalry between the latter has resulted in the standardization of 
conditions in which foreign capital shows readiness to come to a zone. It is 
impossible to ignore these standards, including a certain package of incentives, 
especially in view of the extremely high footlooseness of zone firms. At the same 
time it is important to find for every project a specific "argument" that would 
favourably distinguish it from the like.
If at this point we turn to free zone development programmes worked out 
in Russia at a regional level we may see that they reflect distinctly different
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considerations. Let us take as examples the two largest zones: Altai (262,000 
square kilometers) and Chita (432,000 square kilometers).
The document entitled The Concept of the Altai Zone of Free 
Entrepreneurship (1990, p. 3) outlines the following motives for establishing a 
free zone in the region:
...the accumulated enormous lag of the Soviet economy, Altai included, 
economy in comparison to International experience,...the lack of means for 
the substitution of in all parts obsolete equipment, for solving 
ecological and social problems; extremely limited possibilities to retain 
means for productive, social and ecological purposes from the income 
generated In the krai (region].
The same motives lie behind the establishment of the Chita zone. Once again in 
concept documents one reads about the economic degradation of the region, the 
absence of new centralized investment, the lack of infrastructure and energy 
supply, poor social conditions, etc.
Are these good reasons for creating a free economic zone? Judging from 
the above, they certainly are from the point of view of the local authorities. 
When evaluated from any other position, however, the case leads to many doubts.
First, the aforesaid conditions are not unique properties of the two 
regions in question. Many other Russian territories have experienced similarly 
severe consequences of centralized economic administration. Thus, among newly 
proclaimed FEZ-candidates one finds such privileged and relatively well-off 
centres as St.Petersburg and the Moscow satellite-city of Zelenograd which also 
claim that their economy lies in ruins and insist on the urgent injection of 
funds (Voprosy ekonomiki, No. 10, 1992, pp.80-86). If the presence of ailing
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industry and ravaged infrastructure were taken as a sufficient premise for 
creating a free economic zone, the country would soon arrive at an absurd 
situation in which the whole national economy would become a conglomerate of such 
zones. This plainly contradicts common sense. The excessive proliferation of the 
FEZs would mean that either they became a formality as, by definition, the FEZ is 
an exception to a conventional order, or, conversely, there would no longer be a 
single national economy. Clearly, free economic zones should be created where (i) 
zone related expenses can be brought down to a minimum and (ii) pre-requisites 
for attracting foreign investment are most solid. But this suggests that the 
establishment of the free zones should be co-ordinated on a scale wider than 
strictly regional. Otherwise it will be a problem to provide a balance between 
costs and returns as territories with similar starting conditions will begin to 
compete one with another.
Second comes the problem of financing the FEZs. It is well known that 
their preparation require billions. According to available information, in South- 
Asian countries a square kilometre of a free zone’s territory cost on average 25- 
40 million dollars in infrastructural investment alone. In China a square 
kilometre cost 70-80 million dollars (Variants of Conceptions, International 
Association for the Development of Free Economic Zones, Moscow, 1991, p.5). 
Russian FEZs are not going to be cheap either. However, the draft-budgets of some 
Russian zones recall Monkiewicz’s remark on provincial economic romanticism. The 
further to the East of Moscow, the more optimistic are preliminary budget 
outlines. Whereas one of the most developed industrial and cultural centres of 
the country and a would-be economic zone, the city of St.Petersburg, estimated 
its requirements (at 1990 prices) at 7.5 billion roubles, and a tiny but 
prosperous city of Vyborg, situated 70 kilometres to the North-West of
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St.Petersburg, at 2.0 billion roubles, the enormous and backward Altai region 
evaluated its needs at only 2-2.5 billion roubles (Ekonomika i Zhizn' No.2, 
January 1990, p. 10). Moreover, the vice-governor of the Chita region maintains 
(Rossiiskaia gazeta, July 18, 1992):
we don’t need the money, we need a mechanism to compensate us for those 
particularly unfavourable starting conditions we found ourselves under 
when entering the market.
This is, of course, either an illusion or a play upon words. One way or 
another, a compensative mechanism will always become a mechanism for the 
redistribution of funds. Many of the financing blueprints of free economic zones 
(Chita’s included) are based on the idea of "budget credit". According to this, 
regions stop paying taxes to the federal budget for a period of five-ten years, 
whereafter they start returning the debt accrued by the sum of the interest. It 
would be naive to claim that this scheme does not involve a reallocation of 
resources as the burden of carrying the budget during "tax holidays" falls on 
other regions. The same effect will result from any other privilege granted a 
zone, for example a special tariff regime. Minimally two basic observations 
follow from this. First, the decision to organize a zone, even when taken by a 
territory independently, affects interregional relations. In the initial stage 
the zone is financed, directly or otherwise, by other regions. In the long run 
this places extra responsibility and obligations on the zone-creating territory. 
Second, now that relations between various regions of the country have become so 
tense and economic and market disintegration is a reality, the financial aspect 
is more than ever likely to result in still greater antagonism at an 
interregional level. This highly undesirable effect can be avoided only if there 
is confidence that established zones are able to bring tangible results on a 
national scale.
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This leads us, third, to the question of the return of zone projects. 
The host-region is likely to gain in any case, although gains might prove to be 
short-term. At the veiy least, new infrastructural objects may remain the 
property of the region irrespective of how successful the project will prove in 
other respects. For interregional and national economies extra benefits may never 
be forthcoming taking into account how badly many of the announced zones are 
prepared and equipped to become instrumental in attracting foreign investment.
As regards Altai and Chita, this is already quite clear from the 
quotations above. Let us now turn, however, to the locational aspect of these two 
projects. Changes in production technology and the organization of production 
have made it more economical for global companies to locate both intermediate 
production and final assembly of many goods closer to their final markets. Jan 
Winiecki (1991, p.188) cites a recent Austrian research which shows that 40 per 
cent of world exports is shipped no further than 400 kilometres. As for the two 
zones in question, each is situated several thousand kilometres away from both 
the western and eastern borders of the country, and from sea ports. Each has very 
poor communications with the outer world and, all summarized, seems 
geographically to be the least appropriate place for serving as an export 
production platform.
What do the organizers of zones like Chita and Altai then count on? 
Valentin Fyodorov, the Governor of Sakhalin and a fierce proponent of special 
economic zones, is explicit on the point (The International Economy, March /April
1992, p.40):
Sakhalin is ideally suited for the immediate establishment of a Free 
Economic Zone designed to: 1) Develop our natural resources - oil, gas. 
forest products, coal and marine life: 2) Market these resources in East
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Asia, and 3) Put the revenues back Into social infrastructure... Oil 
companies stand to recoup up to $200 billion in the next 20 years on their 
Investment of roughly $20 billion...
Also Chita and Altai, as is clear from documents, rely or their enormous natural
resources. In the territory of Chita o b la s t for example, there is a unique
molybdenum deposit big enough to meet the demand of the global market for years
to come. However, this orientation of Russian free zones towards the extraction
of raw materials is very debatable, and the fourth question mark comes here.
Indeed, international practice does not know another example of this kind.
Special economic zones are usually organized to precipitate the development of
the industrial potential of a country or a region, but so far never to speed up
the extraction of products in high demand on international market such as oil or
gas, or some rare metals. On the contrary, the development of raw materials by
foreign firms is normally subject to additional taxation. In China, for instance,
in which special economic zones play a notable role, joint ventures in mining and
extracting industries have no special advantages. Instead they are taxed at a
maximum rate (Campbell and Adlington, 1988).
Not all of the twelve Russian FEZs are going to specialize in raw 
materials, but the emergence of extraction zones brings about many serious 
problems. Clearly, they are far from the originally endorsed official concept of 
the free economic zone as a means to encourage the inflow of foreign capital, 
modern technology and up-to-date management in order to secure a technological 
break-through in national industry, an increase in the production of high quality
3. It Is not without Interest to confront this recent statement of Sakhalin’s governor to 
that he made in the autumn of 1990:"We won't rush Into gigantic projects. ...There will be 
no oil development on the shelf for the present. There’s no absolute guarantee against a 
gigantic catastrophe. Oil drilling In the sea is very difficult on the whole, and in that 
region there Is ice. It’s unacceptable to take chances" (Pravda, October 24, 1990).
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goods for domestic and external markets, and the improvement of the position of
the country in the frame of the international division of labour (see The
Strategy of Foreign Economic Relations of the USSR, Moscow, 1988). Instead "raw
materials" zones represent a drastic attempt to survive on a regional level in a
situation in which the local authorities have lost faith in government regional
policy and seek to solve their problems on the basis of isolationism. This leads
to very precarious possible consequences; rapid exhaustion of resources,
environmental degradation, and the conservation of a monoculture economic
4structure are just few of them . A conflict with central authorities concerning 
control over natural resources seems very plausible too in as much as 
manipulating hard currency income generated by mineral export remains the last 
resort of the government’s economic policy.
The situation of free economic zones is in itself a strong argument in 
favour of implementing a new policy in this sphere. It should be based on the
4. The multidisciplinary group of independent experts headed by Professor Komkov 
undertook, in winter 1991, an analysis of the economic and technical project of the 
Sakhalin FEZ prepared by the island's administration. In order to raise maximum interest on 
the part of foreign investors the project foresees a very intensive rate of extracUon of 
mineral resources so that within the first 20 years of exploitation the reserves are 
expected to diminish by half. The revenues are to be invested in the development of fishery 
and accompanying industries which are planned to become a basis for the island's economy 
when oil and gas resources are exhausted. The experts expressed serious reservations 
concerning some major components of this design, (i) The two main specializations of the 
zone do not complement one another, as oil deposits lie under the sea. Their exploration is 
likely to interfere with fishing and related industries, and even to cause serious damage 
to marine life thus putting at risk the future of the island's economy. (11) The island has 
not enough human resources and training facilities to enable the rapid development of both 
extracting and fishery sectors as planned. The envisaged rate of oil production will cause 
very profound restructuring of the local economy. The restoration of a more balanced 
structure at a later stage may consume a substantial part of oil money. Hence, claim the 
experts, in its present form the project is able to stimulate a short-term oil boom on the 
island but does not provide for its future unless it is amended to stipulate the more 
equilibrated growth of different industries and tighter integration with the mainland 
economy.
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awareness that, though the regime within the FEZ may be the incarnation of 
liberalism, the idea of the zone has emerged from the practice of state economic 
regulation and worldwide the zones are its instrument. There is a need for a 
state programme determining unified criteria for zone formation in the territory 
of the country. This will provide a possibility to execute methodologically 
coherent expertise in consideration of various proposals and to exclude 
competition between zones. It is nonetheless important that a clear and explicit 
programme will also be helpful in promoting Russian free zones in the 
international arena. Such a programme would be both evidence of the seriousness 
of intentions on the side of the host-country and a valuable source of first-hand 
information for potential investors. This will lead to a climate that both 
protects national interests and reduces risk - and hence costs - to foreign 
investors by moving towards some degree of stabilization of business parameters.
Until recently, slow progress in the development of "raw resources" 
zones has suggested that the Federal authorities are still undecided on this 
issue. On the one hand, the government and the Parliament have issued a sequence 
of decrees, directives and orders designed to facilitate and precipitate the 
establishment of free zones. On the other hand, none of them in reality has been 
implemented. The only privilege that the zones may actually offer the foreign 
investor is a 50 per cent cut in trade tariffs. This dualism can be attributed, 
to an extent, to difficult general conditions in the national economy which 
interfere with many government plans. At the same time this may be taken as an 
indication that the central power would prefer that the zones were more in line 
with their initial design, i.e., that they are developed as technology intensive 
production sites.
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6.2. Achievements and Failures of Free Export Zones
6.2.1. The Mythology of Free Economic Zones
As is clear from the available documents of the Central Planning 
Committee (Gosplan), the State Commission on Foreign Economic Relations (GVK), 
the Ministry of Finance and other ministries, prepared in the period from 1985 
to 1991, the official Soviet viewpoint on the merits and defects of the free 
economic zone as an instrument of foreign economic policy was based on the 
perception that other countries’ experience of them was on the whole positive. 
How well was this opinion founded? Supprisingly, it is not easy to answer this 
question.
To start with, the evaluation of the performance of free zones is
usually based on expert assessments. Quantitative information on zone economies
is scarce and erratic, probably because host-countries prefer to treat it as
5confidential . In several cases some statistics are included in foreign trade 
gross figures and the like data but typically it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to extract it from these sources. Therefore, the studies of FEZs have to rely on 
sporadic data gathered by research missions and individual investigators in 
various zones. This is clearly not sufficient to make extensive comparative 
studies.
On the other hand, it must be admitted that a certain tradition has 
emerged in the depiction of FEZs generally in positive terms. By nature the FEZs 
are a type of expensive commercial enterprise and their patrons, governments and
5. Statistics are conspicuous by their absence even in the case studies contained in the 
UN Centre on Transnational Corporations 1990 and 1991 reports on free economic zones.
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local authorities, have a vested interest in ensuring them a good reputation. But 
there were also other forces with motives for giving good publicity to the zones. 
This played a decisive role in the fate of free economic zones to the extent 
that, at a certain point, they became something like a symbol of an export-led 
economic growth model for developing countries. This happened largely because of 
the efforts of the UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organization) 
which, from the beginning of the 1970s, has been issuing surveys, feasibility 
studies and promotional literature, and organizing workshops on industrial free 
zones and incentives to promote export-oriented industries. It should also be 
noted that the "clients" of free zones, different categories of investors 
including transnational corporations who thanks to the zones obtained additional 
privileges for their off-shore production, were also inducing "Third World" 
countries to experiment in this field.
Finally, it is necessary to note that free economic zones have never 
been the object of a complex fundamental study. The exhaustive and meticulous 
bibliography of international investment literature compiled by the UN Center on 
Transnational Corporations staff (UN, New York, 1988) contains over 70 titles of 
books and articles devoted to FEZs. Acquaintance with these and later 
publications demonstrates that they address themselves mostly to historical 
topics, to host-country conditions and legislation, or to some particular, often 
technical, aspects of the functioning of the zones. Publications attempting to 
contribute to what might be called the political economy of free economic zones 
in the developing countries, especially its international component, are in
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reality rare . The most comprehensive and ambitious attempt to study the
phenomenon of "zones" in the wider context of the international economic regime
was made by Folker Frôbel, Jürgen Heinrichs and Otto Kreye in the monograph New
International Division of Labour. Structural Unemployment in Industrialized
Countries and Industrialization in Developing Countries (1980). Probably for the
first time, the FEZ was examined as a category of the international political
economy (IPE), more precisely, the "new" IPE as they included in the analysis not
only states but also firms and international organizations. They effected a
synthesis of economic, political and social studies offering a unifying concept
that allowed connections to be made between the origination of free economic
zones and important shifts in the global economy and politics in the 70s and the
80s triggered by the evolution of transnational corporations into major agents of
bargaining relationships. As a result they reached what appears to be a very
harsh conclusion (p.292):
The process of the world market oriented Industrialization of the 
underdeveloped countries as determined by the rationality of the 
valorization of capital is found in its ideal-typical form, or to put it 
more concretely, in its most undisguised and brutal expression, in the 
free production zones.
6. A recent monograph on the zones is entitled The Political Economy of China's Special 
Economic Zones. It is written by George T. Crane and was published in 1990. However, 
despite its title, as a study of the political economy of the SEZs. it is very 
disappointing. It is the intricacies of policy and the personal and inter-departmental 
rivalry around the special economic zones within Chinese bureaucratic structures with which 
the book is largely concerned. There is practically nothing in the book on management, 
labour, foreign invested-lnvested factories, the distribution of benefits between the host- 
country and TNCs, subcontracting operations, etc. The author describes his theoretical 
framework as "eclectic" which in reality implies that there is hardly any. As a result of 
his research Crane reaches the conclusion that while the SEZs may not have entirely 
succeeded in accounting terms, "SEZs have fostered a sense of economic vitality that has 
helped energize the country as a whole"(p. 165).
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Although the book did not pass unnoticed (originally written in German, 
it was later translated into English), it has had more influence on research on 
the transference of industry from Western to "Third World" countries and 
"imported" industrialization than on works on free economic zones. More exactly, 
the principle criticism of the zones contained in the book did not have a great 
effect while the criticism of some particular features of the zone economy, for 
example, the exploitation of female labour, was elaborated further very 
intensively by other authors.
Taking into consideration that the export-oriented type of zone is 
likely to become prevalent in Russia and other CIS states, it may be useful to 
verify once more, based on the evidence of the last ten years, some of the 
hypotheses which reflect the most widespread assertions concerning the 
contribution of free economic zones to the economy of the host-countiy. In the 
economic literature four possible merits are most often attributed to the FEZs 
(see, for instance, Maex, 1983; Warr, 1988; Yakovleva, 1988; Uckmar, 1989; Crane, 
1990): (i) the increase in employment; (ii) the inflow of foreign currency, 
leading to improvements in the balance-of-payments; (iii) the transfer of modern 
technology; and finally, (iv) the promotion of national products in international 
markets.
6.23. What Is a FEPZ?
At this point some introductory remarks are necessary. The generic term 
"free economic zone" describes a phenomenon the origins of which may be traced 
back to medieval "city-states" and "free merchant cities". As has already been 
mentioned, nowadays it a has wide but often loose and confusing usage, being
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applied to economic territories and entities very different in their status and 
purposes. In a more traditional sense under the name "free economic zone" a part 
of sovereign national territory is understood in which goods of foreign origin 
can be stored, sold or bought free of usual customs duties, i.e., it is a duty 
free market place or a warehouse which, although situated within national 
borders, for fiscal reasons is regarded as being outside the frontier. Such zones 
exist in many countries (not to mention numerous duty free shops in international 
airports). In Italy, for instance, this status was granted to the cities of 
Livinio and Campione, in the Federal Republic of Germany to two small islands, 
Helgoland and Businen, in Spain to the Canary islands, etc. Less frequently one 
may come across the term "free zones" in the descriptions of special banking and 
insurance zones, enterprise zones and even technological parks.
In the following section, however, attention will be given primarily to 
territories designated to serve as the sites for foreign direct investment in 
industrial production and services. Therefore, in order to avoid ambiguity, the 
term "free export promoting zones" (FEPZ) will in preference be used in this 
chapter. This choice is not incidental. This term most adequately summarizes 
three salient features characteristic of the zones in question. First, that they 
are designed to serve world markets. Second, that they are exempt from certain 
regulations in force for the rest of the territoiy of the host country. And 
finally, that these zones, although explicitly organized in accordance with the 
principle of laissez-fair, are implicitly an extension of and thus subject to the 
economic policy of the host-countiy’s government.
Formally the name FEPZ should be reserved for the specialized 
industrial estate located physically and/or administratively outside the customs
barrier, oriented to export production. Its facilities serve as a showcase to 
attract investors and as a convenience for their establishment, and are usually 
associated with other incentives (Basile and Germidis, 1984, p.20). However, in 
general it is justifiable to extend this name also to separate entities eryoying 
special legislative treatment and designed to function as world market factories,
7
such as "maquiladoras" in Mexico. In fact the FEPZs themselves are 
conglomerations of the world market factories; hence the term FEPZ may be used 
both in the sense of territory and in the sense of status.
6J2.3. Eight Theses on the FEPZ
1. Free export promoting zones are an attribute of underdeveloped
economies.
Territories designated to serve specifically as sites for foreign direct 
investment in industrial production and services, and this is precisely what is 
awaited from free zones in Russia and other Commonwealth member-states, are not 
spread in industrialized countries at all (maybe with the exception of the 
Republic of Ireland). Free economic zones did not gain widespread recognition 
until the mid 70s, when they became strongly associated with a major change in 
the orientation of the development strategy of third world countries from import 
substitution to export promotion. They finally evolved into a symbol of outright 
success in the 80s as a number of less developed countries (LDCs) had spurted 
into the league of newly industrialized countries. Despite many notable failures, 
the proliferation of the free economic zones in the LDCs during those years was
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7. "Maquiladoras”, or border plants, emerged In Mexico in the course of the initiation of 
Mexico’s Border Industrialization Program launched in 1965. They are mainly US assembly 
plants placed along the US border, producing electric and electronic products, textiles, 
foodstuffs, sports equipment and toys, as well as a variety of other goods.
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uneven but ever growing, with only two of them in operation in 1966, 79 in 1975 
(Frôbel et al., 1980, p.306) and over 260 by the end of the 1980s (UNCTC, 1991, 
p.2).
2. Free export promoting zones evolved as a product of haryaining between less 
developed countries and transnational corporations concprninp conditions 
necessary for attracting foreign investment into those countries which initially 
can propose international investors no other advantages than abundant labour 
force.
All FEPZs irrespective of their location are strikingly similar in terms of 
commercial and financial incentives and technical equipment they provide to 
investors. The most important privilege granted to foreign capital there is 
simply the lack of any restrictions on foreign investment and capital transfer. 
This is the case even in those countries in which serious restrictions are placed 
on foreign capital outside the zones. Other common features are the following;
★ Full exemption from duties and taxes, for a certain given period, on all 
machineries and productive equipments as well as on the raw materials and 
components required for production activities in the zone.
*  Income tax exemption for a given period of time.
#  A special period of holiday or reduction of rates on all other direct and 
indirect taxes, surtaxes, surcharges, etc. payable by enterprises not located in 
the free zone.
♦  Freedom from foreign exchange control as well as the assurance of free 
repatriation of earned profits ( in some cases up to a certain rate of 
percentage).
*  Preferential financial facilities, such as provision of short, medium and long 
term loans at advantageous rates, for those investing in the zone.
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#  Preferential tariff rates on the cost of utilities, cost of ground and standard 
factoiy buildings, on transportation costs between the zone and sea-or-airports 
of arrival and departure, etc.
*  The availability of apartment houses, work and repairshops, canteens, medical 
services, banking services, post and telecommunication services, patrol and 
security services, public warehouses, insurance services, recreational 
facilities, etc.; in other words the availability of the whole range of modem 
facilities and services for the benefit of the zone inhabitants and workers.
★ The simplification of red-tape for enterprises operating in the zone through 
"one-stop*1 administration.
The last but not least important general feature of the FEPZ in a LDC 
worth mentioning is a special regime which regulates labour relations within the 
zone. In some countries workers are not allowed to organize trade-unions on 
zones’ territories, in others the zones are exempted from labour legislation, 
especially those articles which deal with the social rights of employees. This 
involves the elimination of minimum wage ordinances, exemption from the
g
obligation for firms to pay social security contributions, etc . Even in the 
People’s Republic of China, which according to its Constitution is a state of 
workers and peasants, enterprises in special economic zones are free to manage 
their labour in accordance with the priorities of profit optimization (Sclair, 
1991).
8. In 1975, an official brochure advertising South Korean free export zones for potential 
investors outlined the following "merits* of labour conditions in the country. "The working 
hours may be extended to sixty hours per week by mutual agreement. An extended work week 
has become a common practice In manufacturing and export Industries". "Foreign investors 
are given special protection from unwanted labour disputes” (quoted in Frobel et al.. 1980, 
p.320). The average working week of a South Korean worker was still 54 hours In 1987 In 
comparison with 44 hours In Japan (1988) and about 42 hours In European medium-to-rlch 
countries.
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The afore outlined similarity of the FEPZs reveals one their very 
peculiar feature: unlike other development programmes the installation of a free 
zone does not presume any particular tailoring of the general design in response 
to the specific needs of a given country. This observation deserves special 
explanation. The above description of the of characteristics the FEPZ in legal, 
spatial and organizational terms, gives a definite idea that the FEPZ is 
skillfully designed to meet any possible needs of a foreign investor, while 
providing no clear answer to the question of why developing countries have found 
this concept appealing. The apparent explanation is that the host countries are 
not so much interested in the zones themselves, but create them for the sake of 
possible positive impact they may have on their development as a whole.
The concept of FEPZs gained popularity with LDCs in the late 70s - 
early 80s as a result of a growing disappointment in the import substitution 
policy. In this situation the introduction of FEPZs seemed to many to be an 
excellent intermediary step facilitating transition towards export oriented 
growth, providing good possibilities for attracting foreign capital, technology, 
know-how and management expertise, and creating new working places, while at the 
same time producing no menace of exposing obsolete national industries to direct 
competition with foreign producers as the total output of a FEPZ was destined for 
export.
However important for the development of a LDC such objectives may be, 
they usually find no direct reflection in the organizational principles forming 
the legal and financial framework for a FEPZ. This inconsistency indicates, in my 
opinion, a serious intrinsic contradiction characteristic of the free export 
promotion zone as an element of international economic relations.
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This contradiction is related to the fact that a FEPZ may emerge only 
as a result of the combination of the interests of the government of a host 
country on the one hand, and multinationals as the main investors of capital 
around the world, on the other. It is apparent that initial considerations 
underlying their decision to cooperate within the framework of the FEPZ cannot 
entirely coincide. The solution to this conflict of interests is inevitably 
predetermined by the inequality in economic potential of the parties involved: in 
bargaining about the conditions of participation in a FEPZ the multinational 
corporations are better placed in so far as, for one thing, they dispose of at 
least three of the assets most desired by the LDCs - investment capital, modern 
skill and technology, and established position in the world markets, for another, 
they are relatively free to choose countries and regions in which to make direct 
investments, while the developing countries are forced to compete with each other 
on the grounds of abundant and easily accessible resources (an unskilled labour 
force most importantly) and under limitations imposed by the geography and 
geology of their national territory.
This means that to be successful a FEPZ should first of all correspond 
to certain demands of the multinational corporations, which raises the question 
which has long been under discussion in academic circles, namely, what makes a 
firm operate abroad. A number of hypotheses explaining this phenomenon with 
varying degrees of sophistication have been introduced in recent years, most 
notable among them briefly discussed in Chapter 2. However, the success of FEPZs 
in developing countries suggests that FEPZs’ experience may be very useful in 
identifying possible answers to this question.
Chapter 6. The 'Political 'Economy of free 'Economic Zones 271
Modem theory suggests that a multinational will invest in the 
following cases.
First, when organizing industrial production in a foreign country promises to be 
more profitable than simply using it as another export market. This situation may 
occur inter alia
♦  if a foreign country has comparative advantages over other countries in which 
the multinational carries production in the cost of labour, raw materials and 
other input factors;
*  if organizing production abroad may supply the company with economies of scale 
and a reduction in transportation costs;
★ if the company, due to less stringent regulations and standards, may reduce 
expenses on environment and labour protection;
*  if through foreign investment the company may circumvent trade barriers, 
penetrate the territory of a closed regional economic organization, and win 
residential status to acquire the privileges attached to it;
if producing overseas helps to disguise profits, and to avoid or decrease tax 
payments.
Second, when foreign investment provides real or potential advantages over 
competitors (local firms as well as other multinational companies). Among 
possible examples the most important may be considered to be those which reflect 
the TNCs’ global approach to market strategy and profit optimization. For 
instance, the necessity of maintaining a worldwide standard for quality may force 
a TNC to establish its own processing unit in a country rich in natural resources 
rather than relying on local suppliers. Again, it may choose a foreign country in 
which to organize a regional centre of production in order to secure better
reception for its products in the neighbouring states. Sometimes a large firm 
considers a presence necessary simply if it notices its main competitors opening 
up new economic territories.
Third, when by doing so the multinational seeks to protect its interests when 
other less costly methods fail to give results or do not seem to be reliable. It 
may be the case, for instance, if a firm does not consider the patent legislation 
of a particular country to be efficient enough to defend its technological 
property, trade name, etc, but at the same time it needs to use this technology, 
trade name, etc. in products to be sold in the countiy in question. Under such 
conditions organizing its own production may help the firm to stay ahead of 
imitators.
In this context a free export promoting zone in a developing country 
may become a success only if it provides foreign investors with at least one of 
the following advantages: cheap factors of production; a proximity to main 
markets and/or sources of supply; a special financial and regulatory 'climate" to 
allow TNCs to capitalize on their "transnationality". The LDCs which are not 
generously endowed with natural resources and do not occupy the strategic 
geographical position in the region have to compensate this, if they want to 
compete for foreign investments, by selling what they poses in abundance not only 
cheap but also in a very attractive packing. This is what FEPZs in general are 
meant for: to export labour force, some raw materials and few locally made 
components which would hardly attract any attention of the multinationals were 
they not supplied under very favourable conditions at the expense of a host 
country.
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This situation might have been in conformity with the rules of the free
interplay of supply and demand had the market been perfect. In reality the very
fact of the existence of the economic enclaves of FEPZ type in developing
countries is itself a strong argument against the hypothesis of highly
9competitive nature of the international capital market . Actually the world 
direct investment market (at least the segment accessible to LDCs) is the 
sellers’ market and the oligopolistic market, dominated by multinational 
corporations and transnational banks. The inequality of buyers and sellers 
declares itself in particular in the fact that a FEPZ ceases to be an integral 
part of the national economy of the host countiy and extends the sphere of 
"supranational" business activities of transnational corporations.
Corporations become "supranational" as a result of the formation of the 
gigantic net of branches and affiliates spread all over the world, the 
accumulation of enormous monetary assets, great progress in communications, and 
loopholes and inadequacies in national regulations. This new quality makes "open" 
economies even more open and vulnerable to outer influences. At the same time it 
has become a factor of external economic policy which can not be ignored by any 
government as a component of competition in international markets. These 
circumstances explain why the US Administration actually has fostered the 
expansion of American corporations overseas by such measures as deferring the tax 
payments on the income earned abroad or the favourable tariff treatment of some
9. This hypothesis In Its condensed form was summarized by H.Grubel as follows-.Foreign 
investment is the result of decentralized decisions by private individuals who are driven 
by the profit-motive. In the resultant voluntary exchange these Individuals gain privately, 
but so do the people in the host-country and the world as a whole. In other words, the 
analysis of foreign Investment has established the fact that it Increases the efficiency of 
global resource allocation through voluntary exchange. Competition among owners of capital 
resources of many countries assures that there are few rents and that the global output 
gains are distributed according to the dictates of efficiency" (H.Grubel. 1982,p.l7).
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products assembled abroad by US firms out of American-made components (Tariff 
regulations 806.30 and 807.00) thus augmenting the attractions of the "off-shore" 
business.
In this connection FEPZs appear to be something more complex than 
solely the outcome of bilateral relations between TNCs and LDCs. The involvement 
of the third party - the regulatory authorities of industrialized countries - 
impose further constraints on the ability of a host country to influence the 
development of FEPZs on its territory.
3 .  F E P Z s  are infiiiffiHent to egtahliah long term relationship with foreign firms 
as the "footlooseness" of foreign capital is coherent to the nature of these 
zones.
The problem of the "footlooseness" of TNCs is one of those very often addressed 
to in the literature on FEPZs. This issue is far from being purely of academic 
interest. For host countries the readiness of the TNCs to leave entails 
additional strains and costs: if it happened the host country would lose not only 
a source of hard currency receipts, working places and a hope for technological 
progress, but would be forced to write off a considerable amount of spending on 
infrastructure and would never recuperate other expenditures on organizing a 
zone.
Statistics which can be helpful in testing the hypothesis of the 
"footlooseness" of TNCs is rather scarce. In Warr’s Export Processing Zones one 
may find an analysis of aggregate economic performance of Bataan FEPZ 
(Philippines) (Warr, 1988, p. 11). The total number of firms occupying the zone at 
the beginning of the years 1979 to 1982 remained almost constant, increasing
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from 51 to 52 firms during 1980. But during 1979, four firms entered the zone and 
four other left. In 1980, five entered and four left. During 1981, three entered 
and three left and during 1982 two entered and four left. All in all this 
signifies that in the duration of only four years the composition of the zone had 
changed by impressive 56 per cent.
Even in the absence of comprehensive statistics it looks possible 
through deduction to arrive at the conclusion that firms in FEPZs are especially 
mobile as, actually, the zones are purposely designed to be in conformity with 
what may be called "easy come - easy go" principle. Ceteris paribus a foreign 
investor would be fastened more firmly to those outlets which propose some 
special advantages either not easily available or too resource-consuming to be 
developed elsewhere. In contrast to this the FEPZs are all cut after the same 
model and provide standardized package of incentives, thus being intentionally 
deprived of national features. As such they embody the previously immaterial 
category of an extra-territorial (in economic terms) world production (more 
precisely, assembly) centre.
When a foreign firm comes in a FEPZ it finds there factory buildings 
which it can lease on advantageous terms, workers ready to work overtime and 
under other discriminative conditions, local administration eager to provide 
maximum hospitality (which does not mean, of course, that foreign firms do not 
encounter bureaucratic obstacles). The firm installs machinery which it has 
bought in the international market and organizes production under the parent 
company’s license and trade mark on the basis of imported components for the 
purpose of export. These favourable conditions could have provoked the investor
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into a long term deal had not they be available also in at least 29 other 
countries. This condition changes the situation to the opposite.
The "footlooseness" of TNCs in free export zones can be also attributed 
to the fact that TNCs* interests in the zones concentrate mainly around cheap 
labour force. This attraction is very unstable by nature, as comparative labour 
advantages may change very rapidly under the influence of a variety of social and 
economic factors. A general tendency towards diminution of the competitive 
importance of unit-labour cost10 increases the vulnerability of the FEPZs by 
making foreign investors even more sensible for the slightest changes in labour 
conditions there. It is quite comprehensible that for companies with highly 
labour intensive technologies the relationship between investment and social 
stability tends to be stronger than for companies in industries which are not 
labour intensive11, as the former are more dependent on the state of social 
environment.
Working conditions in FEPZs in LDCs are usually very tough. Employees 
are underpaid and overexploited (this aspect will be treated in detail below). 
This has become possible because of the general underdevelopment of the countries
10. In Detroit of the total direct cost of assembling a car, labour's portion is now a mere
10 per cent to 15 per cent, down about 20 per cent since the early 1980s. "We have seen a 
recognition that unit-labour costs by and large are not the big problem", says an 
automotive analyst In his interview to Business Week. "If it's not the problem for the 
Industrial naUons. it's not the advantage for the developing naUons." (Business Week. 
January 16, 1989, p. 19).
11. Lars H.Thunell failed to find empirical support to this hypothesis in case of a number 
of Latin American countries (see L.Thunell, 1977, pp.77-79), which does not, however, 
refute it In general because of the weaknesses of his methodology: a) he examined only 
three countries; b) he considered only major political changes such as the replacement of 
ruling parties, neglecting less evident events which nonetheless could be very decisive for 
the social climate as a whole.
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in question and to the deliberate efforts of host governments. Intensive work in 
combination with low social protection make the situation in the zones 
potentially unstable: on the one hand there is a constant threat of labour unrest 
(even in China were the Constitution was amended in 1982 to ban strikes, Shekou’s 
special economic zone alone had 21 work stoppages and strikes on 1986 and 1987, 
resulting from managements violations of contracts and labour regulations), on 
the other hand, in the absence of trade unions and the like organizations (their 
activities are usually banned within the zones) there is no organizational 
mechanism to arrange necessary contact between workers and employers in a 
critical situation.
Is there a possibility for a LDC to find an "antidote" against TNCs’ 
"footlooseness"? As will be shown in this chapter elsewhere, the pure escalation 
of financial privileges does not help much. A lot depends on TNCs’ attitude 
towards a particular zone. If the TNC regards it simply as another suitable site 
for one of its world factories, "footloose" approach will be an integral part of 
its strategy. On the contrary, the TNC will demonstrate more loyalty and 
tolerance if it regards zone’s activities to be a stage in opening up the 
internal market of the host country as is the case in China and India in which 
enormous but undeveloped markets are gravitation centres for foreign companies.
4. In establishing a FEPZ the balance of costs and gains is especially 
precarious.
The cost of a zone is crucial for any host-country. The costs of establishing and 
running a FEPZ are possible to be systemized in two categories. The first may be 
called direct capital costs and it covers all money spent on supplying the zone 
with an infrastructure, factory buildings and other necessary facilities plus an
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international advertising campaign, the training of officials, etc. These are 
actual costs as opposed to what may be called missed gains which constitute the 
second category and comprise the revenues which the state could have received if 
firms in the zones had had no financial and tariff privileges.
Direct costs may achieve very substantial amounts. The case study of 
FEPZs in 26 countries undertaken by the experts of the Institute for Oriental 
Studies of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR has shown that host countries 
spent at least four dollars in investments in infrastructure and other zone 
facilities in exchange for every single dollar of foreign direct investment. In 
China, for example, initial zone investments have totaled 22 billion dollars with 
the result of only four billion dollars of foreign direct investment attracted to 
four special economic zones of the country by 1989 (Socialisticheskaya 
Industriya, November 30, 1989, p.3). Taking into consideration that more than one 
half of the sum of the initial investments was financed from foreign sources 
through the distribution of bonds, shares and through direct bank credits, the 
actual input/output ratio should be estimated in the Chinese case even higher. 
From the economic point of view such expenses may be justified only if these 
special economic zones function for a very long period of time with a very high 
rate of efficiency. The above calculations, if they are correct, entail that host 
countries become in a sense the hostages of their own FEPZs: after all the 
gigantic investments made they cannot risk losing foreign investors. As any large 
investment project, a FEPZ, once launched, tends to gain its own momentum 
threatening to escape the control of its initiators.
More arbitrary are the evaluations of the necessary scope and type of 
financial assistance to be rendered by the host country government to firms
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active in the zone. From the very beginning such assistance (interest subsidies, 
state guaranties, tax advantages, interest advances, etc.) was envisaged as one 
of the main attractions of a FEPZ. After a lapse of time two facts have become 
evident. The first and most obvious is that incentives in the form of direct 
money transfer or subsidies (like the interest rate subsidy) have proved to be 
more effective than non-fund using incentives (like accelerated depreciation). 
The second is more striking. Numerous examinations and interviews have shown 
that foreign investors are not inclined to place too much importance on these 
types of incentives at all, considering as more decisive other factors. Ch. Oman 
in his notable New Forms of International Investment in Developing Countries 
(1984, p. 73) comes to the conclusion that
the overall state of the host economy and the world-wide business cycle 
are more important than the regulatory or incentive-oriented nature of 
host-govemment investment policies per se.
According to A.Basile (1989, p.4), an OECD expert on export processing 
zones, potential investors give considerations in the first place to political 
stability in the recipient country, to the attitude of the government and the 
population as a whole to private investments, to the tradition of respecting 
international agreements existing in the country. Some zones (in India, for 
instance), which are generally acknowledged to be successful, offer very limited 
tax advantages to the investors.
It would be wrong, however, to deduce that multinationals are 
completely indifferent to financial conditions prevailing in a FEPZ. Yet, 
apparently, there are circumstances making them less receptive to such 
incentives, which means that those LDCs especially generous in providing them 
have in fact been running unnecessary costs. To a certain extent the attitude of
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multinationals may be explained by the existing practice of avoiding double 
taxation which ensures that revenues not taxed in the host country will be taxed 
in the resident country.
More important is the assumption which one quite often comes across in 
books on multinational corporations that the latter have developed an efficient 
system for the intrafirm redistribution of financial resources free from public 
control and monitoring. For obvious reasons exact figures are not available, but 
considering the data which can be judged to reflect the respective activities 
indirectly, it may be safely maintained that LDCs face a very serious challenge 
which, in the case of developing an export promoting zone, may cause a 
considerable income drain for the state.
5. The potential of FEPZs to trickle down modem technology and know-how to the 
mainland industries of host-countries is strongly limited.
Access to modem technology remains one of the highest priorities of developing 
countries. It is not by chance, therefore, that FEPZ projects inspired high 
expectations of help to bridge the technological gap between the LDCs and 
industrialized countries. But it did not take long to realize that the simple 
fact of functioning of a number of individual foreign-owned high-tech enterprises 
does not entail any improvement in the technological level of an economy as a 
whole. Under these conditions the disappointing remarks concerning the role of 
foreign direct investments in the technology distribution process in the LDCs, 
which may be found in the UN Center on TNC report Transnational Corporations and 
Technology Transfer (1987, pp.33, 35 and the following), are not unexpected. Also 
a number of special studies on export promoting zones and joint ventures in the
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LDCs have given the same results (see, for instance, Campbell and Adlington, 
1988; Warr, 1988; Dorrenbacher, 1991).
It is not difficult to deduce what makes TNCs so reluctant to share
modern technology. Patents, know-how, trade marks and management skills are
commonly evaluated by corporations as their most important "intangible" assets.
Technology, especially that which originates in-house, appears to be the major
source of competitive advantage for multinationals, maintains one of the studies
(Bertin and Waytt, 1988, p.23). Managers in TNC headquarters are well aware,
though, that under certain circumstances this advantage tends to be very fragile
as world-wide the army of imitators is ready to exploit ideas that do not belong
them and that cost them nothing to develop. For this reason, and also because the
resources demanded for protecting technological rights abroad are enormous in
terms of organizational and financial outlay, the transnational corporations show
an obvious propensity for transferring R and D results "internally", i.e. through
the net of controlled companies. This implies that foreign affiliates are not
established in the FEPZ to serve as technological ”supermarkets” but, on the
contrary, to provide the TNCs* R and D with the highest rate of protection. The
transfer of imported technology into other firms in the same and/or closely
related industries is highly restricted by foreign partners through special
clauses or through daily business practice. Even when participating in joint
ventures, the TNCs take measures not to loosen their control over technology.
Local partners, as has happened in the PR of China, often complain of obtaining
no real access to key technological processes. As R.Mellick (1985, pp.25-26)
notes in respect of Indonesian/Japanese joint ventures
The most important determinant of the number of expatriate managers was 
the degree of sophistication or complexity of the product the firm
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produced. In industries such as textile, pharmaceutical, galvanized steel 
and nylon Indonesian managers were conspicuous by their absence.
In the economic literature two possible ways in which foreign companies 
may contribute to the technological development of a host country are mentioned 
most often: (i) through training of national workers, engineers and management 
and (ii) through so-called "backward linkages". But it is not difficult to 
discover that both variants are deeply inconsistent with the nature of the FEPZ 
as a phenomenon and that the lack of serious progress in the field is not in the 
least incidental.
One of the main characteristics and attractions of the FEPZ the is the
easy availability of a cheap but disciplined and hard-working labour force.It is
cheap because it is poorly educated and has no previous experience in
professionalized work although the literacy rate can be relatively high. These
qualities match the demand of many industries, ranging from textiles to
semiconductors, which still rely upon labour dependent technologies. The zones
provide them with an extremely advantageous opportunity for locating primitive
12assembly production . That this is really the case is supported by the fact that 
in the 1970s the annual amount of foreign direct investments per working place 
was less than 2,000 dollars (Document UNCTAD TD/B/C.2/211/Rev. 1, p.22). However, 
as it is rightly stressed by the authors of the The New International Division of 
Labour, this does not imply, as it is often claimed, that FEPZs are destined only
12. For Asian FEPZs it was found that in fact two Industrial categories (wearing apparel 
other than footwear, and radio, television and communications equipment) accounted for more 
than half of all industrial enterprises. Product categories of secondary importance were 
spinning, weaving and finishing textiles, knitting mills, and the manufacturing of sporting 
and athletic goods. The specific products made in the bulk of the enterprises were semi­
conductors, radios and various kinds of garments (Maex, 1983, p.28).
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for labour-intensive production. Capital-intensive production is equally as open 
to operation by unskilled and semiskilled workers.
Modem production technology allows the separation and allocation of 
operations to unskilled and semiskilled labour at all levels of 
production. It Is precisely those production processes that can be 
operated on either a capital-intensive.i.e. automated, or labour-intensive 
basis,I.e. performed manually, which are often allocated to an unskilled 
labour-force in world market factories since both automation as well as 
the employment of unskilled labour requires the breaking down of the 
labour process into its most rudimentary parts (Frobel et al.. 1980, 
p.328).
The bulk of the FEPZs’ workers are thus engaged in simple routine 
operations which they can normally learn in a few weeks or even days. Hence, 
foreign companies investing in the FEPZs face no need to improve the quality of 
the labour force. On the contrary, when the cost of labour rises, they tend to 
move away to other countries as the example of South Korea, Singapore and Hong- 
Kong has proved.
There is substantial evidence to confirm the above assertion. Companies 
in the zones do not seek to consolidate their staff as is usually the case with 
highly-skilled professionals. The bulk of employees is hired on the basis of 
monthly or even daily contracts. The average period of employment of a worker in 
a zone is about three years. This turnover hardly provides any diffusion of 
skilled manpower within a national economy as: (i) workers in the zone are mostly 
occupied with very simplified assembly operations and as result receive no 
training which may prove useful beyond the frame of a particular conveyor 
technology; (ii) the majority of the zone’s workers are women who usually stop 
working at an early age after getting married. It is not surprising that the
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author of a study on the technological effects of foreign direct investments in 
South Korea (Doo-Soon Ahn, 1983, S.213) has arrived at the conclusion that
there Is no evidence for diffusion effects of technology through mobility 
of workers and technological personal between FDI-firms and other firms.
The concept of "backward linkages" assumes that by placing orders with 
local businessmen, and demanding high quality and reliable supplies, TNCs force 
local producers to modernize and improve their operations. However, once again 
evidence contradicts such optimistic assumptions. From the survey of 33 
enterprises in the free economic zones of the Philippines and Malaysia it was 
discovered that almost 70 per cent of the zones’ enterprises bought less than 
1/10 of raw materials, components and parts on the domestic markets ( Maex, 1983, 
p.39). In 1978 in the FEPZ of Penang (Malaysia) zone enterprises imported 87 per 
cent of raw materials from abroad, 9,6 per cent from firms within the FEPZs and 
only 3,2 per cent was supplied by the domestic economy. In electronics in 
particular the share of domestic supplies was negligible. In Sri Lanka local 
supplies for FEPZs’ garment manufacturers were also very marginal and mostly 
confined to services and packing material. The case of Masan zone in the Republic 
of Korea in which local contents component runs at about 44 per cent in 1991 is 
rather an exception.
TNCs in free export promoting zones in LDCs prefer to rely on their 
international partners as suppliers and do not invest in local producers as the 
TNCs find it expensive to raise the quality of their products to acceptable 
levels. Reluctance to rely upon local raw materials also derives from the global 
strategies of the corporations involved. Parent firms wish to preserve a high 
level of international mobility for their processing operations and developing 
long-term commercial relationships with local suppliers in the host countries
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does not serve this goal. If the corporation wishes to retain the capacity to 
relocate its processing activities internationally at short notice it is more 
expedient to purchase these inputs from the cheapest reliable international 
source. They are also not inclined to sell technology through patents for the 
reasons discussed earlier.
6. FEPZs help increasing employment in host-countries. though their role in 
improving the quality of labour force is limited.
One of the main reasons for the enthusiasm of host countries about FEPZs was the 
assumption that they could assist in solving the two-digit rate of unemployment 
problem typical of the great deal of developing countries by serving as export 
outlets for an excess of labour. As such they have quite a good record, having 
absorbed as many as 1,5 million workers by the end of 1980s (UNCTC, 1990, p.l). 
The rate of job creation in the zones was usually higher than in mainland 
economies. In Jamaica, for example, in 1981-1984 employment rose by only 2,4 per 
cent as compared with 1,100 per cent in export promoting zones. These impressive 
figures, however, should not conceal the fact that the FEPZs still account for a 
less than moderate share in the host countries’ total employment ( from 15 per 
cent in Malaysia to below one per cent in Jamaica) (Employment Effects of 
Multinational Enterprises in Export Processing Zones in the Caribbean, 1986, 
p.53). Employment effects of FEPZs may be seriously diminished by the following
*  the demand for workers in the FEPZ is a function of foreign capital and as such 
is unpredictable and unstable;
*  the employment has a specific structure with the bias towards young female 
labour, thus leaving almost intact other categories;
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¥  owing to restricted horizontal integration of zone enterprises with mainland 
enterprises the augmentation of employment in the former has only an 
insignificant multiplier effect for the host economy as a whole.
One remarkable fact deserves special attention. If to compare the 
characteristics of the typical worker employed in FEPZs nowadays and twenty years 
ago no tangible changes can be discovered Thus, recent articles on Chinese zones 
demonstrate that there is no considerable difference in the structure of the 
labour force of a zone irrespective of how long the zone has been in operation. 
Such kind of stability suggests at least two conclusions. First, that the status 
of the woman has not changed much in developing countries. Women there have fewer 
than men chances to change there living conditions and female labour is still 
considerably less paid than male. Second, that years and novelties in technology 
have not affected the orientation of TNCs’ investments at the cheapest and less 
protected sector of the reserve labour army of the LDCs.
Some authors claim that the discussion on working conditions in FEPZs 
has often not reflected familarity with the employment conditions and wages 
existing outside the FEPZs in the developing countries concerned and has ignored 
the obvious fact that unless workers were better off being employed in a FEPZ 
than otherwise, FEPZ firms would find it impossible to hire. References are often 
made to investigations which have revealed that a zone worker’s income in 
national currency was as a rule equal or higher than that of a worker employed at 
a firm outside the zone either because of relevantly higher salaries or 
favourable foreign currency/national currency exchange rate (if zone workers were 
paid in hard currency).
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♦  owing to restricted horizontal integration of zone enterprises with mainland 
enterprises the augmentation of employment in the former has only an 
insignificant multiplier effect for the host economy as a whole.
One remarkable fact deserves special attention. If to compare the 
characteristics of the typical worker employed in FEPZs nowadays and twenty years 
ago no tangible changes can be discovered. Thus, recent articles on Chinese zones 
demonstrate that there is no considerable difference in the structure of the 
labour force of a zone irrespective of how long the zone has been in operation. 
Such kind of stability suggests at least two conclusions. First, that the status 
of the woman has not changed much in developing countries. Women there have fewer 
than men chances to change there living conditions and female labour is still 
considerably less paid than male. Second, that years and novelties in technology 
have not affected the orientation of TNCs’ investments at the cheapest and less 
protected sector of the reserve labour army of the LDCs.
Some authors claim that the discussion on working conditions in FEPZs 
has often not reflected familarity with the employment conditions and wages 
existing outside the FEPZs in the developing countries concerned and has ignored 
the obvious fact that unless workers were better off being employed in a FEPZ 
than otherwise, FEPZ firms would find it impossible to hire. References are often 
made to investigations which have revealed that a zone worker’s income in 
national currency was as a rule equal or higher than that of a worker employed at 
a firm outside the zone either because of relevantly higher salaries or 
favourable foreign currency/national currency exchange rate (if zone workers were 
paid in hard currency).
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But the question is not whether zone workers’ salaries are above or 
below the average rate for a host country but whether they cover the costs of the 
reproduction of the workers. Being employed by a zone firm local workers get 
involved in technological processes which might have no analogous in traditional 
industries dominating outside the zones, in the terms of the intensity of labour 
first of all. A historical parallel suggests itself at this point. After 
implementing conveyor methods of production Hemy Ford was forced after a while, 
for the first time in American history, to introduce guaranteed minimum salary 
rate at $5 a day to compensate the drastic discrepancy in labour intensity at his 
plant and in the rest of automotive industry. The intensity gap between zone and 
non-zone enterprises could hardly be less profound which implies that any direct 
comparison of average FEPZ earnings with average mainland earnings can be only 
deceptive if it does not refer to comparative working conditions.
Another consideration one can scarcely avoid when analyzing working
conditions in LDCs’ free export promoting zones is as follows: companies from the
countries of "enlightened" capitalism are eager to capitalize on the backwardness
of their partners and are quick to apply to the 19th century methods of
13exploitation . This once again confirms the limited nature of the FEPZ as a 
showcase for modem capitalist technology, skill and management and adds support 
to the hypothesis that FEPZs have been developed to utilize one very specific
13. A Business Week article (October 31, 1988, pp. 16-17) provides a rare opportunity to 
obtain an Insider view of labour conditions In a FEPZ. The article deals with Chinese 
zones, where a Business Week reporter encountered the twin horrors associated with old- 
style capitalism - child labour and illegal working hours. Chinese InvesUgators discovered 
children as young as 10 making toys, electric gears, garments, and artificial flowers. They 
were forced to work as long as 14 and 15 hours a day at salaries ranging from S 10 to $ 31 
a month. The Chinese press had documented numerous such stories.
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factor available in developing countries - a cheap labour force - under 
conditions extremely advantageous for multinational corporations.
7. Increase in zone exports does not imply the strengthening of a host-countrv’s 
national competitiveness in world markets.
FEPZs have made a certain contribution to the growth of industrial exports from 
host countries. Thus, in the Republic of Korea, FEPZs exports accounted, in 1986, 
for around four per cent of the total exports of manufactures. In the Philippines 
and Sri Lanka in 1980, FEPZs accounted for 12,3 per cent and 25,8 per cent of 
the total exports of manufactures. Labour intensive off shore production by TNCs 
accounted for roughly ten per cent of the manufactured exports in Hong Kong and 
for 40 per cent in Singapore (Maex, 1983, p. 18).
Especially impressive are the figures of electronics industry export 
from Malaysia, in which about 90 per cent of the production are concentrated in 
FEPZs. In the 70s the electronics industry grew at an average annual rate of 
13.3 per cent, and Malaysia became the world’s largest exporter of semi­
conductors, overtaking Singapore. Export earnings from the industry increased 
from M$ 15.7 million or 1.8 per cent of total export earnings of the
manufacturing sector in 1970 to M$ 2.7 billion or 37.5 per cent of total
manufactured exports in 1980, and M$ 7.0 billion or 53.3 per cent of total
manufactured exports in 1986. In 1987, exports reached M$ 16.7 billion.
Employment had increased from less than 600 in 1970 to 85,000 in 1985 (Lee and 
Fong, 1988, p.25).
Exports statistics, however, are completely misleading if to be taken 
as the indicator of free export zones as sources of gain for national economies.
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Because of negligible domestic component of FEPZs’ products, exports is almost 
balanced with imports, resulting in low net foreign exchange earnings. These 
earnings are even further diminished as a result of the repatriation of profits 
and capital by TNCs. Actually, profits and interest payments may account for 
substantial portions of the value added by FEPZ firms owing to privileges granted 
to them. In general, according to UN statistics, the share in value added by FEPZ 
enterprises does not exceed 25 per cent of the total value of goods produced or 
assembled there (CTC Reporter, 1986, No.21, p.55). An Asian Regional Team for 
Employment Promotion ( ARTEP, Bangkok) report showed that, in 1981,51 per cent 
of total value added (net production value) was accounted for by capital service 
(interest) and profits. The importance of potential resource flow from the host 
country is demonstrated in the case of Sri Lanka for garments, which had a value 
added ratio of only 0.28 and a foreign component in equity and loans of about 68 
per cent. Furthermore, in Malaysia, in a case study of two typical FEPZ firms in 
electronics and garments, profit rates on investment capital seemed very high in 
comparison to benefits accruing to the government and to workers (Maex, 1983, 
p.38). It is also characteristic of FEPZ enterprises that they prefer not to 
reinvest the income in the zones and tend to repatriate even amortization 
accumulations.
Taxes raised from FEPZ firms, for the reasons discussed earlier, are 
generally small. Tariffs for the utilization of the infrastructural facilities 
also can not yield a lot with subsidies being one of the incentives for 
investment. The major source of gain for host countries are foreign exchange 
earnings of those employed in the zones. In South Korea, Malaysia and the 
Philippines they account for one half of the total amount which only confirms 
that for the host countries the FEPZs represent a form of indirect labour export
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(UNCTC, 1991, p.331 and further). But this source is originally confined by low- 
wage policy inalienable of any FEPZ.
8. FEPZs can have contradictory effects on the regional economic structure of the 
host-countrv.
One of the qualities often attributed to FEPZs is that they may serve as a 
vehicle of strengthening the regional structure of a host country acting as an 
industrial pole for depressed or underdeveloped areas. Their alleged contribution 
to regional development may be suggested as threefold: through the accelerated 
development of infrastructure; through the creation of new working places at zone 
enterprises; and through the general revival of the regional economy and the 
labour situation because of the zone stimulated demand for services and to 
cooperative ties between local and zone firms. This explains why local 
authorities usually actively support the plans of the implementation of FEPZs. 
The example of Shenzhen in China, which has developed within only ten years from 
a provincial town of seven thousand inhabitants to a modern industrial city with 
a population of one million spread on the territory thirty times the size it 
originally was, shows very clearly the possibilities a special economic zone may 
open for the region.
On a national scale the efficiency of FEPZs’ contribution to regional 
development seems less indisputable. In fact, almost every regional development 
programme ever conceived or implemented has been a ready victim for criticism as 
excessively capital-consuming and too unreliable in respect to results. These 
reproaches may well be addressed to FEPZ projects, even more so that they are 
meant to attract foreign capital in the first place thus multiplying the cost and 
uncertainties of regional planning.
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The fact that FEPZ construction programs are extremely expensive have 
been mentioned earlier in this chapter. However, there are reasons to think that 
the degree of the utilization of infrastructure in FEPZs in general fails to
reach its optimum parameters because of the special incentive regime effective
there. As one research argues (China’s Special Economic Zones, 1986, p.62)
Under a market system entrepreneurs tend to make use and take advantage of 
existing social overhead capital. Spatially this tendency creates 
agglomeration. Firms are set up closely to each other where social 
overhead capital already exists. Agglomeration leads to centralization of 
development which extends outward continuously. The reverse is true in 
Shenzhen. The conditions relieve entrepreneurs from having to consider the 
availability of infrastructure when choosing a location. As a result 
developing projects are dispersed all over the special economic zone.
This inefficiency may be short term: as more and more firms enter a zone the 
usage of social overhead capital should increase. Another thing is that zone 
authorities, in anticipating future unpredictable developments, have to assume 
maximum demand and therefore over-provide, thus running constantly extra costs.
Whatever extensive are the incentives they cannot guarantee by 
themselves attracting foreign investment to regional development areas. As was 
shown in this chapter earlier, the general investment climate is often more 
important a factor. This circumstance may play a crucial role especially in cases 
when the zones are organized as a result of local initiative. Lack of favourable 
social and economic environment is able not only to undermine such initiatives 
but also depreciate the investments made. The experience of Belgium, for example, 
demonstrated that the creation of the Common Market was the primary factor that 
induced the great increase in foreign investment in the country from the 1950s to 
the 1970s, with firms from non-EEC countries trying to substitute investment for 
trade, while a sophisticated package of regional development incentives only
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helped to increase the total propensity to invest in underdeveloped regions (see 
G.Thoman, 1973, pp.33-35). An OECD report on foreign investment in Turkey has 
registered a steady increase of capital inflow to the country resulting from 
steps led to general improvement in investment conditions, such as the Turkish 
government joining "Declaration on International Investment and Multinational 
Enterprises" initiated by OECD. At the same time regional incentives have helped 
to channel mere 20 per cent of the total flow to "underdeveloped" regions of 
Eastern Turkey (OECD, 1983, p. 17, p.26).
Studies on regional planning have revealed a strong inverse correlation 
between variables such as profitability, productivity and demand and the 
propensity of a particular firm to invest in depressed areas. Conversely, those 
firms of a given industry that tend to select locations in the depressed areas 
are more labour intensive than those that invest in "normal" areas.
As regards the assistance of FEPZs in solving the problem of 
employment, as once was pointed out (Frobel et al., 1980, p.367),
the crcatlon of specific job opportunities In export oriented producUon 
cannot be equated with a general reducUon in employment.
Zone industries’ preferential demand for young female workers is not 
capable of effecting a reduction of unemployment among the male population as a 
whole or among older women. At the regional level the presence of export 
promoting zone may even aggravate the demographic and employment situation, as on 
the one hand the structure of the population tends to be distorted through the 
over-presence of women of a particular age category leading to the emergence of 
"cities of women", an unfavourable urban phenomenon already present in some 
industrial areas; on the other hand the zones act as gravitation points for
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unemployed from all over the country who concentrate in the neighbouring areas. 
The Chinese zones again may serve as a good example. In 1989, as economic 
recession hit the country, millions of unemployed rushed to south provinces in 
hope for getting job in the special economic zones there despite the ban on the 
free movement of the labour force existing in the country. This great "exodus" of 
unemployed put veiy serious problems before local authorities and accelerated the 
initiation of a nation-wide programme aimed at retaining rural population in 
countryside areas.
Zone implications for the development of regional industrial potential 
are also debatable. There are few doubts that the presence of a FEPZ promotes the 
raise of consumer demand for services and dwelling on the part of the zone firms’ 
employees arrived from other parts of the country. At the same time, consequent 
upon the lack of backward linkages between zone and local industries, the 
expansion of local production does not take the shape of a break-through in 
quality and technology but is effectuated on the basis of previously assimilated 
technologies which in the case of developing countries tend to be obsolete. The 
multiplier effect of the zone is also diminished as a result of special 
consumption pattern of zone employees who have high propensity to accumulation 
(young female workers, for instance, go to free zones with the intention to make 
savings for their future matrimonial life).
In some cases FEPZs may cause adverse social consequences especially 
there where local currencies are nonconvertible and the market of goods and 
foodstuffs payable in these currencies is scarce, as is actually true of many 
developing countries. Under these conditions the possession of a hard currency is 
a serious advantage in the terms of well-being, dividing people into two
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categories: those who through their free currency assets have access to better 
quality goods, foodstuffs and services and those who have not. This situation may 
cause even more profound social strains in countries with long term egalitarian 
tradition. Another undesirable consequence is the inevitable development of a 
black market in foreign exchange, goods and foodstuffs, as well as of smuggling. 
Host countries take different measures in order to prevent this development or 
diminish its scale, including the construction of internal borders as the Chinese 
did by encircling Shenzhen with another "Great Wall" this time made of 80 
kilometres of barbed wire. This measure and the like are hardly able to change 
radically the social climate around the zones as long as economic preconditions 
for tension and criminality are preserved.
6.3. Some Problems of Establishing Free Economic Zones in Russia
Theaboveargumentprovidesgroundsformaintainingthatthephenomenon 
of the free export promoting zone has taken its present shape as a result of the 
interplay of three major factors. One was the aspiration of the governments of 
developing countries to open new outlets for excess labour. On the other hand, 
new technological developments opened the possibility of breaking down the 
manufacturing process first into labour-intensive and capital-intensive phases, 
and then splitting the former into its most basic parts to enable the utilization 
of the unskilled labour force. Finally, the progress in transportation and 
communication systems allowed the reduction of transportation and management 
costs to a minimum, making a world-wide production scheme profitable.
If we specify - in general terms - the transnational corporation and 
the government of the host-country as two main participants in the FEPZ, their
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prospective gains are completely different. The former, by organizing production 
in the zone, enjoys the advantages of a "cheap" and abundant labour force, the 
favourable geographical position of the zone, and the almost unlimited freedom of 
entrepreneurship apart from the privileges associated with off-shore business.
The gains of the host-country are predominantly indirect. In fact, it 
is possible to maintain with a considerable degree of certainty only that FEPZs 
provide labour opportunities for a specific category of workers as described 
above while other tested consequences such as the dispersion of technology and 
know-how, the revitalization of national industry through the backward linkages 
of zone firms, contribution to national regional programs, and the improvement of 
the balance-of-payments of the host-country are either untraceable or play a 
substantially less important role than that often attributed to them. This can be 
explained by the enclave nature of the FEPZs and their outward rather than inward 
orientation. In a sense, the export promoting zone is a well equipped selling 
point for the labour force more than anything else.
The enclave character of FEPZs also suggests that it is wrong to expect 
that participation in the world market through the zones will help the host- 
country to find a more appropriate niche there or to identify itself in the 
international division of labour. The specialization of a zone, being defined by 
the investment decisions of TNCs which reflect their own global profit 
optimization strategy, does not usually reflect any specific quality of the host- 
country’s national economy. While the FEPZs fail to integrate the mainland 
economy of host- countries into the world market they exert considerable pressure 
on their finances and are likely to provoke an increase in their external debt.
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One of the most frequently stated purposes of establishing the free 
export promoting zone is to learn the newest methods of capitalist management and 
to adopt the latest developments of modern capitalism. However, zone capitalism 
bears only a slight resemblance to the western pattern with features such as the 
social state, sophisticated labour legislation, etc. The zones look more like the 
preserves of "old time capitalism", providing foreign capital with the complete 
freedom to exploit local labour coupled with the exemption from state monitoring 
and control.
FEPZs cannot be regarded as a solid basis for the development of the 
national economy also because they tend to be quite unstable in terms of economic 
performance. The latter depends, to a great extant, on factors which are out of 
the control of host-countries. For instance, much of a zone’s success depends on 
the comparative development of wages in competing countries, on changes in 
technology, on trends in tariff and tax regulations in industrialized countries, 
etc. Generally, transnational corporations come to the free zone in search of 
quick profit. The zones are unable to tie up foreign capital in so far as the 
supply of cheap labour force in developing countries exceeds the demand.
As it is not the absolute low price of labour force that attracts 
foreign investors to FEPZs but a relative wage rate with respect to productivity 
of labour, such zones may exist even in countries with a comparatively not so 
cheap labour force. The phenomenon of the FEPZ has been evolving, demonstrating 
its potential for further development. More simple industries move over to new 
free zones leaving older ones clear for more sophisticated production. This does 
not necessarily have beneficial consequences for host-countries: the more
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sophisticated the production in the zone, the bigger the gap between the mainland 
and zone economies, the fewer "backward linkages" such production induces.
The exhaustion of the reserves of cheap labour does not threaten the 
future of FEPZs as long as comparatively cheap labour is always available. 
Nevertheless, with a cheap labour force being the main justification for their 
existence, there are strong reasons for considering the FEPZs a temporary 
phenomenon. Indeed (i) changes in production technology and the organization of 
production have made labour costs less important in many industries as wage costs 
have already fallen to a very limited weight in total production costs; (ii) 
foreign firms are tempted to choose highly automated methods of production in an 
attempt to minimize other costs associated with an abundant labour force (such as 
the risk of more frequent labour conflicts) (UN Document E/C. 10/1991/7). Under 
these conditions the desire to preserve the attractiveness of the FEPZs in the 
eyes of foreign investors tends to result in even greater pressure on zone 
employees.
The conclusions above inspire serious doubts as to the expediency of 
the large-scale implementation of free export processing zones in Russia. China 
is the only example of a large country which is progressively enlarging its 
"special" economic sector. Much of the success of Chinese coastal provinces in 
terms of attracting foreign capital must be attributed to a unique factor, 
namely, to the role played by Hong Kong capital and entrepreneurs, and the 
capitals of the Chinese diaspora outside China (The Economist, Survey "Asia’s 
Emerging Economies", November 16th 1991). Russia is in no position to enjoy the 
same advantage. As for problems generated by zone development, the Chinese 
experience appears to be more universal. One of these problems is the threat of
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political and social disintegration within the country which many in China take 
very seriously (see Far Eastern Economic Review, April 5, 1991, pp.21-29).
This does not mean, of course, that the idea of creating specialized 
zones is not valid at all under Russian conditions. Rather it requires further 
elaboration based on expertise, skill and imagination. As long as the conceptual 
framework of free economic zones in Russia remains as ambiguous as it has been of 
late, any serious expressions of interest on the part of foreign investors are 
unlikely. It is beyond the scope of this analysis to attempt a comprehensive 
projection of such a concept. However, it seems to be appropriate to put forward 
some considerations concerning this subject.
First of all, it is crucial to decide on the purpose of free zones in 
Russia. Leaving aside those groups for which the turmoil around the free zones is 
just a convenient ground for achieving certain political ends, there are people 
who believe the FEZ to be a tool for the profound social and economic 
reorganization of the society on the basis of market relations, the nuclei of a 
new efficient and modern economy. These expectations by far extend the true, 
rather limited, opportunities opened by the zones. If the FEZs can help to 
establish a new way of life in Russia it is only following their contribution to 
the solution of some particular economic problems. The most fruitful and 
practical approach would be to treat them for what they are, i.e., as specific 
instruments of foreign investment and trade regulations, and an element of 
regional policy. Seen thus, the zones lose much of their mystery and become 
manageable at a conceptual level. The practical outcome of this approach is that 
the efficiency of a zone would depend ultimately on two factors: (i) how well the 
concrete objective, justifying the establishment of the zone, is defined and (ii)
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how well the characteristics of the zone conform to the specifics of this 
objective.
In other words, it is necessary to move away from the creation of free 
economic zones in general, especially founded on a territorial principle, and to 
start to establish clearly specialized tailor-made zones: customs zones and free- 
trade zones in the place of transportation junctions; export-processing zones in 
industrial centres situated close to foreign borders or on international trade 
routes; technological parks in the vicinity of university centres, etc. The 
clarity of criteria would be a sort of guarantee that returns cover costs, and it 
would also allow the correction and improvement of the mechanism of the zone 
economy so that it better suites the interests of the host-country. The interests 
of investors would also be better seen after. Distinct specialization would allow 
the introduction of laws and incentives, distinguishing the FEZ opportunity from 
direct investment opportunities elsewhere in the host-country. Besides, such an 
approach would eliminate a situation in which the burden of identifying and 
pursuing investment projects is largely shifted to the party least equipped to do 
the job, namely, the prospective foreign investor. Last but not least, foreign 
investors are known to have more confidence in a zone if they feel that the 
development of their particular industry was a predominant consideration for the 
establishment of the zone. As a survey of 180 transnational corporations has 
shown (CTC Reporter, No.28, Autumn 1989), the respondents strongly preferred 
"single-purpose" to "multi-purpose" FEZs. "No zone can be all things to all 
investors", conclude the authors of the survey (p.32).
Free export promoting zones have the right to exist on equal terms with 
other zone types. There are no reasons to discriminate against them. On the other
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hand, it must be clear that there are no logical grounds either for expectations 
that the export of labour force can help improve the national competitive 
position whereas the export of crude oil and timber - in the past, the two basics 
of Soviet foreign trade - have failed to do so. Organizing export production for 
transnational corporations may be a good solution for some military enterprises 
undergoing conversion. They may be given a special status to function as world 
market factories, such as "maquiladoras" in Mexico. The creation of special 
"import" processing zones, however, appears to be potentially even more 
promising. This type of special zone was never seriously investigated in the 
Russian economic literature. They can be helpful in diminishing the burden of 
import generated money transfers on the balance of payments, but not only that. 
The production of the "import" zones may be expected to be sold more cheaply and 
be more adaptable to local market conditions than purely import products. 
Finally, "import" zones are certain to be more integrated into the national 
economy. Hence, they are more instrumental in contributing to the breaking down 
of monopolistic structures in the Russian market.
Lastly it is necessary ti< underline that, under present unstable 
conditions in the Russian economy, free economic zones demand the special 
attention of authorities as they can easily become centres of activities in 
contradiction to the national economic interests of Russia. There is no doubt 
that not only foreign producers will be eager to utilize the advantages resulting 
from the relevant extraterritoriality of the zones. Consequently, the zones may 
facilitate the flight of capital from the country (already the illegal assets of 
Russian firms and residents abroad are estimated at 20 billion dollars) and play 
the role of transit points for whole-sale black market trade. The current 
confusion about the status of the zones, loose and unclear regulations, the
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emergence of "accidental" zones in territories unfit for this purpose have meant 
that potential threats have been becoming a reality. A quite obvious but 
necessary conclusion follows from the above observations: the government should 
not "toy" with the FEZs; if they are not treated skillfully they will bring more 
losses than gains.

CONCLUSIONS
The attempt of the thesis has been to analyze the principles of the 
national policy towards foreign direct investment in a country undertaking a 
post-communist transition. Contemporary Russia has been chosen as the object for 
research.
The main argument advanced in the first part of the thesis has been 
that the choice of economic strategy in Russia is still expressly subordinated to 
political considerations and has continued to be ideologically biased. This has 
contributed to the atmosphere of intolerance towards some categories of views and 
recommendations, dealing with economic issues, while other categories tend to be 
accepted uncritically. As a result, not all the significant factors involved find 
adequate reflection in the decisions determining the economic policy. This leads 
to the absolutisation of some of economic postulates, which are often taken at 
their face value without sufficient reference to the specific conditions of the 
country.
The integration of the ex-Soviet economy in the world market appears to 
be one of such cases. As has been demonstrated in the thesis, the hasty and 
poorly prepared integration can have negative consequences for Russian industry 
because of the particular features that it has acquired over decades of planned 
management and not least because of the oligopolistic structure of the world 
market itself. The need in a certain transitional period is evident. More
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disputable, however, is whether the adaptation of Russian industry to a new 
environment should be entrusted to a market mechanism alone or the interference 
of the state is necessary.
The analysis undertaken in the thesis has provided arguments favouring 
the second approach. The "national competitiveness" concept has served as a 
theoretical framework. This concept demonstrates, first, that the competitiveness 
of a nation has become central for the development of its welfare; second, that 
the task of increasing the national competitiveness exceeds the scale of any, 
even very large, national firm more so as the very notion of the "national" firm 
has lost its precision. The role of the state can be expected to be particularly 
essential in countries seeking to eliminate the lag that separates them from the 
most developed members of the international community as one of the major lessons 
to be learned from the economic history of the 20th century is that only a mixed 
economy has the potential to concentrate resources in priority spheres crucial 
for the implementation of technological renovation and the achievement of an 
independent policy of development. The policy of relying on a government’s skill 
in mixing market mechanism and government planning, as the example of Japan and 
the ASEAN countries has demonstrated, is especially attractive when the private 
sector is still in the infant stage.
As foreign capital is to play a particularly important role in the 
opening up of the ex-Soviet economy, the research has been focused on foreign 
direct investment and relevant regulations. A distinction between two types of 
FDI, "enclave" and "integral", has been made. This has allowed to claim that the 
traditional set of incentives designed to attract foreign investment is not 
sufficient to secure a wide inclusion of the foreign owned/controlled sector in
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the national industrial-production complex of the host-country as well as its 
contribution to the growth of the value-adding capacity of the national economy. 
That is why it is possible to speak about a narrowly defined and widely defined 
capital entry management system. The latter affects the investment climate as a 
whole.
The investigation of the investment climate in post-communist Russia 
has been concentrated on political and policy risks. It has generally confirmed 
the acknowledged believe that the investment situation in the country is fairly 
unfavourable. Most attention, however, has been given to revealing the trends 
lying behind the dynamics of the investment climate. In particular, the duality 
of the government economy policy has been addressed. It has been found too 
indecisive and inconsistent to be defined either liberal or interventionist. As a 
result, the present policy leaves too much room for arbitrariness at the lower 
levels of power, while some important issues of the regional and structural 
policy fail to obtain the attention they deserve.
The consequences of such a situation have been demonstrated using the 
example of free economic zones in the country. Confusion about the status of the 
zones, loose and unclear regulations, the emergence of "accidental" zones in 
territories unfit for this purpose have meant that an important instrument for 
attracting foreign capital has been underemployed in some cases while in others 
the creation of the zones has even contributed to further destabilization of the 
already shaken Russian economy.
It emerges from the thesis that foreign capital entry regulations in 
contemporary Russia should be contemplated as a component of a national
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industrial policy. A relative (compared to the actual needs of the country) 
shortage of foreign investment in Russia, as well as in other CIS countries, can 
be overcome by channeling the available resources according to preselected 
objectives. This can be done most effectively on the basis of the principles of 
"new" market-friendly interventionism that provides for the subordination of 
government action to economic rationality.
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Tables
1991 GNP as Percentage of 1989-90 Average: Prognosis
Ranking Country Percent
1 Turkmenistan 80.5
2 Uzbekistan 78.7
3 Kazakhstan 76.6
4 Kyrgyzstan 69.7
5 Latvia 68.5
6 Russia 67.9
7 Azerbaijan 67.0
8 Estonia 66.1
9 Belarus 66.0
10 Ukrain 63.0
11 Lithuania 62.6
12 Moldova 62.0
13 Tajikistanz 60.0
14 Armenia 59.5
15 Georgia 58.2
Source: PlanEcon/ENI Conference on Economic Transition, Rome 17-19 N o vember 
1992.
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FLOWS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE 
FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS (1987-1990)
(Million Dollars)
Stock as Percent
1987 1988 1989 1990 of end-1990 Share
T OTAL 43.7 153.7 640.6 480.1 1318.2 100.0
Rus s i a 38.6 124.4 453.8 343.7 959.5 72.8
U k rain 0.0 5.2 18.7 27.6 51.5 3.9
Belarus 0.6 4.6 47.3 48.5 101.0 7.7
M o l d o v a 0.0 2.0 9.3 3.5 14.8 1.1
K a z a k h s t a n 0.0 0.9 2.3 5.9 9.1 0.7
K y r y g y z s t a n 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0
T a j i k i s t a n 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.0
T u r k m e n i s t a n 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.8 0.1
U z b e k i s t a n 3.3 1.8 13.3 13.0 31.4 2.4
A r m e n i a 0.0 1.0 7.3 5.5 13.8 1.0
A z e r b a i j a n 0.0 2.1 4.3 2.7 9.2 0.7
Geo r g i a 0.0 6.9 19.2 9.2 35.4 2.7
Est o n i a 1.0 3.7 41.1 2.3 48.0 3.6
L a t v i a 0.0 0.1 8.7 18.2 27.0 2.1
L i t h u a n i a 0.2 1.1 13.6 0.2 15.2 1.2
U n i d e n t i f i e d 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.0
Source: P l a n E c o n  d a t a b a s e  on joint ventures.
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FLOWS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
(Million Dollar)
Fr o m  Authorized Capital From Authorized
of All Registered Capital of
Joint Ventures* Operating Joint
Ventures Only**
Annual Totals
1987 89.40 43.73
1988 416.70 153.73
1989 1692.10 640.62
1990 953.60 480.14
1991 N A 234.96
Cumulative Totals
1987 506.10 43.73
1988 922.80 197.46
1989 2614.90 838.08
1990 3568.50 1318.22
1991 NA 1553.18
Russia Onlv 
Q u a r t e r l y  investment 
Q4/91 52.34
Ql/92 19.71
Q2/92 5.37
Cumulative
1991 1193.31
Ql/92 1213.02
Q2/92 1218.39
* A c c o r d i n g  to ECE Database of Soviet joint ventures. 
** As calcu l a t e d  using PlanEcon database.
Sources Plan E c o n  database on joint ventures, ECE database on joint ventures.
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NUMBER OF JOINT VENTURES IN THE FORMER 
USSR BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN 
(As of Janu a r y  1991)
All Coun t r i e s 100.0%
G e r m a n y 13.7%
U n i t e d  States 12.0%
Finl a n d 8.9%
Italy 6.3%
A u s t r i a 5.6%
Gr e a t  Brit a i n 5.5%
Franc* 3.4%
Switzerland* 3.8%
Canada* 2.6%
Japan* 1.6%
India* 1.5%
A u s t ralia* 1.5%
* Reg i s t r i e s  as of O c t o b e r  1990.
Source: EC E  d a t a b a s e  on joint ventures.






